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ABSTRACT 
This thesis considers the relationship between collision regulations and an automatic 
collision avoidance system (ACAS). 
Automation of ship operations is increasingly conunon. The automation of the 
collision avoidance task may have merit on grounds of reduced manual workload 
and the elimination of human error. Work to date by engineers and computer 
progranuners has focused on modelling the requirements of the current collision 
regulations. This thesis takes a new approach and indicates that legislative change is 
a necessary precursor to the implementation of a fully automatic collision avoidance 
system. 
A descriptive analysis has been used to consider the nature of the collision 
avoidance problem and the nature of rules as a solution. The importance of 
coordination between vessels is noted and three requirements for coordination are 
established. These are a mutual perception of: risk, the strategy to be applied, and 
the point of manoeuvre. The use of rules to achieve coordination are considered. 
The analysis indicates that the cunent collision regulations do not provide the 
means to coordinate vessels. 
A review of current and future technology that may be applied to the collision 
avoidance problem has been made. Several ACAS scenarios are contrived. The 
compatibility of the scenarios and the cunent collision regulations is considered. It 
is noted that both machine sensors and processors affect the ability to comply with 
the rules. 
The case is made for judicial recognition of a discrete rule-base for the sake of an 
ACAS. This leads to the prospect of quantified collision regulations for application 
by mariners. 
A novel rule-base to match a pm1icular ACAS scenario has been devised. The rules 
are simple and brief. They avoid inputs dependent on vision and visibility, and meet 
all the aforementioned coordination requirements. Their application by mariners to 
two-vesseL open sea, encounters was tested on a navigation simulator. The 
experimental testing of such a rule-base is unique. 
Mariners were given experience of applying the rule-base in certain circumstances 
and asked by questionnaire what their agreeable action would be. This was 
compared with their usual action. While the number of experiments was small, an 
indication was given of the impm1ant issues in applying a quantified rule-base. 
Aspects identified for fm1her study include the testing of rule•base elements in 
isolation, and the use of quantified rules in multi-ship and confined water 
encounters. 
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CAS 
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Automatic Radar Plotting Aid 
Collision Avoidance System 
COLREGS 72 International Regulations For Preventing Collisions At Sea, 1972. 
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Vessel Traffic Services 
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" ... if one could rely on accurate infonnation, navigation would be a simple science, 
where as the art and fascination of it lies in deducing correctly from uncertain clues" 
Francis Chichester, The Lonely Sea and the Sky 
!.I BACKGROUND 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The application of automation to ship operation is increasingly common. Arguments 
can be made for the replacement of manual labour by machine, on grounds of safety 
and economics. The argument for safety is supported by statistics that purpmt 
human error as having a part in the majority of marine accidents 1• 
Collisions between vessels at sea continue to occur despite considerable advances in 
navigation aids and several waves of legislation. l11e consequences of collision, loss 
of life and resource, and resultant pollution, have encouraged many parties to work 
towards a solution to ,the problem. Most recently work has focused on the partial or 
full automation of the collision avoidance operation. 
lliC work of computer programmers and engineers has considered the problem one of 
replacing man by machine within the existing legislative framework2·3.4·5·6 ·7 . Analysis 
described in this thesis will indicate that legislative change is a necessary precursor to 
the implementation of a li.JIIy automatic collision avoidance system. Two published 
papers by the author8·9 may be taken as a synopsis of the argument, and will be found 
in Appendix G. 
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1.2 AIM OF THE STUD¥ 
The aim of this study is to describe the role of regulations in collision avoidance, and 
show the relationship between regulations and an automatic collision avoidance 
system. A further objective is to describe preliminary studies into the acceptability, by 
human mariners, of quantification in a discrete rule-base. 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
1.3.1 Descriptive analysis 
A descriptive analytical method has been used to define some aspects of the nature 
of the collision avoidance problem. This has allowed rules in general, and the 
International Regulations for Preventing of Collisions at Sea, 197210 (COLREGS 
72) specifically, to be examined as to their role in collision avoidance. 
The collation and description of technology that may constitute a collision 
avoidance system, have allowed fmther analysis of the suitability of the COLREGS 
72. The requirements implied by the current regulations have been examined against 
the teclmological capability of various scenarios. The scenarios include present day 
manual operation; true artificial intelligence, and expe11 systems with a variety of 
supporting sensors. Having indicated that the COLREGS 72 are incompatible with 
the most likely automatic system, the thesis goes on to consider new rules. 
Criteria for the new rules are derived from definitions concerning the role of rules 
and the limits of a teclmological scenario that has been assumed. A discrete rule-
base has been constructed, drawing on the work of previous researchers where 
appropriate. 
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1.3.2 Simulation 
The human application of the discrete rule-base has been tested in the course of this 
research by running collision avoidance exercises with a navigation simulator and 
practising mariners. Navigation simulation is commonly used and widely accepted 
as providing useful results when tiyihg to recreate mariners' usual behaviour. In the 
experiments, mariners were asked to apply the new rules to the circumstances 
presented to them. A post exercise questionnaire was used to obtain details of the 
mariners' usual action at sea, and their acceptance of the new rules. 
The use of a post-exercise questionnaire to obtain manoeuvre data, rather than 
taking the actual actions during the simulation exerctse is not widely reported. 
When mariners' "usual" action at sea is compared with work by other researchers it 
shows a reasonable level of validity. The "new" action data is unique, as is the 
particular rule-base, and therefore cannot be compared. The level of usefulness and 
limitations of the data is discussed in the thesis. 
1.4 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis comprises eight chapters, including this introduction (chapter 1) and the 
conclusion (chapter 8). 
Chapter 2 considers the nature of the collision avoidance problem and solution. 
Important terms are defined and discussed. The use and role of rules as a solution is 
examined. The cunent regulations are critically analysed. The inputs to a collision 
avoidance system that are implied by the current regulations are noted. 
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Chapter 3 examines the available and developing technology that may be applied to 
the collision avoidance problem. Technology is considered under the headings. of 
the human machine; machine sensors; machine processors, and general technology. 
The technology that may comprise an automatic collision avoidance system is 
considered. 
Chapter 4 exammes the relationship between data input and processmg, and 
collision regulations. The requirements of the COLREGS 72 (as considered m 
chapter 2) are maiTied with the teclmology available in several scenanos (as 
described in chapter 3). This analysis indicates the incompatibility of the 
COLREGS 72 with various teclmological scenarios, including present manual 
operation and automatic operation with expert systems. 
Chapter 5. The development of regulations that may be compatible with both 
manual and automatic operations is described. A technological scenario is assumed 
and rule criteria derived. Relevant work by other researchers is considered. 
Chapter 6 deals with the experimental testing of the collision avoidance RULE-
SETS. The navigation simulator: human sample; individual exercises, and 
questionnaire procedure are described. 
Chapter 7 describes the experimental results and analysis. The validity of the results 
is discussed, before making an analysis in general and detail. 
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CHAPTER2 
A DISCUSSION OF THE NATURE OF THE COLLISION AVOIDANCE 
PROBLEM AND S(i)LUTION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Defming a problem is usually the key to fmding a successful solution. Both themists 
and pragmatists have desctibed the collision avoidance problem with methods ranging 
from mathematics to philosophy. No definitive desctiption appears to have been 
forthcoming, and if indeed it had, perhaps there would no longer be a problem. 
rhe aim of this chapter is to develop principles from which the problem can be 
analysed. The place, nature and limitations of rules as a solution will be discussed. 
Specific reference to the COLREGS 72 will include the data inputs required, and the 
responsibility implied by the current regulations, The COLREGS 72 will be critically 
analysed regarding .their role in preventing collisions. 
2.2 RISK OF COLLISION 
2.2.1 Collision occurs when two (or more) vessels hy to occupy the same space at the 
same time. 
2.2.2 Collision avoidance is the practice of action that prevents vessels being in the 
same place at the same time. llo take reasoned action before a collision occurs it is 
necessary to predict that the vessels will be in collision. 
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2.2.3 Prediction and Risk of collision 
TI1e "prediction of collision" is not satisfactory in practice to describe the state when 
action is necessary to avoid collision, for reasons explained below. The term "risk of 
collision" encompasses the state "prediction of collision" and describes the 
circumstances when action to avoid collision is necessaty. 
2.2.3.1 Interaction 
TI1e usual foundation for any prediction comes from extrapolating past and existing 
observations. In collision avoidance the extrapolation of data may indicate that vessels 
are passing clear. However, if the passing distance is relatively small, the vessels may be 
drawn into collision at the last moment by a hydrodynamic effect known as interaction. 
The effect of interaction does not become apparent until the vessels are very close. It is 
necessary therefore to pass at a distance at which interaction will not have a significant 
effect. TI1e prediction process must indicate a pruticular passing distance rather than 
simply collision or not. 
Due to the effect of interaction it is necessary for vessels to pass with a distance 
between them if tisk of collision is not to exist. Two other factors affect the distance at 
which vessels must pass when considering risk of collision. 
2.2.3.2 Accuracy 
TI1e data that is used, and the prediction process, will have limits of accuracy. It is 
necessary to allow a margin to compensate for the possible inaccuracy of the prediction. 
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2.2.3.3 Uncertainty 
As previously stated, prediction involves the extrapolation of past observations. The 
future, it may be argued, will be a derivative of the past. This notion allows life to be 
lived with some order and avoids the need to consider the infinite number of chaotic 
scenarios that might exist. In reality the future can turn more to the chaotic end of the 
scale rather than the orderly. The uncertainty of the future requires a particular .passing 
distance to be left between vessels, so that if an unpredicted and adverse tum of events 
took place, a reasonable chance of avoiding collision by emergency action would exist. 
2.2.4 Acceptable ~isk 
When quantifYing tisk of collision it is necessary to quantifY the interaction effect, the 
prediction accuracy, and the uncertainty. The first two may be quantified. Uncertainty 
by its nature is impossible to quantifY, 
If uncertainty were to be quantified then it would first be necessary to quantifY what is 
considered a "reasonable chance" of avoiding collision. That the phrase "reasonable 
chance," is used, indicates that the elimination of risk is not required, and that there is an 
acceptable level of risk. 
It could be argued that while two vessels exist on the surface of the Earth, tisk of 
collision is greater than zero. It would help minimise the risk if one vessel stayed in p01i 
while the other was at sea. lt is necessary to weigh the consequences of collision with 
the need for vessels to travel with their cargoes from one point to another. An acceptable 
commercial risk and hence passing distance. is delivered by society's values, by various 
routes. 
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Statistically, risk of collision increases with the proximity of land and traffic density. 
This would imply a need for greater passing distances. However in practice, in these 
areas acceptable passing distances become less; the risk of collision is accepted as being 
higher. 
Goodwin~s work on domains 1 suggested that the mruiner's concept of acceptable 1isk 
depended on a variety offactors. It also indicated that matiners are sometimes forced to 
accept passing distances which ru·e less than they would like. A general trend showed 
that larger vessels tried to achieve larger passing distances. Tllis concurs with the notion 
that with a larger turning circle or stopping distance, the larger vessel will need more 
room in an emergency. Against the trend, the largest vessels achieved smaller passing 
distances, perhaps suggesting a upper linlit to what could be achieved, or that underlying 
conditions forced the largest vessels to accept passing distances created by more 
manoeuvrable vessels. 
2.3 ACTION TO A VOID COLLISION 
Having determined that there is a need for action to avoid collision (risk of collision 
exists), it is necessa1y to fmd approp1iate action. 
2.3.1 Sight-line Rotation 
Calvert2 notes that an essential collision avoidance p1inciple is to maintain or establish 
sight~ line rotation. Sight-line rotation is dependent on vessel separation and both vessels' 
course and speed. To ensure that net sight-line rotation occurs, both vessels' actions 
must be considered. 
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2.3.2 Sight-line rotation by force 
Sight-line rotation may be achieved by force if one vessel is faster or more 
manoeuvrable than the other. l11e other vessel could try to have a collision but would be 
Wiable to force the issue, Kemp3 has shown that the faster vessel can guarantee collision 
avoidance by her manoeuvre alone. As the vessels' speeds become closer in value the 
faster would need to put the other on the beam or abaft the beam to be sure of avoiding 
collision. As a general practice this approach would be inefficient for progress along a 
track and is unsuitable for commercial shipping. l11e other case, a more manoeuvrable 
vessel, can be best imagined by considering a Greenpeace dory under the bows of a 
large ship. 'The dmy does not have to be faster than the ship, but can avoid collision by a 
sudden alteration of course away from the ship's track. The ship is Wiable to match the 
rate of change of track and so sight-line rotation is forced. This case is again Wlsuitable 
for general commercial practice. 
2.3.3 Complementary Action Strategies 
Sight-line rotation may be anti-clockwise or clockwise (positive or negative rotation 
respectively), A net rotation through complementary action may be achieved by various 
strategies. In a pmticular encounter: 
[Strategy (i)] both vessels may adopt a convention of positive rotation and 
manoeuvre accordingly; 
[Strategy (ii)] both vessels may adopt a convention of negative rotation and 
manoeuvre accordingly; 
[Strategy (iii)] one vessel will stand-on while the other is responsible for making 
the manoeuvre and choosing the sight-line rotation sense. 
Clearly some form of agreement is necessruy to coordinate vessels in this way. 
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2.3.3.1 Complementary action through natural principles? 
Principles of disengagement that may be used in the absence of fonnal rules have been 
suggested by Kemp4 from his experimental evidence. He suggests that three main 
principles would apply: 
"(a) Manoeuvres would be made to pass astern of the vessel being 
avoided. 
(b) Manoeuvres would tend to m crease whatever nuss distance ts 
originally estimated. 
(c) There would be a reluctance to reduce speed." 
None of these principles involves any fonn of coordination between the vessels. Only 
one vessel can pass astern of the other. Passing astern can be in conflict with increasing 
the existing closest point of approach ( cpa ). 
If both vessels made a manoeuvre independently of the other, then the result would be 
non-complementary for 50% of the encounters. If a vessel can observe tlte action of the 
other it is possible for her to make her manoeuvre complementary with that ofthe vessel 
that manoeuvres first. However, it is not always possible for a vessel to observe the 
actions of the otlter, and it is not satisfactory for a vessel to be waiting indefinitely for 
the other to "show her colours". When the vessels do manoeuvre simultaneously, a 
cancelling of the effect of the individual manoeuvres may occur. 
lt is also cm*ctured that without a fmm of coordination, the wtcertainty in risk of 
collision may increase, commensurately increasing the accepted safe. passing distance. 
This will mean that to move from a "risk" situation to "non-risk" situation, larger 
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alterations of course and speed are required, which will result in a decrease in the 
efficiency of shipping. 
2.4 IMPLEMENTING COMPLEMENTARY ACTION STRATEGY 
On examination, the first two complementary action strategies are similar in nature but 
opposite in sense. The third is different in nature to the frrst two, and variable in sense. 
2.4.1 Strategies (i) or (ii) may be termed dual responsibility, as both vessels are 
required to manoeuvre. At frrst sight they appear a very simple and effective strategy for 
achieving complementary action. The action required under these strategies was 
considered by Calvert5·6 and fw1her quantified by Hollingdale7. 
It was shown by Calve1t, that for a pruticular sight-line rotation, the sense of course 
alteration or speed alteration was dependent on the target's relative bearing. For positive 
rotation it was shown that with a target forward of the berun an alteration of course to 
starboard was required. Targets aft of the beam necessitated a port alteration for 
complementary action. The appropriate speed alterations were an increase if the target 
was to port and decrease if the target was to starboard. Negative rotation manoeuvres 
are fmmd by reversing the sense of positive rotation manoeuvres. Positive sight-line 
rotation is the general theme that runs through the cunent COLREGS. 1l1e following 
analysis will describe the strategies in positive rotation teims. 
An apparent advantage of strategies (i) and (ii) is that having agreed which strategy to 
operate under, the only information required to apply the strategy is target relative 
bearing. Another apparent advantage is that it is not necessary to distinguish between 
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vessels, as both are operating under the same rule. Unfortunately, in practice there are 
some limitations to this strategy. 
Ahead 
RELATIONSIHP BETWEEN BEARING OF THREAT AND THE 
MANOEUVRE WIDCH~ WHEN EXECUTED BY OWN CRAFT, 
MAKES THE LARGEST CONTRIBUTION TO THE MISS 
DISTANCE WITHOUT INFRINGING THE MANOEUVRING 
AREA OF TBE OTHER CRAFT. 
Numbers on the inner circle are tums which produce the maximum 
rate of rotation of the sight-line in the anti-clockwise sense. The 
speed changes shown also produce rotation in this sense. If both 
craft make the maximum turns~ they will be on opposite courses at 
right angles to the original sight-line. Note that when own craft is 
not permitted to turn, the turn permitted to the other craft is between 
90° and 180°, depending on its aspect 
Figure 2.1 
Calvert's analysis 
Source: CAL VERT, Reference S. 
2.4.1.1 Target on the port beam 
Inspection of Calvett's diagrams (Figure 2. 1) indicates that when a target is on the port 
beam, a positive contribution (towards anti-clockwise rotation) cannot be made by 
32 
course alteration. Hollingdale's quantitative analysis (Figure 2.2) shows that for a target 
on or near the port beam, course alteration can provide no, or only a small, positive 
contribution. An increase in speed appears to be the logical action, however in practice, 
most merchant vessels have only a small reserve of speed, and the increase may take 
considerable time to be realised. 
Position around 
circle indicates 
direction of threat 
Own ship 
Turn. to port 
Turning rules to produce a miss dismnce of at least half the 
range at which course is altered, if both ships manoeuvre. 
Fig.2.2 
Hollingdale's analysis 
Source: Hollingdale, Reference 7. 
2.4.1.2 Initial negative cpa 
A negative cpa is one associated with negative (clockwise) sight-line rotation. lf in the 
first instance risk of collision exists with a negative cpa, that cpa must be overcome by 
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positive action before a positive cpa is built up. If one vessel can only make a small 
positive contribution, due to having the target on the port beam, or due to having a low 
speed, or being restricted in her ability to make large course alterations, then action by 
that vessel alone may not be sufficient to overcome the existing negative cpa. That 
vessel may have to rely on the target taking action, or take negative, non-complementary 
action herself to increase the cpa. 
If a vessel cannot take the approptiate action as per the strategy, and the cooperation of 
the target cannot be assured, then a dilemma will exist. The choice is to stand-on until 
the target manoeuvres or to make a non"complementary manoeuvre oneself. Ideally the 
target will manoeuvre in good time to clarify the situation. However it is possible for the 
target to not follow the strategy for various reasons. It is therefore necessary for own 
ship to know when to manoeuvre as escape action in a non-complementary way. This 
situation has parallels with strategy (iii). 
2.4.2 Strategy (iii) achieves complementary action by requiring one vessel to stand-on 
holding course and speed, while the other is responsible for choosing the sense of 
rotation and making a manoeuvre. To operate this strategy it is necessary to be able to 
distinguish the stand-on vessel from the give-way vessel. Methods of doing so are 
considered later. 
Deferring the method of distinction between the vessels, the advantages of one vessel 
choosing the sight-line rotation may be shown. Having the choice of rotation means that 
the most convenient manoeuvre sense may be had. If as with strategies (i) and (ii), one 
direction is inappropriate. then the other, usually increasing the existing cpa or avoiding 
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crossing ahead, may be used. This strategy allows one vessel to avoid being deviated 
from her track while the other may choose the most approp1iate deviation in the 
circumstances. 
ln practice the stand-on vessel may not be as "plivileged" as she fust appears. lf the 
give-way vessel does not appear to manoeuvre then the stand-on vessel will have to take 
some escape action. The stand-on vessel cannot make her action complementary with 
that which the give-way vessel may subsequently take, because there is no convention 
for sight-line rotation. 
From the description of the three strategies it is clear that they have diffeling strengths 
and weaknesses, It is important to note that no strategy provides a general 
complementary solution. When the target appears to be a rogue, anti-strategy escape 
action may be necessary. 
2.4.3 Escape action 
Because rogue behaviour does exist anti-strategy action will be necessary. This action 
though not desirable. is justifiable in the pursuit of the overall aim of avoiding collision. 
To minimise anti-strategy action due to apparent rogue behaviour, it is necessary to 
consider the nature of "rogue" vessels. 
2.4.4 The nature of the rogue 
Rogue behaviour might be considered that which does not implement the 
complementary action strategy. It stems from different sources. Seven "types" of rogues 
have been categorised. and are described below. 
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2.4.4.1 Target makes a non-Iisk assessment 
If the target considers that risk of collision does not exist it will not make a collision 
avoidance manoeuvre. As own vessel does consider "risk" to exist the target appears as 
a rogue. This type of rogue will appear to be standing on. To avoid tllis rogue type a 
mutual perception of risk is necessal)'. 
2.4.4.2 Target is yetto manoeuvre 
As the complemental)' action strategy itself is not concerned with when manoeuvres are 
to be made, all vessels wllich are required to manoeuvre, appear to be rogues until they 
do so. Following tllis analysis, anti-strategy escape action appears to be justifiable at any 
time before tl1e target manoeuvres. Tllis approach throws the whole idea coordination 
away. lt appears necessary to make clear, as well as what strategy is being used, the 
point by wllich manoeuvres are expected to be made, wllich will in turn create a basis 
for when escape action is acceptable. lllis rogue type appears to be standing on. For 
coordination a mutual perception of manoeuvre point is necessary. 
2.4.4.3 Non-mutual assessment ofthe strategy requirement 
An inadequacy in the accuracy or of the type of data wllich is available may cause 
different strategies to be applied by each vessel. l11is may, depending on exactly what 
the strategy requirement is, cause the target to appear as a rogue. lllis type of rogue may 
appear to be standing on, giving way, or manoeuvring anti-stmtegy depending on the 
perceived strategy requirement. To avoid tllis type of rogue the strategy (and associated 
mles)must be robust enough to survive likely misperceptions. 
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2.4.4.4 Target cannot manoeuvre as per the strategy requirement 
As described above (2.4.1) it may not be possible for a strategy (i) manoeuvre to be 
implemented. An obstruction may exist in the direction in which a manoeuvre is 
required, or given a small initial negative cpa, one vessel may not be able to achieve 
significant positive rotation without the cooperation of the other being assured. In these 
cases the target may appear to be standing on, and later may make an anti-strategy 
manoeuvre. 
A strategy (iii) stand-on vessel, may not be able to hold her comse and speed, if an 
alteration for navigational purposes or collision avoidance with a third vessel is 
necessary. lltis rogue type will appear to be giving way. 
2.4.4.5 Non-detection of own vessel 
If the target has not detected own vessel then it will not make any collision avoidance 
manoeuvre. Titis type of rogue will appear to be standing on. 
2.4.4.6 Ignorance of the strategy requirements 
If the watch keeper on the target vessel is ignorant of the strategy requirements then the 
vessel may appear to be a rogue. ll1is type of rogue may stand-on, give-way, or 
manoeuvre anti-strategy depending on the particular strategy requirements. 
2.4.4.7 Ignoring the strategy requirements 
If the watchkeeper on the target vessel is deliberately ignoring the strategy requirements 
then the vessel will appear as a rogue. This type of rogue will stand-on, give-way, or 
manoeuvre anti-strategy depending on the particular strategy requirements. 
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2.4.5Coordination requirements 
The description of rogue types indicates that to apply a complementary action strategy, 
it is necessary for the vessels to have a mutual perception of three featmes. TI1e featmes 
are risk of collision, the strategy to be applied, and when manoeuvres are to be made. 
2.4.6 Collision avoidance as a game of coordination 
Cannell8 has considered collision avoidance as a "game" of coordination. He states that 
the solution of a coordination problem may be found in three ways: 
" (i) Agreement, specific agreement in an individual case. 
(ii) Tacit agreement in a series of similar situations. 
(iii~ By the obvious salience of a particular solution." 
2.4.6.1 Salience 
If an encounter has a particularly salient feature which both parties might reasonably be 
expected to recognise, then this feature may enable coordination. Experiments by 
Kemp9 showed that a head-on encounter with a clear initial miss distance held no 
solution problems for naive (without seafa1ing expe1ience) subjects. All subjects altered 
cow-se to increase the existing cpa. However, when the initial cpa was zero the naive 
subjects could not fmd a coordinated solution. It is clear from this that a salient solution 
can only be fow1d when one exists. 
In practice the salience of a solution is open to misperception by both parties, leading to 
different, conflicting, w1coordinated solutions being found. lllis is evidenced by a 
proposal by Corbet10 for a new head-on mle. TI1e mle hopes to use salience as the 
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solution to encounters. However, recognising the possibility for misperception and 
hence uncoordinated manoeuvres, the second stage rule is necessary. 
Corbet's proposal requires that when vessels are meeting "end-on or nearly end-on" they 
alter course to increase the existing cpa. A red to red encounter requires vessels to alter 
to starboard, while a green to green encounter requires vessels to alter to pmt. If 
however this action results in one vessel alte1ing to port and the other to starboard, then 
as per the spirit of the existing crossing rule, the vessel with the other on her starboard 
side shall either alter back to starboard, or complete a round turn to port, to effect a red 
to red passing. 
Salience does not provide a general solution to the collision avoidance coordination 
problem for two reasons. One, salient solutions are not available in all cases, and two, 
the quality and type of infmmation which is available under operational conditions is 
not adequate to prevent misperceptions of a supposed salient feature. 
2.4.6.2 Specific agreement in an individual case 
Specific agreement may be reached on how to coordinate action m an individual 
encounter. A communications channel is required between the two vessels, and/or a 
third pa1ty. Through the communication channel mutual perception of the encounter can 
be achieved allowing coordination to ensue. This type of coordination has the 
advantages of circumventing misperceptions due to inaccurate data and processing, and 
decreasing the uncertainty in Iisk of collision. 
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Specific agreement includes the "external overall control of traffic" from Kemp's 
classification of collision avoidance systems11 , and Cm·bet's active\directive branch of 
Marine Traffic Control12. It also includes a system where vessels are able to 
communicate directly with each other. The sound signals as per the current COLREGS 
for agreeing an appropriate ove1taking manoeuvre are an example of such a system. ll1e 
use of ship-to-ship vhf RT communication enables specific agreement. The future 
possibility of the mandatory caniage of automatic cooperative communications systems 
would enhance the opportunity to achieve coordination in tltis way. 
The cunent technical and adrninisterial situation does not provide a communication 
channel robust enough for specific agreement to be a present day general solution. It 
may play a greater role in the future, as the undoubted potential is recognised. 
2.4.6.3 Tacit agreement 
Tacit agreement requires a previously established convention, i.e. formal rules. Tacit 
agreement needs no on-line communication channel; fmmal rules provide the 
"communication" necessary for coordination in the general case. In effect, before 
vessels leave pmt, they have an agreement on how to coordinate action in case of 
collision 1isk. The communication element takes place before leaving port, and at sea 
the agreement is tacit. 
Fmmal rules do however suffer from the potential 1nisperception of the situation, and 
they may be unsuccessful if applied to extraordinary circumstances. 
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Given the general inadequacy of salience and the lack of a robust communications 
channel for specific agreement, tacit agreement through formal rules has been deemed 
as part of the collision avoidance solution. This thesis is concerned with rules as a 
solution. 
2.5 THE NATURE OF RULES 
2.5.1 Rules to meet the coordination requirements 
Formal rules may be used to promote coordination between vessels in order to achieve 
complementaty action. ll!ere are tlu·ee requirements for coordination (See 2.4.2) with 
which the rules may concern themselves. These are establishing a mutual perception of: 
risk of collision; the strategy to be applied; and when manoeuvres are to be made. 
2.5.1.1 A mutual perception of risk of collision 
It may be pettinent to consider why vessels may not have a mutual perception of tisk of 
collision. Of the three factors which make up risk of collision, the irtteraction effect is 
mutual between the vessels and so should have no bearirtg. The accuracy of the 
prediction method will be individual to that used aboard each vessel. Risk assessment by 
visual obsetvation of target bearirtg may have a different result and potential accuracy to 
manual plotting of radru· returns, or the continuous automatic plotting catried out by 
automatic radar plotting aids (ARPA). Non-mutual perceptions may occur due to the 
accuracy factor. 
ll!e uncertainty factor may also cause non-mutual perception of risk of collision. 
Uncet1ainty of the fi.tture requires a sufficient passing distance to be left irt order that a 
reasonable chance exists of avoiding collision by emergency action. 1l1e passing 
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distance required by a larger less manoeuvrable vessel will be greater than that of a 
smaller more handy vessel. Goodwin's observations12 indicate that this fact is to a large 
extent mirrored in practice. 
1l1e concept of safety, or what is an appropriate safe passmg distance, may be 
considered as a topic for metaphysical debate. In the absence of specific instruction the 
watchkeeping matiner must make a judgement. 1l1e judgement will be a product of the 
mariner's expe1ience. The experience may include his formal training in college and the 
exan1ples of his contemporalies in practice. The experience of individual mariners will 
not be common throughout the watchkeeping population. 1l1e effect of an experience is 
likely to be individual for individual mminers. A differing concept of safety is inevitable 
throughout a population of human mariners. lllis must create the possibility of non-
mutual perception of risk of collision. 
There is clearly a spread of conceptions of Iisk of collision across the population of 
mariners and the circumstances of the case. l11e role of a mle here would be to change 
the spread of values to a particular value. Through uniform training a particular 
conception might be achieved across the human population. TI1e range of values across 
different circumstances appear to be an inevitable feature of the nature of shipping. A 
multi-vessel encounter in confined waters may make a pmticular passing distance 
impossible to achieve. ll1e value of 1isk of collision which is acceptable in this case, 
may be far too small to be acceptable for a two-vessel encounter in open water where 
achievable passing distances may be great. 
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A fixed value for risk of collision emphasises the relationship between vessel speed and 
what can be achieved. A faster vessel will achieve a particular cpa with greater ease than 
a slower vessel. The slower vessel will have to begin her manoeuvre earlier or make the 
manoeuvre greater in scale. If due to the strategy to be applied it is necessary for the 
vessel to overcome an initial cpa before building a new cpa, she may fmd herself as a 
rogue type(2.4.4.4). If there were no fixed 1isk value she could initially stand-on, 
accepting the passing distance and waiting to see if the target makes a manoeuvre, 
which she can then complement. 
l11e experimental work in this thesis includes a preliminary investigation of the use of a 
fixed risk of collision value for two vessel encounters in open waters. 
2.5.1.2 A mutual perception of the strategy to be applied 
Unless vessels have a mutual perception of the strategy to be applied it appears pointless 
having a strategy at all. If in all cases strategy (i) is to be applied then there should 
always be a mutual perception, both vessels always being required to contribute towards 
anti-clockwise sight-line rotation. If strategy (iii) is always to be applied then the rules 
may be used to allocate the give-way and stand-on responsibilities. Kemp's 
classification 14 of collision avoidance systems divides tllis strategy into two rule types, 
Hierarcllical and GeometJical. 
Hierarcllical rules differentiate between the vessels by specific characteristics of the 
vessels. The specific characteristics must be readily and mutually identifiable. Unless a 
continuous spectnun of identifiable characteristics is available then hierarchical rules 
can only be supplementary to more general rules. 
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Geometrical rules use relative beating as a frame of reference by which to distinguish 
between vessels. By using target relative bearing and target heading, vessels may be 
mutually distinguished and awarded differing responsibilities, However, when vessels 
are meeting on reciprocal courses, they cannot be distinguished in this way. 
If the strategies are to be combined in some way then the rules must distinguish between 
encounters with different strategy requirements. 
2.5 .1.3 A mutual perception of when manoeuvres are to be made 
Previous research 15 indicates that without fmmal rules, the point at which a manoeuvre 
is made will vary tluoughout a population of mariners. If this behaviour manifests itself 
in a non-mutual perception of when a manoeuvre is to be made, then rogue behaviour 
will be exhibited(though not intended), which may force anti-strategy action. Rules 
might be used to indicate when manoeuvres should be made. Tilis in turn may defme 
when it is acceptable to treat the target as a rogue 
2.5.2 Other requirements of rules 
2.5.2.1 Minimise rogue behaviour 
Rogue behaviour undermines the operation of rules. It is therefore impmtant for rules to 
be such that they minimise rogue behaviour. TI1e rogue which ignores the strategy 
requirements(2.4.4.7) may be so uncomfortable with the action prescribed by the rule 
that they feel they must rebel. If the action prescribed leads to an unsafe situation then 
the rebellion may be justified. If the action presc1ibed is safe, and is part of the logical 
coordination of vessels, then the rebellion may lead to a break down of the overall rule 
strategy. 
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Kemp16 suggested that rules should require action which is as close to that if there were 
no fonnal rules. Mariners would be most likely to follow rules demanding action of this 
sort, and rogue behaviour would therefore be minimised. On the other hand Schauer17 
notes that a rule's role may be to tum natural behaviour to nmmal behaviour. If natural 
·behaviour involves a wide spectrum of action, then creating a nonn by rule enforcement 
will entail considerable changes to what individual mminers would naturally do. l11ere 
is a compromise to be had between achieving a nmmal behaviour, and creating a rule 
which will be followed. 
2.5.2.2 Robustness over likely misperceptions 
The need to have a mutual perception of various features in an encounter has been 
discussed above. Despite the need; and rules devised to emphasise the need, 
misperceptions can occur due to the inherent limitations of data and processmg 
accuracy. Because misperceptions will occur it is desirable to have rules which are 
"robust". By this it is meant that if a pmticular feature is misperceived then the resulting 
behaviour will have a minimal effect on the overall application of the strategy. 
2.6 THE LIMITATIONS OF RULES 
1.6.1 Two vessel strategy 
So far, when discussing the ways in which the three complementary action strategies 
may be implemented, encounters between two vessels only have been considered. It is 
clear that the addition of a third vessel in risk of collision can cause any simplicity in 
either of the strategies to collapse. A vessel could be obliged to alter to starboard for one 
vessel atld to port for the other. A vessel could be obliged to stand-on for a vessel, while 
give-way to another. 
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2.6.2 Confined waters 
The discussion of strategies has also assmned that there is open water all around. In 
some circmnstances this is the reality. In seeking port however, vessels must travel in 
the vicinity of land, shoal water, floating navigational aids and other shipping in general. 
This reality can create a problem in implementing strategy (i) or (iii). A requirement to 
turn in a particular direction may not be possible due to the obstruction, A stand-on 
vessel may need to manoeuvre to avoid the obstruction. 
2.6.3 Circumstances of the case 
it is clear that the circumstances in a collision avoidance scenario extend beyond a 
single vessel or a vessel creating risk of collision. It may be argued that in the general 
case the circmnstantial variables are infmite. l11e possibility of creating rules which 
account for all circmnstantial variables can only be considered alongside the concept of 
a supreme being. Even given such mles not even the fastest computer, let alone mere 
mortal man, could begin to apply them. To apply them on-line at sea requires stepping 
from the improbable, to the impracticable, to the impossible. 
l11e mles which mmtal men may conceive must be specific in nature, The inevitable 
general application of mles means that whether following a mle produces a useful 
outcome depends on the circumstances of the case. Rules of increasing complexity may 
be w1itten ttying to encompass the circmnstantial variables. At some point the ability of 
the operator to apply the mles as prescribed will fail to be adequate, A compromise 
between circmnstance encompassing complexity, and operational application ability, 
must be made. 
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2.7 THE INU:RNATIONAL REGULATIONS FQR PREVENTING 
COLLISIONS AT SEA, 1972 
2.7.1 Development 
A British Royal Commission of 1831 proposed that steamers navigating in rivers should 
keep to the starboard side, hence creating a port to port passing18 This principle was 
developed into mles of increasing complexity. Annex B of the International Conference 
on the Safety of Life at Sea 1948 was entitled "Regulations for Preventing Collision at 
Sea". These regulations-came into force in 1954. 
By this time, the collision regulations entailed vanous concepts and procedures. 
Responsibility for action was detennined by encounter types, which were described in 
tenns of encounter geometry and vessel classification. Special light, shape and sound 
signals were used to help determine the type of encounter. Vessels were usually 
assigned roles as the give-way or stand-on party. 
TI1e post war use of marine radar emphasised the question "Did the steering and sailing 
tules apply when vessels were not in sight of one another?" TI1e 1960 SOLAS 
convention Annex B made it clear that different rules applied depending on whether or 
not vessels were in sight. 
TI1e improper and inappropriate use of radar had led to several well publicised "radar 
assisted collisions" as they were called. TI1e 1960 rules hied to address the need for 
radar to achieve its potential. An annex conceming the use of radar infmmation as an 
aid to avoiding collision was attached to the rules. An implied reference to radar and 
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radar plotting is found in Rule l6c 19. By the 1972 conference, radar was included in the 
body of the rules, and there was an implied reference to ARP A 
2. 7.2 The requirements of the current collision regulations 
lihe cunent regulations entail an amalgam of strategies (i) and (iii). When vessels are 
"not in sight" of one another strategy (i) is generally promoted (exceptions are 
considered in 2.7.4.2). When vessels are "in sight" then strategy (iii) is used with one 
exception. When two power d1iven vessels(equal hjerarchy) are meeting on reciprocal 
or nearly reciprocal courses, Lhen strategy (i) applies. The mixing of the two strategies 
and the use of the give-way stand-on concept of strategy (iii) leads to the regulations 
requiring a variety of data inputs. 
2.7.2.1 Target vessel being in or not in sight 
Having detected a target it is necessary to decide whether the target is in sight or not, the 
rules being different for the two cases. If the target is in sight, responsibility is divided 
according to geometiy and vessel classification. If the target is not in sight, 
responsibility for action is given to each vessel, and in most cases strategy (i) is applied. 
Section 11 of the steeling and sailing mles (Rule 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18) apply to 
"vessels within sight of one another". Section Ill (Rule 19) refers to the "Conduct of 
vessels in restricted visibility". Rule 19(a) states "Tilis Rule applies to vessels not in 
sight of one another when navigating in or near an area ofrestticted visibility". 
Rule 3(k) states that "Vessels shall be deemed to be in sight of one another only when 
one can be observed visually from the other". 
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Rule 3(1) states that "The tenn "restricted visibility" means any condition in which 
visibility is restricted by fog, mist, falling snow, heavy rainstonns, sandstonns or any 
other similar causes". 
In order to apply the rules of Section Il or Sectioniii COJTectly, it is necessary to have as 
inputs one, the existence or lack of visual detection of a target, and two, the existence or 
lack of visibility restricting phenomena. 
2. 7.2.2 Target in sight 
If the target is in sight, and 1isk of collision is deemed to exist, responsibility for action 
must be found. To do tlus it is necessary to know the target relative bearing, target 
aspect, and target type and condition compared to own vessel type and condition. 
Responsibility by geometJy 
Tirree encounter types exist according to geometry: 
Overtaking, Rule 13; 
Head on, Rule 14; 
Crossing, Rule 15. 
Tius results in five possible scenmios for own vessel: 
being ove1taken by target; 
target crossing from pmt: 
ove1taking the target: 
target crossing from starboard; 
head on. 
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The first two scenarios require own ship to stand"on. The third and fourth require own 
ship to give-way, while the fifth possibility splits the responsibility between the two 
vessels, the manoeuvre specified as an alteration to starboard. 
In order to differentiate between the five scenruios it is generally, necessary to know the 
relative bearing and the aspect presented by the target. In the first instance, relative 
bearing divides the situation into four as shown in Figure 2.3. U the target is in section 
one, own is being.overtaken by the target, and no reference to tru·get aspect is necessary. 
If the target is in section two, tlu·ee or four, it is necessary to know target aspect in order 
to distinguish between the remaining four scenarios. 
N.B. Target aspect is a product of target relative bearing and target heading. 
Responsibilitv by classification 
If by geometry, the encounter is not an overtaking scenario tl1en, it is necessary to refer 
to Rule 18, Responsibilities between vessels. This rule sets up a crude pecking order 
between broad classes of vessels. For exrunple Rule 18 (a): 
A power-dtiven vessel unde1way shall keep out of the way of: 
(i) a vessel not under command; 
(ii) a vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre; 
(iii) a vessel engaged in fishing; 
(iv) a sailing vessel. 
The rule goes on, requiiing a sailing vessel to keep out of the way of numbers (i), (ii) 
ru1d (iii); and a vessel engaged in fishing to keep out of the way of the first two. If both 
vessels are power dtiven then the geometrical rules complete the division of 
responsibility. An encounter between two sailing vessels is dealt with specially by Rule 
50 
2 
4 
Target Target . 
·~· · ·crossing from 
. crossing : .. starboard 
. ftomport 
Head 
. on. 
·-112'/~0 247'/~0 : 
. . 
Target 
crossing from 
starboard 
3 
w 
n 
Overtaking 
the target 
s 
h 
Being 
overtaken by 
target 
1 
Fig. 2.3 
Encounter scenarios by geometry in the COLREGS 72 
Source: Author 
51 
12, using wind direction as a frame of reference by which to divide responsibility. The 
regulations do not concem themselves with the division of responsibility for encounters 
by vessels of the same class, except power -dtiven and sailing vessels.as mentioned. 
To obey Rule 18 it is first necessary to know own-ship's class and target class. Target 
class is indicated by day from general appearance, specific prescribed shape and sound 
signals, and by night from the display of specific lights and again sound signals. 
2. 7.2.3 Target not in sight 
If the target is not in sight then Rule 19 applies. Pmi (d) of Rule 19 requires that certain 
actions shall so far as possible be avoided. These actions are dependent on whether the 
target is forward of the beam or abeam\abaft the beam. The input required is target 
relative beating. 
Part (d)(ii) of Rule 19 makes a distinction between a vessel forward of the beam being 
overtaken or otherwise. l11e required input here is target aspect(heading and bearing). 
2.7.2.4 The give-way stand-on concept 
In mru1y circumstances the current regulations for vessels in sight of one another require 
a vessel to "keep out of the way ofthe other". lltis is termed the "give-way" vessel, the 
other the "stand-on" vessel. In general the former has a largely free choice of what 
evasive action to take, the latter being required to "keep her course and speed". 
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l11e give-way stand-on concept works well in the first instance. If however the stand-on 
vessel fmds it necessary to manoeuvre, then the freedom of action initially granted to the 
give-way vessel makes the achievement of complementary action difficult. 
It is not desirable for any vessel to keep her course and speed indefmitely, while 
standing into danger. It is also not desirable to have the breakdown of the give-way 
stand-on concept, leaving difficulty in achieving complementmy action. The regulations 
pennit[R.17(a)(ii)] and later require [R.17(b)] the stand-on vessel to manoeuvre if, she 
perceives that the action of the give-way vessel is inappropriate with respect to the 
regulations [R.17(a)(ii)], or inadequate for avoiding collision [R.17(b)). The action 
required of the give-way vessel must therefore be such to avoid the stand-on vessel 
having these perceptions. Rule 16 requires the give-way vessel to so far as possible take 
"early and substantial action to keep well clear". 
For the give-way vessel to take action "early" enough to satisfy the stand-on vessel it is 
necessmy to know the limit of the stand-on vessel's manoeuvring point. This might be 
considered as the vessel's arena as described by other researchers20. It is necessary to 
communicate manoeuvres to the stand-on vessel. For this reason "substantial" 
manoeuvres are required in order that they may be observed. Observation under current 
operation/regulations is by visual means (supplemented by radar). llte need to keep 
"well clear" indicates that the stand-on vessel must perceive the action as providing a 
safe passing distance, It is necessmy for the give-way vessel to have knowledge of what 
the stand~on vessel will accept as a safe passing distance. This might be considered as 
the stand-on vessel's domain. 
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In order to obey Rule 16 the give-way vessel must know the target's(stand-on) arena and 
domain, and target's method of observation or perception. The inputs required by Rule 
17, the stand-on vessel, are own domain and arena. 
2.7.3 Summary of inputs required by current regulations, Rules 1J to 19. 
From the previous discussion inputs required by the current collision regulations can be 
detived. llhese are shown in Table 2.1 
Rule number 
Required inputs 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Target beating ./ ./ ./ ./ 
Target heading ./ ./ ./ ./ 
Target classification ./ 
Target domain ./ 
Target arena ./ 
Target perception method ./ 
Own classification ./ 
Own dmhain ./ 
Own arena ./ 
Existence/lack of visual ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
detection of target 
Existence/lack of visibility ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ ./ 
restricting phenomena 
Table 2.1 
Summary of inputs required by the current regulations. Rules 13 to 19 
2.7.4 COLREGS 72 and the coordination requirements 
Fotmalmles may be used to promote coordination between vessels. It is interesting to 
consider whether the COLREGS 72 meet the coordination requirements which were 
identified. 
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2. 7.4.1 A mutual.perception of risk of collision 
l11e current regulations do not provide a definitive measure for a mutual perception of 
risk of collision, l11e closest that the regulations come to quantifying risk of collision is 
in Rule 7( d)(i) " ... risk shall be deemed to exist if the compass bearing of an approaching 
vessel does not appreciably change". Rule 7( d)(ii) indicates the limitations of 1isk 
assessment through obse1vation of bearing change, " ... risk may sometimes exist even 
when an appreciable bearing change is evident. .. " 
Rule 16 requires that action should be so as to "keep well clear". This, it is supposed, 
recognises the need to create an apparent mutual perception that a safe passing distance 
is being achieved. The need ce1tainly exists if coordination is to be achieved, the 
regulations however do no more than indicate the need. 
2. 7.4.2 A mutual perception of the strategy to be applied 
To ensure a mutual perception of the strategy to be applied it is necessary for each 
vessel to be able to differentiate between encounters with different strategy 
requirements. ll1e current regulations use a mixture of strategy (i) and (iii). The 
requirements of strategy (i) are simple while the requirements of strategy (iii) will 
depend on which vessel is assigned give-way or stand-on responsibility. ln general 
Rules 11 to 19 specify the strategy to be applied. 
The major difference in strategy occurs over vessels being in or not in sight. "It is 
conceivable that instantaneous sighting may not occur, even if both vessels are keeping 
an efficient visual look-out, due to such factors as diffe1ing intensities of navigation 
lights or to patches of low fog obscuring the bridge of one vessel but not her masthead 
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lights. A vessel must comply with the Rule which relates to the situation which applies 
at the particular instant. ''21 Given that operational factors force this rule boundary open 
to non-mutual perception it would be desirable for it to be robust. 
A vessel operating under Section II(vessels in sight) may expect a particular target to 
stand-on to her give-way manoeuvre. l11e target, operating under Section Ill(vessel not 
in sight), is not required to stand-on. TIIis type of encounter is prone to non-
complementruy action. In a crossing case the proscribed action for the give-way vessel 
under Rule 15 may help to keep action complementary with a vessel operating under 
Rule 19. In the ovettaking case there is no such prosctibed action for the give-way 
vessel. 
No strategy at all 
Rule 19(d)(ii) requires that when a target is abaft the beam alteration of course towards 
the vessel should be avoided. llus implies that for a target on the port side, abaft the 
beam, the preferred action is to tum to starboard. l11is action, although reducing the rate 
of approach, is not always complementruy with the action required of the target vessel 
which may in any case regard itself as an overtaking vessel with little restriction on 
altering to pott. In th.is case the current rules do not promote a complementruy strategy 
at all. 
As already mentioned, when vessels, except for power-driven and sa.iling vessels, of the 
same status (as described by Rule 18) meet, the COLREGS 72 do not offer a strategy. 
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2.7.4.3 A mutual perception of when manoeuvres are to be made 
TI1e current regulations do not state quantitatively when manoeuvres are to be made. In 
the 1960 rules, the stand-on vessel was required to hold her course and speed until she 
"fmds herself so close that collision cannot be avoided by the action of the give-way 
vessel alone"22 . Tlus rule tried to avoid unnecessary cancelling action by making the 
stand-on vessel leave her escape action to the last moment. Action at the last moment 
however, will have its least effect. Also, leaving action until the give-way vessel cannot 
avoid collision by her action alone, may still result in collision if the stand-on vessel was 
less manoeuvrable than the give-way vessel in the first place. It is clear that th.is rule was 
too stringent for use in practice. TI1e 1972 revision of the rules expanded the stand-on 
vessel's option by allowing her to "take action to avoid collision by her manoeuvre 
alone, as soon as it becomes apparent to her that the vessel required to keep out of the 
way is not taking appropriate action in compliance with these Rules"[R.l7(a)(ii), 1972]. 
TI1e phrase "as soon as it becomes apparent" is not defmed in the regulations, hence 
encouraging escape action more than under the 1960 rule. 
It has been in1plied from the regulations (2.7.2.4), that Rule 16 requires the give-way 
vessel to have as an input, knowledge of the arena of the stand-on vessel. Tills 
knowledge would allow the give-way vessel to make her manoeuvres appear as if there 
was a mutual perception of when manoeuvres were to be made. Operational teclmology 
does not allow the give-way vessel to know the stand-on vessers arena. In practice the 
give-way mariner must guess tills infmmation. Until a manoeuvre is made the stand-on 
mariner must guess whether his opposite number is a rogue, or Ius opposite number 
considers the arena yet to be infiinged. 
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For the give-way- stand-on concept to succeed a mutual perception of satisfactory give-
way manoeuvres is necessary. It may be argued that the stand-on vessel needs to 
appreciate the give-way vessel's perception of her(stand-on) domain and arena. Tltis 
type of circular argument may exist at sea today in the absence of other criteria.. or the 
ability to agree criteria. 
2. 7.5 COLREGS 72 and responsibility 
It has already been noted that it is impossible to write rules which can account for all 
possible circumstances. That the basic coordination requirements are not met by the 
COLREGS 72 is symptomatic of that fact. 
2. 7.5.1 The ordi.narv practice of seamen 
The current regulations avoid infmite complexity by using the concept of the "ordinary 
practice of seamen". Rule 2(a) requires precautions in line with the ordinary practice of 
seamen to be taken. The current regulations as written do not explicitly indicate how the 
navigator should behave. They are limited to the following: 
-the regulations indicate some of the factors that should be considered for vessel 
navigation and collision avoidance; 
-in some instances they assign responsibility to one vessel for keeping out of the 
way of the other, and in one instance they describe the sense of course alteration 
for both vessels; 
-in some instances they prosctibe manoeuvres. 
The regulations themselves do not entail a complete mle-base. Tltey lack vanous 
instructions which include: 
-a strict definition of risk of collision; 
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-the sense of course alteration in many cases; 
-the extent of course or speed alteration; 
-the timing of course or speed alteration. 
In law the ordinary practice of seamen is deemed to cover the detail of the "missing 
parts". 
In practice the manner must interpret undefmed phrases in the regulations. lihe 
inte1pretation is affected by the training and experience of the mariner. A mariner's 
training, in college, may have exposed him to some pertinent case law, and at sea, 
exposed him to the accepted practice of his more experienced contemporaries. A 
mariner's experience of collision avoidance will affect his conception of safety. 
2.7.5.2 T11e mariner and the law 
In law, the "missing pruts" of the collision regulations are given quantification when 
cases of collision come to comt. Inspection of case law will show what is an acceptable 
passing distance, for risk of collision not to exist, in a pruticular set of circumstances. 
The distance will vary depending on the circumstances, but it will not vary depending 
on the particular mariner being tiied. There are absolute values for risk of collision and 
by these the mariner will be judged. The srune argument applies to the point at which 
manoeuvres are to be made. 
In court, the effect of circumstantial vruiables are considered ren·ospectively to one 
particular collision. The deliberation is carried out by several men with advisors, over a 
period of hours or days. At sea, to comply with the law, the individual mariner must 
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make a correct judgement as to the effect of the circumstantial variables, on-line, over a 
period of minutes. 
2.7.5.3 An absolute rule system 
The generality of rules has caused Schaue~3 to note that " ... accepting a regime of rules 
necessitates tolerating some number of wrong results - results other than those which 
would have been reached by the direct and correct application of the substantive 
justifications undergirding the mle". l11e current regulations imply tllis linlitation of 
rules and yet will not accept a number of wrong results. 
Rule 2(a) states that "Notlling in these rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner, 
master or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to comply with these 
Rules or of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinruy 
practice ofserunen, or by the circumstances of the case". 
Rule 2(b) states that "In construing and complying with these Rules due regard shall be 
had to all dangers of navigation and collision and to any special circumstances, 
including the linlitations of the vessels involved, wllich may make a departme from 
these Rules necessruy to avoid immediate danger". 
Rule 2 makes it clear that the mariner is required to know when the general rules are 
going to give Schauer's wrong result, and act upon that in order to avoid collision. The 
mariner is also required to find a solution to the collision avoidance problem in all 
"special circumstances". lihe regulations appear not to give tl1e mariner any reprieve in 
the event of collision. 
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Tite COLREGS are worded and constructed such that in the event of a collision the 
judicial system can find the mariner at fault. Human error or incompetence is the 
apparent reason for the collision. Tills concept of guilt regardless of circumstances, 
presents a high level of personal accountability, and is laudable in that it probably 
promotes a high level of personal responsibility. However, this approach has been 
criticised for inhibiting the use of regulations to truly aid the mariner. Tite regulations 
have been described as being drawn up to suit the pw-poses of lawyers rather than 
mariners, distinguishing responsibility for collision rather than maximising operational 
guidance. 
2.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Prediction of collision has three influencing factors: interaction; prediction accuracy and 
uncertainty. Risk of collision is defmed as the state when action to avoid collision is 
necessary. The idea of acceptable tisk indicates that risk carmot be eliminated. 
Action to avoid collision has been described in terms of sight-line rotation. The ability 
to force sight-line rotation lies with faster and/or more manoeuvrable vessels. General 
practice requires manoeuvres to be complementary. Three strategies for complementary 
action have been identified. Natmal principles appear limited in their ability to achieve 
complementary action. 
An exantination of the complementary action strategies indicates that none offers a 
general solution, In the face of an apparent rogue, anti-strategy escape action may be 
necessary. 
61 
A consideration of possible rogue types shows that apparent rogue behaviour may be 
minimised by attaining a mutual perception of three aspects of an encounter. The 
"coordination requirements" are for vessels to have a mutual perception of: risk of 
collision; the strategy to be applied, and when manoeuvres are to be made. 
Tacit agreement is recognised as the coordination solution which envelopes formal 
rules. The use of rules to achieve the mutual perception of the coordination 
requirements is considered. The enforcement of a fixed value for risk of collision or 
when manoeuvres are to be made demands a spread of conceptions across the 
population of mariners to be melted into one. A mutual perception of the strategy to be 
applied requires that rules distinguish between encounters with different strategy 
requirements. Rules must also be robust over likely rnisperceptions. 
Limitations of the simple strategy rules are clear when encounters involve more than 
two vessels or cmlfmed waters. Rules which can be successfully applied in all 
circumstances would be infmitely complex. A compromise is necessruy between rule 
complexity and ease of application. 
Major inputs required by the COLREGS 72 have been identified. The COLREGS 72 do 
not meet the coordination requirements of providing a mutual perception of risk of 
collision or when manoeuvres are to be made. The present regulations do consider 
strategy although they are incomplete and are not always robust across rule boundaries. 
In one instance they promote non-complementruy manoeuvres. 
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The COLREGS 72 and present judiciary imply that nothing in the rules will be a 
defence of the mariner in the event of a collision. The regulations and judicial system 
appear as an absolute rule-base, being suitable for application in aU circumstances. The 
mariner may be held responsible for collision in any case. 
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CHAPTER3 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE AVAILABLE AND DEVELOPING 
'IECHNOLOGY WIDCH MAY BE APPLIED TO THE COLLISI0N 
A VOIDANCE PROBLEM. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
lltis chapter considers the technology which may support or make up a collision 
avoidance system. Technology will be discussed in te1ms ofsensors.and processors. The 
chapter is divided into sections considering the human machine; machine sensors; 
machine processors and general supporting technology. rechnological scenarios for an 
automatic collision avoidance system will be considered. Consideration will be given to 
likely political-technological development. 
3.2 A COLLISION A VOIDANCE SYSTEM 
Marine collision avoidance has hitherto been considered as a manual task, with the 
human watchkeeper using various technological tools as aids to the operation. lltis 
thesis considers the possibility of automatic collision avoidance, using no human input 
at all. The familiar model of the human watchkeeper, surrounded by his aids to 
navigation, may not bear analytical compruison with a model of an automatic system. 
A simple conceptual model of a collision avoidance system (CAS) has been devised 
which should encompass the elements of both manual and automatic operation. A 
deeper exrun..ination may indicate that reality is more complex than the model. For our 
initial purposes the model is adequate, providing form for collision avoidance systems 
whatever their nature. 
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In general a system exists within an environment. For the system to interact within the 
environment it must have a sensor element which will create data from the environment. 
It must also have a control element with which to input a change to the environment. 
Between the sensor and control, data will be processed in some way by a processor 
element. 
Environment -+1 Sensor -+ Processor -+ Control I -+ Environment 
Fig.3.1 
Conceptual model of a collision avoidance system 
Source: Author 
At a simple level the collision avoidance system consists of the human eye sensor, the 
human brain processor, and a rudder angle alteration control. In this thesis we are 
concerned with the sensor and processor. TI1e main task of the control ftmctions, 
altering course and adjusting speed, are already highly automated on many ships, and 
are suitable for overall automatic operation. 
3.3 TilE HUMAN MACHINE 
Sensors 
3.3.1 The human eye 
Seeing is the physical recording of the pattern of light energy received from the 
sunounding world. 1 TI1e process of human vision is effortless, and yet for most people it 
provides the input by which to create a model of the outside world. It should be noted 
however that seeing is only the use of the eye as a sensor, giving distorted two 
dimensional images. Vision involves the processing of this data by the brain, giving an 
interpretation of what we see. TI1e human brain is the primary organ of vision. l11e ease 
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by which the eye sensor gathers information has made it fundamental to collision 
avoidance. 
Visual target detection is dependent on electromagnetic radiation (in the visual 
spectrum) reflected or radiated from a vessel, reaching the eye. Daylight is reflected 
from effectively all bodies. At night there is less if any, natural light to be reflected, 
making visual detection less likely. Attificial light may be reflected from bodies, or 
radiated directly from lamps. 
Having left the target the light must travel to the eye. Unless travelling in a vacuum the 
light will suffer some form of attenuation increasing with distance. The further the 
target, the more the signal will be degraded. In practice, good atmospheric conditions 
will allow a target to be perceived at tl1e geometrical limit of line of sight. 
Atmospheric conditions become degraded as aerosols become more prevalent. Aerosols 
such as small water droplets, fog and mist; larger water droplets, rain, hail and snow; 
and sand, all attenuate the light signal. Aerosols may absorb and scatter the light before 
it reaches the eye, preventing visual perception. 
3.3.2 The human ear 
Hearing is the physical collecting of ambient sound energy. The ear is the human sensor 
for sound energy. Like light the sound signal is attenuated over distance. In practice the 
appreciation of sound is limited due to the relatively small distances over which it can 
travel without significant distortion. The direction of a sound source is also difficult to 
ascertain with accuracy. In collision avoidance sound as an input is limited to specific 
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signals made under convention by vessels, and voice reception from other vessels via 
radio communication. 
Processor 
3.3.3 The human brain 
l11e human brain is central to controlling almost all human activity and is party to the 
very sense of consciousness and being. lb.is organ is complex and its processes are onJy 
pattially understood. The inputs and outputs of the brain are electrical and chemical 
signals. For our purposes the brain's actions will be considered in terms of the result of 
its actions, rather than the mechanism ofthe action itself. 
3.3.3.1 Vision 
As stated above, vision is a function of the brain processor. Light initiates a reaction by 
cells in the eye which is interpreted by the brain, presenting some concept of the outside 
environment. For the purpose of collision avoidance, vision involves the detection and 
non-detection of other vessels. If a vessel is detected then it may have relevant attributes 
which can be recognised. ll1ese include aspect; type, size, colour; special shape signals, 
and lights at night. Vision is also used for sensing the data provided by machine sensors 
and processors. 
3.3.3.2 IJ1telligence and reasoning 
A collision avoidance system requires a processing element. ill the manual system the 
human brain is the primary processor. l11e brain exhibits the concept of intelligence, 
perhaps the highest level of processing. Altl10ugh intelligence has a dictionary definition 
it has no agreed scientific meaning and is not described by quantitative natural laws. 
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The capabilities that may be expected through intelligence have been described by 
Fischler and Firschein2 in the following list. 
"Attributes of an intelligent agent 
We expect an intelligent agent to be able to: 
- Have mental attitudes (beliefs, desires, and intentions) 
-Learn (ability to acquire new knowledge) 
- Solve problems, including the ability to break complex problems into 
smaller parts 
- Understand, including the ability to make sense out of ambiguous or 
contradictory information 
- Plan and predict the consequences of contemplated actions, including 
the ability to compare and evaluate alternatives 
-Know the limits of its knowledge and abilities 
- Draw distinctions between situations despite similarities 
- Be original, synthesize new concepts and ideas, and acquire and employ 
analogies 
- Generalise (fmd a common underlying pattern in superficially distinct 
situations) 
-Perceive andmodel the external world 
-Understand and use language and related symbolic tools". 
Given what appears to be a most comprehensive list of capabilities, it is at first sight 
difficult to conceive what the intelligent agent could not do. What the list does not imply 
is the standard or level of the abilities. The list does recognise that there may be limits to 
knowledge and abilities. An intelligent agent only has to give an example of the 
attribute, not show success in all applications of the atttibute. 
Whether the human has intelligence attributes to the level which will achieve collision 
avoidance will depend on the detail of the collision avoidance scenario. On the whole, 
under cwTent conditions, it appears that the human mariner is successful in avoiding 
collision. Collisions do occur however and a contributory cause may be inadequate 
processing ability. 
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3.3.3.3 Learning 
A particularly significant aspect of human intelligent behaviour is the ability to learn. 
llte human brain appears to be able to modify behaviour according to experience. This 
means that the human processor can constantly evolve, adapting itself in order to be 
successful in its environment. 
3.3 .3 .4 Biological vulnerability 
TI1e functioning of the human brain and therefore the level of operational intelligence 
may be affected by chemical and electrical signals received at the brain. Signals may be 
induced from pain, stress, fatigue, illness and disease, and drugs. Some drugs may, at 
least in the short term, enhance the brain functioning. Most other factors, including other 
drugs tend to detract from the brain's ability. llte variability of human operational 
intelligence creates the chance of a usually adequate watchkeeper making an inadequate 
decision. 
3.4 MACHINE SENSORS 
3.4.1 Primary Radar 
Primruyradar(radar) is compulsory on merchant vessels greater than 1600 GRT3. Target 
range and bearing may be obtained by the reception of a transmitted signal which is 
subsequently reflected from the target. Detection by radar is not always possible. 
Tite detection of a target by radar is not guaranteed for various reasons. The transmitted 
signal must make it back to the scarmer. During travel between scarmer, target, and back 
to scarmer, the signal may be attenuated by various aerosols, particularly rain. 
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The signal will be diminished as it is reflected from a target. For a target with poor 
reflecting properties the signal retwned may reduce to zero. Signal reflection depends 
on the aspect presented, shape, texture, material and size of the target. Large metal 
vessels generally make better radar targets than small wooden or plastic craft. 
Having retwned to the scanner the signal will register. However for the retwn to be 
recognised as a target it has to be discemible from other retums known as clutter. 
Clutter is the name for unwanted random echoes. Sea clutter is caused by radar 
reflection from sea waves and is most prevalent to windward near to the vessel. Clutter 
by precipitation, particularly rain, fmms as random echoes on the screen, wherever rain 
is falling. In any type of clutter, despite fLitering teclmiques, a target with a weak 
response may not be detected at all. 
3 .4. 1.1 Radar image processing 
A simple radar image processing teclmique has been reported on by Japanese 
researchers. An attempt to estimate gross tonnage, shape and aspect of radar targets was 
made. It was reported that the aspects of vessels could be ascertained with "relative 
certainty" 4 
3.4.2 VhfRT 
3.4.2.1 Voice 
Yecy high frequency radio telephone (vhf RT) allows voice communication between 
suitably equipped vessels. Communication range under normal atmospheric conditions 
is usually line of sight of aerials. This technology has the potential to allow an 
interactive exchange of data between vessels. The vessels may confirm each others 
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perception of the situation and discuss and agree what action is to be taken. However 
there are several operational limitations to the general use ofthis sensor. 
It is not always possible to detetmine with certainty that the vessel which is observed is 
the same as that which is responding to a vhf RT communication. Vessel identification 
is simple when reference can be made to a mutually perceived reference point such as a 
buoy. Tlus explains the successful and everyday use ofvhfRT in buoyed rivers and pmt 
approaches and in particular the Great Lakes, USA. When in more open waters, it may 
not possible to confirm the identity of an observed target. In this case a vhf RT 
communication has the potential to be nlisleading and dangerous. The United Kingdom 
Government MerchantSiupping Notice (M.845) warns of this problem. 
Language comprehension is another limitation for verbal communication m an 
international setting. Successful vhf RT communication also needs both parties to be 
cooperative. Both must have suitable equipment and both must be using it correctly. 
3.4.2.2 Data 
Digital Selective Calling (DSC) techniques allow efficient communication of data on 
vhf RT frequencies. Particular recipients may be automatically addressed, giving a level 
of security. Communication speeds are much quicker than voice for comparable levels 
of information. Tlus relieves pressure on the finite capacity of radio frequencies. 
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3.4.3 Satellite:communications 
Voice and data transmissions may be made through satellite communications systems. 
Communication is limited only by line of sight of terrestrial aerial to satellite to 
terrestrial aerial. 
Coverage by lnmarsat geostationaty satellites is up to 70" latitude, Transmission times 
are almost immediate and free of interference. 
3.4.4' Automatic cooperative communications · 
Automatic cooperative communication(ACC) is defmed as the automatic exchange of 
information between parties. The concept of automatic identification of vessels has long 
been muted. l11e proponents of tllis concept have indicated benefits for collision 
avoidance and efficient Vessel Traffic Services(YTS). lt is for the sake of inlproved 
YTS capability that automatic information exchange is now becoming a reality in 
specific localities. Discussion is cmTently concerned with the wider application of such 
technology to aid all approp1iate aspects of maritime safety. 
3.4.4.1 YTS and ADS 
Recent stranding incidents [EXON V ALDEZ, BRAER5] and "Jut and mn" collisions 
(OCEAN HOUND6] have caused public discussion about the requirement for an 
efficient sllip reporting scheme. The expansion of YTS as a tool to aid vessel safety 
requires commensurate improvements to the traffic image that is presently available7. 
The concept of ADS(Automatic Dependent Surveillance) provides the appropliale 
improvement. 
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ADS is a conceptual name for a system which will monitor the movements of vessels. 
The vessel automatically transmits its identity; course; speed; position and other 
information to a Marine Traffic Control centre. In Valdez, Alaska, ADS is being 
installed for the monitoring of tankers in Prince William Sound.8 Trials ofan Automatic 
Vessel Monitoring System are being canied out by the Swedish Maritime 
Administration9•10. 
The technical specification of particular systems varies. The positioning element is 
usually provided by GPS. Communications can be achieved through the space segment 
giving world-wide coverage or by tenestrial means depending on operational 
requirements. 'The actual data which is communicated appears to be at least vessel 
identity and position. 
3.4.4.2 ADS teclmologyfor automatic ship to ship communication 
The type of teclmology which underpins ADS could equally be applied to effect 
automatic communication directly between vessels. The system tested by the Swedish 
Maritime Administration allows ship to ship as well as ship to shore data exchange. 
3.4.4.3 Radar transponders for automatic ship to ship communication 
l11e earliest calls for the automatic identification of vessels were made with radar 
transponders in mind. Developed in the 1939-45 war, intenogation fiiend or foe (IFF) 
transponders were first used to identifY "fiiendly" aircraft from less cooperative targets. 
Tllis system required very large radar scanners and sophisticated radar processing 
equipment for the shore based stations. It is considered that the system is unsuitable for 
ship to ship use because of its limited capacity and does not allow data transfer other 
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than identification. The expense of shore stations and the "environmental eyesore" of 
the large aerials makes tllis an unlikely candidate even for simple ship to shore 
identification. 11 
A more probable system would have secondary radar transponders operating with a 
dedicated channel between the accepted mruitime radar bands. 12·13 This type of system 
appears to have suitable capacity although data transfer is, as with IFF, limited. Shore 
based surveillance costs using such teclmology may be prohibitive. 14 
The use of modified seru·ch and rescue transponders is being considered. Data transfer 
will be limited as with the other radar based systems. 15 
3.4.4.4 Scope of application 
ll1e application of an automatic cooperative communication system is dependent on 
political factors. Successful implementation of a system requires a policy which ensures 
the carriage of commensurate equipment on board participating vessels. For general 
collision avoidance the nature of sllipping requires that policy formulation is by 
international agreement. 
At present it is commonly assumed that not all craft would be expected or required to 
participate in "the" system. It may be thought unnecessary, impractical or impossible for 
small craft, yachts, fishing vessels or prinlitive vessels to be equipped. These 
assumptions may not be true in the future or the present. 
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Necessity 
l11e present demand for identification and monitoring systems stems from large ship 
strandings and "hit and nm" collisions. lllis evidence leads to the call for larger vessels 
and vessels with environmentally sensitive cargoes to be participants of the 
communication system. If however the technology is to be extended to include ship to 
ship communication for the benefit of general collision avoidance, then it is necessary to 
include as many craft as possible. 
Possibilitv 
Whether it is physically possible to install a system on a particular craft depends on the 
specific technology in use. l11e problems associated with small low tech craft are that of 
available space, and providing a dry environment and electrical power. The proliferation 
of portable and even hand-held equipment indicates that these problems are no longer 
fundamental. 
Practicality 
Given that it is physically possible to install the system on a small craft, it remains to 
consider whether craft owners and operators could be persuaded, or forced, to install 
and use the equipment. Many small craft already carry the component pmts of a 
potential system; vhf RT and an electronic positioning system. GPS is likely to attract 
the massive land market making the basic technology low cost to manufacture. Given a 
statutory requirement the market for the whole sea-borne system will be great. The cost 
of a basic version of the user equipment is likely to be commensurate with commonly 
carried existing instruments. Even if the cost of equipment remained a bmrier to small 
craft users a solution may exist in government subsidies "for the common good" or with 
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equipment hiring arrangements. TI1e policing of a statutory caniage requirement would 
be simple because rogue vessels would not be indicating a transponder signal. 
3.4.4.5 General benefits and opportunities 
The benefits of such technology would depend on the specifics of the system. TI1e 
ability for vessels to share and exchange information on-line at sea may revolutionise 
the nature of the collision avoidance operation. TI1e way would be open to use Cannel's 
"specific agreement" solution to the coordination problem (2.4.6.2). 
The information required for the sake of VTS operations may be sinlilar to ·that wanted 
to aid collision avoidance. Vessel position is essential for both operations. Vessel 
identification, course and speed, vessel manoeuvre actions and vessel classification (as 
per collision regulations) are useful. A sophisticated benefit of automatic information 
exchange is the potential to be always able to indicate and agree action. 
Action might be indicated by transmitting rate of turn information as measured on the 
vessel. The ability to agree to specific action or to agree a common perception of the 
situation might relegate the collision regulations along with their inevitable weaknesses 
to limbo. Misperception due to the inevitable accuracy limitations of individual 
measurements would be irrelevant if specific agreement could be made. It could be 
possible to meet all coordination requirements (2.4.5) in all circumstances. 
3.4.5 Machine vision 
l11e fimdamental role of vision in so many human operations has driven research to 
mimic human vision. In collision avoidance the aim may be to extract the equivalent 
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infonnation as is obtained through human vision (3.3.3.1). An attempt to do this has 
been made although the level of success was not reported. 16 In general the progress 
made in machine vision has been slower that anticipated by early workers. It has been 
realised that vision is part of intelligent processing, btinging with it all the complex 
issues that surround intelligence ...... vision poses such diffictilt problems that AI (sic 
Attificial Intelligence) today is much closer to developing systems which could serve as 
physicians or lawyers than to building robots that could replace gardeners or cooks." 17 
3.5 MACHINE PROCESSORS 
Machine processors may play the role of ptimary or sub-processor in a collision 
avoidance system. ll1e prinlruy processor is involved with the fmal decision sent to the 
control mechanism. A sub-processor will present data/infotmation to the primary 
processor. Automatic radar plotting aids (ARPA) and an advisory expert system are sub 
processors. Automatic expett systems and the human brain are prinlary processors. 
3.5.1 Automatic radar plotting aids 
ll1e systematic plotting of target range and bearing allows infonnation to be created. 
Simple relative plotting gives the relative track of the target. Tllis allows the closest 
point of approach ( cpa) ofthe target to be identified and measured, and the time to the 
cpa (tepa) to be measured. ll1e addition of own vessel course and speed during the 
plotting period, allows the target heading, speed and aspect to be calculated. lltis 
process has been automated by the development of the ARP A. 
ARP A can acquire and track many targets at once, maintairting an accuracy far higher 
than that of manual operation. However it is inherent in the plotting method, manual or 
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automatic, that the result is based on historic data. If either vessel manoeuvres, 
particularly the target vessel, then the processed information data becomes more 
inaccurate, suffering a time Jag which will diminish only after both vessels have had a 
steady velocity for a few minutes. 
The use of ARPA is increasingly common on commercial vessels. Development in 
processor technology has made equipment smaller and more affordable, ln the near 
future the instaUation of ARPA will become practical on aU vessels which currently 
carry radar. 
3.5.2 Exper:t systems 
"An expert system uses a compilation of knowledge of one or more expert persons and 
through a computer program, performs the decision making as if the expert person were 
actually performing the task';. 18 Tllis branch of artificial intelligence (AI) has been 
applied to collision avoidance by several parties. 19·20·21 ·22·23•24 So called expert 
watchkeeper behaviour has been modeUed by the computer program. The expet1 system 
aims to produce expert behaviour solutions to the collision avoidance problem. 
Early work in the general field of expett systems produced programs for identifying 
molecular compounds from analytical data (DENDRAL); choosing appropriate anti-
bactetial treatment given patient symptoms (MYCIN), and evaluating probable mineral 
ore potential given geological data (PROSPECTOR). 25 These consulting type systems 
had data entered to them manually. The data being input would not change within the 
time that it took to produce an answer. A collision avoidance expert system must work 
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on-line receiving a constant stream of data. In order for the system to work effectively, 
machine sensors are used to continuously input relevant data. 
Although expert systems have been classed as artificial intelligence they do not exhibit 
all the attributes of an intelligent agent(3.3.3.2). Expert systems are domain dependent 
and limited in their field of usefulness. Expert systems as they are currently constructed 
are rest:Jicted to operating with the knowledge embedded in their program; they do not 
have the ability to acquire new knowledge or leam new skills and techniques. They may 
be powe1ful in their field but remain st:Jictly fmite in application. 
3.5.2.1Advisory expert systems 
A prototype expert system for pilotage has been developed?6 Most expert systems 
written for collision avoidance have been "marketed" as advisory systems. This mode of 
use would present the human watchkeeper with collision avoidance advice probably via 
a computer screen. The advisory mode of operation is attractive because it might be 
implemented as an aid to navigation \vithout reference to legal constraints. 
Responsibility is supposed to remain with the watchkeeper, defeiTing limitations of the 
machine sensors, which feed the expe1t system. 
Although appearing to offer the abilities ofboth man and machine the advisory system 
scenario will have problems when t:Jying to combine the abilities of man and machine. If 
the machine recommends a manoeuvre which does not concur with the man's reckoning 
then the man must rationalise the two differing ideas. Tltis is an additional task for the 
human watchkeeper. It may be an impossible task unless the machine manoeuvre is 
supported by reasoning in human reasoning terms. Tl1e expert system does not reason in 
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the same way as the hwnan; "In our current state of knowledge, we know as much (or as 
little) about the reasoning in the brain as we do about the location and functioning of the 
hwnan soul''.27 This aspect of advisory systems requires further investigation. There 
may be a place for advisory systems, but the information and the way in which it is 
presented, will be critical to successful use. 
3.5.2.2 Automatic expert systems 
l11e automatic expert system will automatically activate any control function required. 
No human input is involved. 
3.5.3 Artificial intelligence 
When discussing intelligence in the case of the hwnan (3.3.3.2), it was noted that a 
simple definition of intelligence was not available. As artificial intelligence might have 
the same defining features of hwnan intelligence albeit without the hwnan, the absence 
of a simple definition remains. Intelligence appears to be a principal characteristic of 
hwnan behaviour. l11e ability to recreate such a phenomenon is expected to be one of 
fascination. But despite undoubted interest and resources being directed to this field 
results have been limited. 
All early work in AI was domain specific. Domain specific programs are typified by 
expe1t systems as already discussed. They may show success in emulating apparently 
intelligent hwnan behaviour, solving often complex problems. They are also limited to a 
narrow field or domain. The latest generation of chess computers are now regularly 
beating the best hwnan chess players. But apply the chess machine to deciding when it 
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is safe to cross the road, or how to get to the chip shop, and it will be useless. l11e 
machine lacks a fmm of common sense. 
J;he need to give AI machines some form of common sense has been recognised for 
many years. ln 1960 a prospectus for a machine named "advice taker" was published. 
" ... the advice taker will have available to it a fairly wide class of immediate logical 
consequences of anything it is told and its previous knowledge. Tllis property is 
expected to have much in common with what makes us describe certain humans as 
having common sense".28 Twenty eight years later in 1988, the original writer 
commented, "l11e advice taker prospectus, ambitious in 1960, would be considered 
ambitious even today and is still far from being immediately realisable" .29 It appears that 
the machine with common sense eludes us, and that we are domain dependent for now. 
If a program were truly domain independent it would probably meet the list of 
"attributes of an intelligent agent". Given there is no simple definition of intelligence it 
is no wonder that there is as yet no truly artificial intelligence. This may relieve devout 
theologians and remain a puzzle for philosophers. 
3.5.3.1 Machine leaming 
The rutificially intelligent machine is significantly different to the knowledge based 
expett system by way of its ability to leam Where as the expett system performance is 
fixed, the learning facility of the intelligent system results in an evolving, active level of 
perfmmance. 
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3.6 GENERAL TECHNOLOGY 
3.6.1 GNSS positioning 
A Global Navigation Satellite System(GNSS) is highly likely to be the primary source 
of positioning infotmation for vessels in the future. The United States GPS programme 
has proven the potential for global coverage with positioning accuracy of metres. 
Current reservations over reliance on GPS are related to the political control of the 
system rather than the fundamental technical infrastructure. 
GPS is operated by the US Department of Defense primruily as a rnilitaty system. 
Concern that military interests would not always be compatible with commercial user 
interests were realised during the recent Gulf conflict. 30 
The tactical advantage of controlling GPS only exists while the system offers a unique 
service. The availability of the Russian Federation~s GLONASS31 will diminish the 
special place of GPS. GLONASS is remarkably similar to GPS offering global coverage 
and accuracy of a few metres. Integrated GPS/GLONASS receivers are being 
developed. 32 
1l1ere is work currently tmder way, dtiven by the aviation industry, to put GNSS fmnly 
in place for international civilian/commercial use and control. 33"34 l11e cooperation of 
INMARSA T as a body through which to adtninister the system is being considered. 
IN MARS AT appear to be active in the satellite navigation ru·ena. 35 A GNSS is highly 
likely to exist under civilian international control in the future. 
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GNSS and collision avoidance 
Collision avoidance in open waters is concerned with relative positioning of vessels, 
while in constricted waters it is necessary to also position vessels relative to additional 
vessels and navigational limits. GNSS could meet the positioning requirements of open 
and constricted water collision avoidance. l'h.is is likely to be the long term source of 
position data used in automatic cooperative communication systems. 
3.6.2 Event recording and reporting 
The aviation industry has made use of Flight Data Recorders since the late 1950's and 
cockpit voice recorders subsequent to this.36 The automatic recording of various flight 
parameters and speech in the cockpit, has aided the task of accident investigators. The 
so called "black box" is designed to survive the effects of most aviation accidents. l11e 
replaying of the recorded data can help reconstruct the events and circumstances leading 
to an accident. 
l11e mandatoty carriage of such equipment of marine vessels is yet to materialise despite 
recent application to one particular fleet. 37 Course recorders have been available for 
many years, however their use remains arbitrary. The benefits of event recording for 
accident analysis has been recognised38 It is technically possible to collect data 
automatically from an event recorder by satellite communications. 
It is thought that the mandatmy carriage of event recorders could have an influence on 
collision avoidance behaviour. In the event of a collision, or a near miss, or any 
perceived rule infringement, the facts of the case will be evident from the recordings. At 
present the facts of an incident are only established when a collision occurs, and then 
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from subjective memones of the officers concemed. An automatic event recorder 
provides objective tmths easily, enabling near misses and rule infiingements to be 
investigated. In the event of objective criteria being encompassed into regulations, 
proscribed action could be detected automatically. The ability to poLice inappropriate 
behaviour in this way is likely to make mariners more compliant with rules. 
3.6.3 Simulation for watchkeeper training and examination 
The use of navigation simulators for watchkeeper training in collision avoidance and 
general navigation is well established, Recently, consideration has been given to using 
the simulator as an examination tool.39'40 While collision avoidance training may be 
carried out on a simulator the subsequent examination for certificates of competency has 
remained a matter of written and oral inte1rogation. A pilot study for the United States 
Coast Guard has developed a PC based examination, presenting collision avoidance 
scenarios, with automatic scming as an objective. In order to score the candidate's 
action automatically it is necessary to quantify acceptable collision avoidance 
parameters in a given circumstance. It is suggested tl1at this is tantamount to giving 
judicial quantification in the collision regulations. 
3.6.3.1 Autonomous targets 
Initially in navigation simulators a target's interaction was dependent on on·-line 
instructor input Tins limited the number of targets winch could be handled in a realistic 
marmer. Software has been developed which allow targets to operate autonomously. 41 
This is another example of prior quantification being given to collision avoidance 
parameters. 
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3.7 AN AUTOMATIC COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEM 
An automatic collision avoidance system (ACAS) by defmition involves no on-line 
human activity. This precludes the use of the elements described in 3.3 'The human 
machine". The machine sensors and processors which have been described allow us to 
envisage ACAS which vary in sophistication; the highest order appearing to mimic all 
human functions. The use of technology in collision avoidance will depend on political 
and technical development. Figure 3.2 illustrates an estimate of possible 
political/technical development. A number of ACAS scenarios are described below for 
consideration in the next chapter. 
3.7.1 True artificial intelligence 
The highest level of technical development is concemed with true artificial intelligence. 
AI processing and machine vision may allow machines to mimic human functions. All 
other technological development is considered subsidiary to AI and is likely to be 
extant. Tlus scenario is considered as the most extreme and futuristic. Technical 
progress is slow: the political aspect has not been considered, although this may be the 
greatest hurdle. 
3. 7.2.1 Expert systems with future teclmology (except AI) 
Radar image processing is available. Automatic cooperative communications are 
available. ln this scenario ACC is at its most soplusticated allowing intentions and 
agreements to be made slup to slup. Tlus is the second most futuristic scenario after that 
of true rutificial intelligence. Tite soplustication of the ACC could be used to supplant 
the use of rules, moving towards "specific agreement" as a coordination solution. 
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3.7.2.2 Expert systems. cwrent technology and basic ACC 
lb.is scenario includes cwrent radar and ARP A teclmology as well a simple ACC 
system. The ACC allows the communication of vessel position; identity; classification; 
heading and speed. 
3.7.2.3 Expert systems and cwrent technology only 
lltis, the simplest of scenarios, is akin to immediately implementing an automatic expe1t 
system, without any advances in supporting technology. Radar and ARP A are available. 
3.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A collision avoidance system may be considered as having three elements: sensor; 
processor, and control. 
TI1e human "machine" has the eye and ear as sensors, and the brain as a processor. l11e 
eye is the sensor which allows the brain to create vision. A target visually detected may 
have recognisable attributes such as aspect, type, special shape signals, and lights at 
night. Visual detection may be impaired by fog, mist, rain, hail and airborne snow and 
sand, 
l11e human brain exhibits the concept of intelligence. lb.is infers a highly sophisticated 
level of processing. TI1e ability to learn is a particular aspect of intelligence which the 
human exhibits. The operation of the brain may be adversely affected by pain, stress, 
fatigue, illness and disease. Dmgs can have both beneficial and detrimental effects on 
the brain's processing ability. 
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Primruy radar is well established for mruine use. Range and beruing of targets can be 
obtained. Small targets, and targets in the presence of rain or steep waves, may not be 
detected. Experimental work on radar image processing may lead to the instant 
acquisition of target aspect. ARPA, well established on large vessels, is likely to be 
available in the near future to any vessel with the capability of carrying a radar. 
Vhf RT is commonly used to aid collision avoidance but is limited by the need to 
identify the target and by language comprehension. Digital selective calling enables 
efficient data transmission and opens the way for greater user capacity. Satellite 
communications ru·e developing rapidly. They provide secure, interference free 
transmission of voice and data. Instant communication is almost global. 
The concept of automatic cooperative communications is rapidly becoming a reality. 
Potential benefits to enhance the traffic image for YTS and collision avoidance are 
being realised. The actual technology to be used is being debated. Radar transponder 
type technology is one option although this appears limited in data transfer capacity. 
Systems using GPS positioning, and vhf RT or satellite DSC communications appear 
the most likely option. System capability begins with providing target position, 
increasing in sophistication to identity; classification; heading; speed; intentions and 
agreement. Future developments may make this type of teclmology available on all 
craft. 
Machine vision for collision avoidance has been attempted. Success was not rep01ied. It 
is thought that this technology will only be realised in the long term future along with 
general tmly intelligent machines. 
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Several parties have applied expert systems to collision avoidance. Expert systems are 
domain dependent and do not demonstrate true intelligence. The use of expert systems 
in an advisory mode must deal with the problem of forcing the mariner to rationalise his 
own and the machine's conflicting opinions. 
Despite continual and widespread research, the idea of a truly intelligent machine 
remains solely a concept for now. An artificially intelligent machine is significantly 
different from an expett system because of its ability to leam. Tite expett system's 
program and ability is fixed, while a learning machine may evolve. 
TI1e benefits of world-wide high accuracy instantaneous position fixing have been 
realised by GPS and GLONASS. The requirements of the aviation industry are likely to 
drive a civil GNSS to reality. The action by INMARSA T to augment the existing system 
may be seen as a step in that direction. 
Voyage event recorders are not mandatmy but are on a limited ttial at present. As well 
as being useful in reconstructing accident events, data could be used to indicate near 
misses and other mle infringements. Tltis may have an influence on mariner behaviour. 
An automatic collision avoidance system may be envisaged in a variety of teclmological 
guises. Tme artificial intelligence including machine vision implies the ability to mimic 
human behaviour. This scenmio is vety futuristic. Expert system type processors are 
more likely to be the processor in the fu·st ACAS. 
The level of technology which can support the processor will vary according to 
technical and political advances. In particular, the extent to which automatic cooperative 
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communication systems are developed, will have considerable effect on the data 
available to the processor. 
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CHAPTER4 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DATA INPUT 
AND PROCESSING, AND COLLISION REGULATIONS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the relationship between data input and processing ability, and 
collision regulations. In pruticular the COLREGS 72 will be analysed with respect to 
current manual operation and the four ACAS scenruios outlined in chapter 3. Analysis 
of the data input requirements will consider the scenarios concurrently thus: 
current manual collision avoidance; 
true artificial intelligence (3 .7.1); 
expert systems with future teclmology (except Al) (3.7.2.1); 
expe1t systems, current teclmology and basic ACC (3.7.2.3); 
expe1t systems and cmTent teclmology only (3 .7.2.3). 
The processing ability requirements demanded by the COLREGS 72 from the human 
processor were covered in (2. 7 .5). Tlus chapter will consider the compatibility of expe1t 
system and true artificially intelligent processing with the cmTent collision regulations. 
4.2 THE COLLISION A VOIDANCE SYSTEM AND THE RULES 
Rules 
"~ ~~ 
Data Information 
~ ~ 
Environment ~1 Sensor ~ Processor ~ Control I ~ Environment 
Figure 4.1 
The relationship between the collision avoidance system and rules 
Source: Author 
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There is a relationship between the rules governing an operation and the operational 
technology. The connection between the two has been described in the conceptual 
model as data and information. Data is provided by the CAS sensor. Information output 
by the processor represents processing ability. It can be shown that rules have data and 
information requirements. For a motorist to comply with a speed limit rule he must have 
as a data input his own speed, and have the processing ability to compare this with the 
limit. The information produced will instruct the control function to maintain speed or 
slow down. It is necessary for governing rules and operational technology to be 
compatible, if the rules are to be effective. 
4.3 DATA PROVISION FOR THE COLREGS 72 
4.3.1 Current manual collision avoidance 
The way in which the technology of current manual operation meets the maJor 
COLREGS 72 input requirements is summarised in table 4.1. 
Operational technology 
Major inputs Human Human Radar Arpa 
.. processing VlSIOn 
Target bearing ../ ../ 
Target heading ../ ( ../) 
Target classification ../ 
Target domain 
Target arena 
Own classification ../ 
Own domain ../ 
Own arena ../ 
Existence of visual ./ 
detection of target 
Existence of visibility ../ 
restricting phenomena 
Table 4.1 
Major inputs of COLREGS 72 against current manual operation 
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4.3.1.1 Target domain and arena 
In chapter 2 it was stated that the COLREGS 72 imply a need to know the target domain 
and arena. There is however no operational technology which will make that input. In 
practice the human processor has to make a judgement to quantify the values. The 
regulations encourage action to "keep well clear" and to be taken "early", in order that 
the issues are mutually perceived. 
4.3, 1.2 Own inherent processor knowledge 
Own classification, domain and arena are all deemed to be part of the knowledge which 
is inherent in the processor. Own classification is an integral part of the vessel's 
operation and will therefore be known to the mariner. Own domain and arena are a 
product of human processing which defies simple explanation. They are dependent on 
other input variables, but for practical pw]Joses appear as inherent to the processor. 
4.3.1.3 Manual radio conunwtication 
Manual radio commwtications, terrestrial or satellite based, could provide many of the 
major inputs. It has not however been included as operational teclmology as shown in 
Table 4.1. The general use of such communications is not practical due to language and 
identification problems. It is also considered that such commwtication is used primruily 
to reach specific agreement, rather than provide the data for a mle based tacit 
agreement. 
4.3.2 Tme rutificial intelligence 
When a tmly intelligent machine·exists for collision avoidance then all other technology 
may be asswned to be available. Tltis scenario is illustratedin Table 4.2. Machine vision 
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exists and all the major input requirements could be met. There is no reason why an 
automatic system of this type could not comply with the present regulations on the 
grounds of input provision. 
Operational technology 
Major inputs Radar Arpa Machine Automatic Cooperative Advanced Machine 
processor Conununications radar Vision 
Target bearing ./ ./ ./ 
Target heading ( ./) ./ ./ ./ 
Target classification ./ ./ 
Target domain ./ 
Target arena ./ 
Own classification ./ 
Own domain ./ 
Own arena ./ 
Existence of visual ./ 
detection of target 
Existence of visibility ./ 
restricting phenomena 
Table 4.2 
Major inputs of COLREGS 72 against an automatic system using a ll potential 
future technology 
4.3.3 Expert systems with future technology (except AI) 
To make Table 4.2 reflect tilis scenru.io, machine vision must be dropped. Without 
machine vision it is impossible meet ti1e input requirements concerning visual detection 
and visibility restricting phenomena. Tills automatic system could not comply with ti1e 
cunent regulations. It could not distinguish between the requirements of Sections ll or 
Ill. 
4.3.4 Expert systems, current technology and basic ACC 
To make Table 4.2 reflect tllis scenatio, machine vision and advanced radar must be 
dropped. Provision of target domain and arena by ACC must also be dropped. Only the 
most sophisticated version of ACC could provide target domain and arena through a 
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protocol of sharing intentions and making agreements. l11e ACC in this scenario does 
provide target bearing and heading, and may also include target classification. 
As with the previous scena1io the inputs conceming visual detection and visibility 
restricting phenomena are not met. Target domain and arena are now not available. l11e 
ACAS cannot be sure of complying with Rules 16/17 in terms of achieving 
coordination. This must be judged bearing in mind that neither can the current manual 
system. If the ACC does not provide target classification, Rule 18 cannot be complied 
with. 
4.3.5 Expert systems and currently operational technology only 
Titis scenario results in several of the major inputs being ontitted. Radar provides target 
bearing. Target heading may be obtained tiuough the plotting of radar echoes as with· 
ARP A, although this is histmical data. Target classification is ontitted and hence ti1e 
requirements of Rule 18 crumot be met. As before the lack of visual detection etc. 
precludes the differentiation between Sections 11 and Ill. 
4.4 COLREGS 72 RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE PROCESSOR 
The COLREGS 72 and accompanying judiciary impose responsibilities on the mruiner. 
It has already been noted (2.7.5.3) that the COLREGS 72 are worded such that the 
judicial system can always fmd the mruiner at fault in the event of a collision. l11e 
"guilty" mariner may be demoted or removed from the watchkeeping population. The 
merit of this approach to responsibility for ti1e ·human mariner is not of direct concern 
for this thesis. However when the human is removed and machine applied then 
responsibility becomes an issue. 
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4.4.1 Responsibility and the expert system 
The expe11 system is fmite in scope and does not develop in ability. llte machine may 
be expected to follow its program in the same way throughout its life. A machine that 
will diligently follow its pre-programmed instmctions may be tested prior to 
implementation. The substance of the computer program may be inspected, and the 
machine itself might be tested for at least the number of encounters which a human 
mariner would have dwing a life time at sea. Given success in the tests the machine will 
be deemed competent and issued with the appropriate certificate, llte machine's 
competence will remain constant throughout its life-time. 
Despite being tested to a level ofundoubted satisfaction, the machine will not be able to 
account for aU the circumstantial variables which are implied by the COLREGS. ll1e 
machine's program may be massive but is finite, Action initiated by the machine is 
limited in useful application by the fmite scope of the program. 
It is apparent that the machine of limited program is not compatible with the nature of 
the COLREGS. To use a machine with a strictly limited mle-base in the face of the 
absolute mle system of the COLREGS would risk a collision which could not be 
defended in law. Knowingly operating with a machine which could not comply with the 
law in circumstances which may be encountered, would be to coUit criminal liability. 
For the automatic system to be properly used, the COLREGS and suppmting judiciary 
would need to legitimise the machine's limitations. This would require the legal 
recognition of a discrete mle-base. 
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4.4.2 Responsibility and a~tificial intelligence 
Whether or not true artificial intelligence created by man is possible, the concept of such 
can be considered. If a machine can be given the intelligence of man, then does not that 
machine have the same position as man? Man may create a machine which can learn, in 
the same way that he can create another human which can learn, l11e human creation 
learns and eventually the responsibility for the child's actions move from the 
creators(parents) to the individual. If the machine creation learns, then responsibility for 
its actions can move from its creators to the machine itself. The reasons for treating such 
a machine in the same way as a human, may span from ethical to pragmatic. 
l11e intelligent machine behaves similarly to the human in that competence may be 
tested for, but the level of competence may subsequently change. The intelligent 
machine may develop in an unpredictable way, limiting the value of pre-implementation 
tests. It appears unfair to load the machine's creators with the full weight of 
responsibility given an inherent unpredictability in the learning process. This is an issue 
to be addressed for the application of any intelligent machine not only with respect to 
automatic collision avoidance. 
4.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
It is noted that the current manual collision avoidance system can not obtain the data 
inputs of target domain and arena which are implied as requirements by the COLREGS 
72. 
101 
An ACAS which is truly artificially intelligent and has machine vision could comply 
with the data requirements of the COLREGS 72. The use of an artificially intelligent 
processor invites debate over the approp1iate delegation of responsibility. 
The use of an expe1t system as the processor in an ACAS is not compatible with the 
COLREGS 72. The COLREGS 72 imply the need for the operator to be held 
responsible in all circumstances. 1he expe1t system type of processor will always be 
limited by its domain of knowledge. The use of such a machine requires the judicial 
recognition of the rule-base which makes up the machine's program. 
Without machine vision an ACAS crumot provide the input data necessruy to distinguish 
between the need to apply the mles of Section 11 or lll. Only very sophisticated ACC 
can provide the inputs of target domain and arena as implied by Rules 16/17. An ACAS 
\vill only be able to comply with Rule 18 if ACC can provide target classification. 
An ACAS implemented with presently available technology in support, would have 
radar and ARPA only. Such a system could not comply with the COLREGS 72 on 
several counts. These are on mles concerning: vision and visibility; and target 
classification. l11e fact that target heading as provided by ARP A is historical, may 
preclude the use of mles which use tltis data input. Tltis would affect Rules 13, 14 and 
15. 
ll1e relationsltip between operational technology and governing mles is indicated by the 
varying compatibility of the COLREGS 72 to the range of ACAS scenarios. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE DEVELOPMENTOF REGULATIONS FOR SIMlJLATOR TESTING 
5.1 INTRODlJCTION 
It has been shown that an ACAS without true artificial intelligence cannot comply with 
the COLREGS 72. New rules would be necessruy for the introduction of such a system. 
Investigation would be needed to detennine whether such rules would be compatible 
with application by human watchkeeper. l11e human application of rules can be 
investigated using a navigation sinmlator. TI1e first stage is to develop the rules which 
will apply in the sinmlator tests. 
In tllis chapter a particular technological scenario will be assumed, and general and 
specific rule criteria will be noted. Previous collision regulation/avoidance work from 
wllich new mles might be drawn will be considered. Finally the experimental rule-base 
and tmdergirding justifications will be set out. 
5.2 TECHNICAL SCENARIO 
In Chapter 4 it was apparent that the operational technology and governing regulations 
needed to be compatible. Before a mle-base is devised the technological scenario must 
be considered. The technological scenario assumed for the expeiimental mle-base is as 
follows: manually and automatically operated vessels operate in the same theatre of 
operation: the automatic processor is of the knowledge based expert system type; 
primary radar is available as a sensor. 
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The reasons for choosing this level of technological fit are several: It is most likely that 
automatic coUision avoidance will exist in the same theatre as manual operation. Even if 
automation were to become universally applied, the two modes of operation are bound 
to run concurrently dllling a transition phase. l11e present machine sensors are limited to 
radar. By avoiding ilie more futuristic teclmologies it is likely that ilie scenario will 
represent a common denominator between vessels. By limiting the technology to tl1at in 
current use, the effect of the new regulations will not be confused wiili ilie effect of new 
teclmology, and the existing simulator facilities do not require adaptation for ilie 
experiments. 
5.3 RULE-'BASE CRITERIA 
5.3.1 General criteria 
lllere.are two criteria which may be applied generally to collision regulations: 
-ilie rules must aid collision avoidance by promoting complementary action; 
-the rules must be able to be successfully applied by all vessels in tl1e theatre of 
operation. 
ll1e criteria are derived from ideas concerned wiili the role of collision regulations and 
expressed in chapter 2. It is not supposed tl1at the criteria represent some absolute truth 
or are all encompassing. They do fotm a presumption from which tllis argument will 
develop. 
5.3.2 A discrete rule-base and the collision regulations 
The discrete rule-base which makes up the maclline processor's program must be 
recognised by the judiciary. lllis implies that ilie judiciary sanctions ilie quantification 
in the rule-base. Risk of collision, ilie point of manoeuvre, and sense and scale of 
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manoeuvre would all have to be prescribed and therefore lawful and judicially accepted 
values for specific cases. If there were no manual collision avoidance, then the machine 
program and collision regulations could be one in the same. However, regulations for 
application by the human mariner would be too complex if they attempted to reflect 
judicial quantification for all circumstances. Regulations which reflect judicial 
quantification would have to start with the simplest case. lllis is a two vessel encounter 
in open water. 
5.3.3 Judicial quantification embedded in collision regulations 
Given that the COLREGS 72 are almost devoid of quantification it is worth outlining 
the reasons for including quantification in tl1e regulations, Firstly, judicial quantification 
form the primmy standards against wllich collision avoidance behaviour will be judged 
in the event of a collision. llte mariner will be judged by the standards, and so it is only 
proper to indicate what the acceptable standards are, in the regulations, as far as is 
possible. Secondly, the expert systems will, by defulition, operate using the judicial 
quantification. For simple coordination hummt behaviour needs to be compatible. 
Tllirdly, the argument for mles to act to aid coordination in general, implies a need to 
establish a mutual perception of vmious quantifiable aspects of an encounter. 
The argument for not having judicial quantification embedded in the mles is that it 
cannot account for all circumstm1ces if the regulations are to be kept suitably simple for 
human application. Problems may occur when the human mariner has to decide when 
and how not to obey the simple quantification. When faced with a complex encounter, 
the simple mles may inapproptiately influence the mruiner's decision making. 
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5.3.4 Specific criteria 
Given a pmticular scenm1o, specific criteria can be de1ived from the general criteria. 
The technological scenario is that described in chapter 3 and 4 as "expert systems and 
cuiTently operational technology only". Analysis of this scenario with respect to the 
COLREGS 72 indicates some criteria. 
-mles must not require inputs of specific visual detection 
-mles must not require inputs of vessel classification 
-mles may require inputs of target range and bem1ng 
It is an arguable point whether judicial quantification is necessary in collision 
regulations. The consideration of expe1t system ACAS raises the question, and therefore 
judicial qumttificatiori. will be included in these mles. Titis will allow a preliminary 
investigation into the practicality of such an approach. Tile quantification will be aimed 
at meeting the coordination requirements, and in the fu·st instance aim to be suitable for 
a two vessel encounter in open water. 
-mles should aid a mutual perception of risk of collision 
-mles should aid a mutual perception of the strategy to be applied 
-mles should aid a mutual perception of when manoeuvres are to be made 
Specific criteria on qumttification m·e now established. 
-mles must indicate acceptable values for risk of collision 
-mles must indicate acceptable manoeuvres 
-mles must indicate the acceptable point at which manoeuvres should be made 
The use of target heading (as is extensive in the COLREGS 72) is a grey area in tlus 
teclmological scenario. because of differences in the historical derivation of such by 
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plotting and the instantaneous acquisition through vision. The use of target heading will 
be avoided at this stage. 
5.4 PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Previous research and propositions may be drawn on to help make up new regulations. 
Previous work will be considered under tluee areas: whether to manoeuvre; when to 
manoeuvre, and sense and scale of manoeuvres. 
5.4.1 Whether to manoeuvre (risk of collision) 
If "tisk of collision" describes the state when action to avoid collision is necessary, then 
quantification and a mutual perception of this state must be found. 
l11e predicted distance of closest point of approach (cpa) may be considered as a 
measure of risk. Cpa is mutual between vessels and therefore, given suitably accurate 
prediction methods, mutual quantification is possible, Given an agreed risk value of cpa, 
a mutual perception of risk of collision can be obtained. An agreed cpa can be imagined 
as forming a circular domain around each vessel. Predicted infiingement of the "tisk" 
domain indicates a "tisk of collision" situation. 
5.4.1.1 Domain shape 
Goodwin1, Fujii2 and Coldwell3 used the concept of the ship domain to model and 
quantify mariner behaviour. Goodwin's domain is defmed as "the area about own-ship 
that a navigator wished to keep free with respect to other ship's and stationary objects". 
Traffic observation produced a typical domain shown with three sectors (Fig 5.1). 
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Fig.5.1 
Goodwin domain 
Source: Author based on Goodwin 
Goodwin's domain was modified by Davis4 for the pw-pose of computerised traffic 
modelling (Fig 5.2). The cliffeting sector sizes of Goodwin's domain, and the consequent 
offset vessel in Davis' circular domain, may be attributed to the effect of the COLREGS 
on traffic behaviow-. 
Fig. 5.2 
Davis domain 
Source: Author based on Davis 
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Using the asynunetric Davis domain for definition of risk of collision, a non-mutual 
perception of the encounter may be illustrated Fig.5.3. The relative velocity vectors 
indicate that one vessel has her domain infringed while the other does not. In this 
patticular case, under the present rules the vessel which considers risk of collision to 
exist is required to stand-on. This phenomenon of the domain has caused the validity of 
Goodwin's method of domain const:mction to be questioned5. Goodwin's method of 
domain consbuction pretends that the domain ru·ea is dependent on relative bearing but 
not target aspect. 
Fig. 5.3 
Davis' asymmetric domains give non-mutual assessment of risk 
Source: Author 
The general use of any asymmebic domains for tisk of collision definition is open to 
non-mutual perception (Fig. 5.4). The circular domain with the vessel at the centre is 
necessaty to give mutual perception. The existence of an asymmetric domain is 
probably due to the psychological needs of the matiner who faces retribution in the 
event of a collision. The mariner "needs" to have a greater passing distance for green to 
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green encounters than for red to red because the regulations encourage the latter. A 
greater passing distance is "needed" when passing ahead because the regulations 
encourage passing astern. Regulations which encompassed a quantified definition of 
risk of collision may go some way to meeting the psychological needs of the mariner. 
----t----
..-
..-
Fig. 5.4 
Asymmetrical domains can imply a non-mutual perception of risk 
Source: Author 
5.4.1.2 Domain size 
An agreed size for the symmet:Iical circular domain is necessary for mutual perception. 
Natural domain size will vary depending on many factors including the individual 
mariner, and vessel size. TI1e mle-base domain size must create an acceptable nmm 
from a range of natmal behaviour. Safety must be considered against the needs of 
vessels to make progress on a track. 
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An acceptable size for the open water two vessel encounter is a matter for investigation. 
The size chosen for the experimental regulations is one nautical rnile(mile). This 
speculative figure is justified thus. The domain size should be as small as possible so as 
to minimise dismptions to traffic flow. The minimum value is dependent on the tluee 
factors which effect prediction of collision: interaction, accuracy, and uncertainty. 
Interaction might have a significant effect at a range of no more tl1an a few hundred 
metres. Accuracy of prediction methods such as ARP A, are usually within one mile. 
Casual evidence exists that mariners perceive ARP A as having at least such an 
accuracl. Uncettainty, while impossible to quantify, must be accounted for. Cahilf has 
suggested a "provisional" definition of close qumters as " ... that area around a vessel 
where a collision with an approaching vessel could not be avoided by the action of the 
approached vessel alone if the approaching vessel made a major, sudden and 
unexpected course change". He goes on to consider pmticular scenarios where a vessel 
makes a sudden alteration across the head of the other, as if a steering gear failure had 
occmred. The analysis includes particular ship lengths, breadths, and tactical diameters; 
speed ratios and asswned speed loss in the turn. "Collision zones" are established which 
show the positions of the en·ant vessel at steering gear failure, from which the other 
cannot avoid collision. Of the exmnples given almost all the collision zones were witllin 
a mile radius of the vessel. 
5.4.2 When to manoeuvre 
A mutually perceived point at which manoeuvres are to be made might be measured by 
range and or tin1e. 
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5.4.2. I Range 
Range of target is mutual between vessels and therefore, given sufficient measurement 
accuracy and agreed values, a mutual perception of when to manoeuvre can be had. l'he 
simplicity of range as a manoeuvre trigger is attractive, however a single value does not 
reflect differing relative velocities. 
Relative velocity is a product of vessels' relative positions, individual speeds, and 
individual headings. A cmde allowance for relative velocity can be made by varying the 
manoeuvre range with target bearing. In a simple case targets forward of the beam will 
require action at x, while targets abaft the beam will require action at y, where x>y. This 
would introduce the stand-on give-way concept, giving precedence to slower targets 
being overtaken. A more sophisticated example is Davis' arena concept which he 
created for use in traffic simulation8 The arena was circular with own vessel offset from 
the centre. The arena boundary was asymmetrical relative to own ship heading, which 
does not give a mutual perception of when to manoeuvre. For a mutual perception with 
an asymmetrical arena it is necessary to have knowledge of the target's arena. This 
would need new equipment to illustrate the target arena and is dependent on having 
accurate target heading. In any case the arena is a cmde tool for determining manoeuvre 
point. The arena considers the relative positions/bearings of vessels but does not 
encompass vessel headings. Vessel speeds are allowed for only very roughly in that 
vessels approaching from abaft the beam will in general have a lesser relative speed than 
vessels approaching fi·om fmward of the beam. 1.!1 order to allow for relative velocity it 
is necessary to use time as a measurement of when to manoeuvre. 
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5.4.2.2 Time 
The time to go to an identifiable point in an encounter is mutual between vessels. Given 
suitable measurement accuracy a mutual perception of when to manoeuvre can be had. 
A mutually identifiable point in an encounter is the cpa. lihe time to closest point of 
approach (tepa) is a product of radar plotting and readily available to a good accuracy 
from ARP A By specifying tepa's, mutual expectation can be obtained and give-way 
stand-on responsibilities delimited. Under such a mle, with the cpa at zero, the range at 
which manoeuvres are made will be directly proportional to the relative speed. The 
variability of range with relative speed is likely to achieve more agreeable results than a 
fixed range rule. There are anomalies however at the extremes of relative speed. 
With a very high relative speed, say 60 knots, at 12 minutes to collision the vessels will 
be 12 miles apart. If the vessels are detected and plotted by 12 miles, action in open 
water is possible. Action at 12 miles in more constricted waters is unlikely to be 
attractive. A specialmle may be needed here. 
The difficulty of a low relative speed was recognised by Colley in marine traffic 
computer simulation9. Using a manoeuvring time based on range/range rate, Colley 
found that when tl1e relative speed( range rate) approached zero, vessels would approach 
too close before a manoeuvre was triggered. His solution was the range to domain/range 
rate (RDRR) concept. Measuring the time to a specified domain boundary ensures a 
minimum distance at which a manoeuvre is required or triggered. 
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5.4.2.3 RDRR quantification 
The experimental rule-base uses the RDRR concept. It remains to quantify and fmd the 
most effective balance of range and time elements. Starting with the domain shape and 
range it should be noted that it is not fundamental for the risk domain to be the same as 
the manoeuvre domain. That said, logic argues that if vessels can pass just outside the 
risk domain it is likely to be acceptable for vessels to approach the same domain before 
a manoeuvre is triggered. 1l1e expe1imental rule-base uses a circular manoeuvre domain 
with the vessel at the centre (allowing mutual perception) of radius one mile. A small 
advantage obtained by making risk and manoeuvre domains the same is that the rule-
base appears less complex to the mariner. 
The time values used in the m le-base have been tested by inspection and give apparently 
sensible results in many encmmters. Full validation would need extensive testing and 
consideration of the whole rule-base. Values of 18, 12 and 6 minutes have been used. 
These time markers delineate periods of responsibility. Multiples of 6 minutes are used 
at this stage for ease of a1ithmetic, and their typical use in radar plotting, manual and 
automatic. 
5.4.3 Sense and scale of manoeuvre 
Tlus part of the rule-base will defme the strategy wluch is to be implemented. For 
application to an open water scenario manoeuvres are restricted to·course changes. 
Tite strategies used in the COLREGS 72 were (i) and (iii) as described in chapter 2. In 
applying the strategies the COLREGS 72 used concepts of visual detection and vessel 
classification. As indicated in chapter 3 these concepts carmot be used with thls 
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technological scenario. The new rules must be suitable for vessels operating in any state 
of visibility and the limitations of vessels with restricted manoeuvrability must be 
catered for. In avoiding the need to know target heading, the rules are restricted to a 
fixed sight-line rotation sense, strategy (i) (anti-clockwise) being favowite. 
lltere are many rule proposals published, which appear to offer some 
value 10•11 ·12·13•14•15•16. The specific choice at this stage is not critical; the need is to fmd 
something to test. The point of considering earlier work is not to put forward some 
polished article but to avoid reinventing the wheel. All of the manoeuvre diagram-based 
rules are attractive especially if they contain quantification. The choice for the rule"base 
is the Royal Institute ofNavigation (R!N) working party's manoeuvre diagram 17. 
5.4.3.1 RlN manoeuvring diagram 
Work by Calvett18 in 1960 initiated debate over a more mathematically based approach 
to collision avoidance. A RlN working party which formed in 1970, discussed the 
practical application of work by Calvert and subsequent authors. A manoeuvring 
diagram with majority consent was a result (Calvert was a dissenter). The diagram 
quantifies action according to target relative bearing. Positive action (anti-clockwise 
rotation) is promoted, i.e. strategy (i). Give-way action is required for targets forward of 
a line from 112Yz0 through to 292V2° Abaft the line escape action is recommended. The 
diagram came with accompanying notes which were concerned with resumption of 
course, escape action and changes of speed. ll1e diagram was broadly compatible with 
the "not in sight" rules, which emerged later, in the COLREGS 72. 
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5.5 THE EXPERIMENTAL RULE-BASE 
Two sets of rules have been compiled. Appendix A contains RULE-SET A and RULE-
SET B, in full, as presented to experiment subjects. The workings of the rules are most 
easily understood by direct study and will not therefore be described in full here. It is 
noted that each mle-set is contained on only four pages of A4 including explanat01y 
diagrams. Such conciseness has clear value for operational use, and compares 
favourably against the cmTent regulations. 
5.5.1 Difference between sets A and 8 
The RULE-SETS are different with respect to the escape action of the vessel standing 
on for a target abaft the fore/aft boundary line. Both sets require the vessel to stand-on 
between 18 and 12 minutes before the tisk domain is infiinged. At 12 minutes the 
requirements differ. 
Rule set A specifies escape action for the stand-on vessel. A choice of standing on or 
manoeuvring as per the diagram is given between 12 and 6 minutes. At less than 6 
minutes action as per the diagram is compulsory. 
Rule set B does not specifY escape action, although wise words are offered on what 
should be taken into account when choosing a manoeuvre. The stand-on vessel may 
manoeuvre or continue to stand~on, as is deemed approptiate by the mruiner. 
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5.5.2 Theoretical effectiveness 
5.5.2.1 Manoeuvre diagram 
Action taken by both vessels which is compliant with the manoeuvre diagram will, with 
one exception, result in complementary action. The exception is action for targets 
bearing from 210° to 292V2°. Comparison of the manoeuvring diagram with the 
Calvert/Hollingdale analysis (Fig.2.1 and Fig. 2.2) indicates that the recommended 
action will not contribute to positive rotation. However tllis action will only be 
necessary when the other vessel has failed in her responsibility to give-way at an earlier 
stage. In any case the required action will tend to reduce relative speed and presents a 
minimum aspect to the target. llte me1it of a specific manoeuvre for escape action is 
subject to the experimental investigation in this thesis. 
5.5.2.2 Vessels restricted in ability to manoeuvre 
For most meeting and crossing encounters both vessels have a responsibility to 
manoeuvre. In theory the rules allow some, if not all, of the burden to be removed from 
a vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre. Vessels which are being overtaken are 
generally given stand-on precedence. A vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre, 
finding herself overtaking, may often have speed reduction as an option. 
5.6 SUMMARY AND CONCUJSION 
lltis chapter has discussed and desc1ibed the development of collision avoidance rules 
wllich were tested in a navigation simulator for human applicability. 
A particular technological fit of expert system type processing and primary radar, has 
been asswned for an ACAS. Justification for having judicial quantification embedded in 
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collision regulations has been given. Specific criteria have been derived for the new 
rule-base. 
Previous research which may be of use in constructing new rules has been considered. 
Domain theory has been examined with respect to defining a mutual perception of 
whether to manoeuvre. Achieving a mutual perception of when to manoeuvre involved 
discussion ofrange and time as ctiteria. The supetiority of RDRR themy over arenas is 
noted, 
The sense and scale of manoeuvre causes consideration of strategy. Given the 
technological fit (NB knowledge of target heading is not assumed), ·only a fixed sight-
line sense is acceptable, Much previous work has implied such an approach, and the 
choice made here is the RIN manoeuvre diagram. 
The experimental rules exists as two sets. ll1e differences between the sets concem 
escape. action for stand-on vessels. 
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CHAPTER6 
EXPERIMENTAL TESTING OF THE COLLISION AVOIDANCE RULE.SETS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 5 described the fonnation of RULE-SETS for experimental testing. lltis 
chapter desc1ibes the experimental procedure. The elements in the experiment are the 
navigation simulator; the pruticipating mariners; the individual exercises, and the 
questionnaire procedure. 
6.2 NAVIGATION SIMULATOR 
6.2.1 Simulation as a research tool 
l11e operational analysis of mruine navigational watchkeeping is hindered by the nature 
of the subject. Evaluation of real life events requires researchers and or recording 
equipment to travel with a vessel wl1ich in the course of its usual duties may move 
between ports possibly all around the globe, The time between watchkeeping events (i.e, 
an encounter with another vessel) may be large. l11e tinle between events which are of 
specific use to the analyst (an encounter with a particular set of circumstances) will be 
even larger, possibly spanning years. Wltile modem information teclmologies and 
comrnwtication systems make event recording a more feasible means of data collection, 
they do not solve all the analyst's problems. 
Simulation allows resources to be concentrated solely on significant events. Variables 
can be controlled allowing event factors to be isolated. The repetition of events is easy, 
and measurements can be made to a high accuracy. 
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A particular advantage of simulation over real life is that high risk circumstances may be 
deliberately examined. Operations may be tested to simulated destruction which would 
have a prohibitive cost in real life. New operational techniques may be tried and tested. 
In real life the new operation may be illegal and or as an untested procedure, prove to 
have disaster potential. 
6.2.2 Validity of simulation 
Simulation is widely used as a training and research tool in marine industries. The 
validity of radar simulators for research was considered by Curtis and Barratt1. 
Comparing vessel separations for actual behaviour in the Dover strait with simulator 
exercises, they found that "mariners can be expected to respond in the same way as the 
subjects in the tests, given unrestricted sea room". While the study could not indicate 
that all aspects of mariner response would be the same at sea as in the simulator, it was 
clear that simulator action does have a relationship with actual behaviour. 
In order to create the feeling of attendance on the ship's bridge it has been considered 
necessarv for the simulator to2: 
"1. display the view from the b1idge 
2. model realistically the dynamic behaviour of the ship 
3. provide a simulated radar and instrumentation package." 
6.2.3 University of Plymouth navigation simulator 
l11e simulator used for expe1iments in this research is the Racal MRNS 9000 as 
installed at the University of Plymouth. l11e simulation is in real time, with night time 
visuals, realistic ship models, and simulated radar, instruments and controls. 
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6.2.3.1 Ship models 
The validity of the mathematical ship models used in the simulation has been considered 
by Tapp3. The specification of the vessels simulated in the exercises are detailed in 
Appendix B. The vessels are a tanker, container vessel, ferry and jet foil. The jet foil 
was used in order to achieve a 30 knot speed. l11e mariners were told that the vessel was 
a container ship. 
6.2.3.2 Bridge instruments 
llhe simulator is equipped with radar and ARP A A VDU display indicates heading; 
rudder angle; rate of turn; water log speed; and autopilot demands. Steering by autopilot 
is through push button controL Hand steering by wheel is also available. Speed control 
was not available to mariners in the experiments, however it could have been provided 
by push button or telegraph. 
6.2.3.3 ARPA 
l11e ARP A is the Racal Decca 65411. llus maclline had typical radar and ARP A 
features, The set had a choice of head up or North up display. Electronic bearing line 
and variable range marker were available. Automatic plotting could be switched 
between true or relative mode, and vector length was adjustable to half minute intervals. 
Cpa and tepa, target speed and heading were all displayed. A trial manoeuvre facility 
was available. 
For the experiments an overlay indicating the new rule-base "convention" manoeuvres 
was put around the radar screen. This was valid with respect to target bearing when the 
radar was operated in head up mode. 
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6.2.3.4 Visual scene 
The visual scene is restricted to night time simulation. J:arget vessels show lights as 
prescribed by the COLREGS 72. The arc of visual scene is restricted to 135°. llus is 
from right ahead to 22Y:z0 forward of the port and starboard beams. 
6.2.3.5 Geographical database 
l11e simulator has a geographical data base against which it positions the vessels. l11e 
database includes infmmation which will allow the radar images of land and 
navigational marks to be generated. This will be compatible with an actual geographical 
area. 
In order to create an open sea simulation the vessels were positioned beyond the edge of 
data for radar generated land and navigational aids. In the tests no land or targets other 
than the single target vessel was shown on the radar. 
6.3 HUMAN SAMPLE 
Sixteen mariners took patt in the expe1iments. Seven were recruited from University 
staff and students, nine were externally recruited by selected mail shot and word of 
mouth. One was Canadian, the others B1itish. All were male. To prese~e anonymity 
each was given a code letter. 
All subjects held Class 1 ce1tification or equivalent. Twelve had served as master, the 
remaining four as cluef officer. The total sea time of the 16 was 349 years, equating to a 
mean of almost 22 years per person. 
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All bar one of the mariners had ARP A experience. The mean ARP A expe1ience for the 
15 mariners was just over eight years per person. Experience by ship type was varied. 
Some individuals had only tanker, or only small general cargo experience. The majority 
had a wide range of ship type expetience. Ship size ranged from 300 grt to 200 000 dwt. 
Types included container vessels; tankers, oil and gas; bulk carriers; general cargo; 
reefers; fenies, passenger and RO-RO; frigates; mine-layers and mine-sweepers; tugs; 
customs cutters; launches, and dtill ships. 
The time span over which experience was gained is illustrated in Table 6.1. All had 
operated at sea since the implementation of the last major COLREGS revision (1977). 
Three had begun their careers before the 1948 conference regulations came into force 
( 1954 ). All bar hvo had been at sea within the last five years; 11 of the 16 were 
employed at sea at the time of the expetiments. 
1948 1954 1965 1977 1995 
A lY!IJ 1YY4 
8 1950 il979 
c 195 1 1991 
D 1970 1994 
E .1977 1994 
F 1971 1991 
G 1981 1994 
H 1963 ! 1994 
N :1965 1994 
0 1956 1986 
p 1973 1994 
Q 1950 1994 
R 1955 1994 
s 1971 1992 
T 1969 1995 
u 1972 1995 
Table 6.1 
Sea experience time span of human sample 
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The experiments in which mariners partook are illustrated in Table 6.2. In some 
instances it can be seen that two groups exist, each executing different exercises. The 
groups, where they exist, are mariners ABCDEFGH (A-H) and NOPQRSTU (N-U). 
Experience by group is as follows. 
A-H: Four served as master; four as chief officer. Mean sea time 16.25 years 
N-U: All served as master. Mean sea time 27.375 years. 
The disparity of experience across the groups was unintentional. It will be bome in mind 
during analysis when appropriate. 
Exercise Mariners 
1 ABCDEFGH RSTU 
2 ABCDEFGH -
2X F NOPQRSTU 
3 ABCDEFGH RSTU 
3R F NOPQRSTU 
4A ABCDEFGH -
48 - NOPQRSTU 
4R - NOPQRSTU 
SA ABCDEFGH -
58 - NOPQRSTU 
5R - NOPQRSTU 
6 ABCDEFGH NOPQT 
7 ABCDEFGH NOPQT 
7R - NOPQRSTU 
Table 6.2 
Mariners participating in exercises 
6.4 DESCRIPTION OF EXERCISES 
F owteen different exercises were tun. Eight were completely different, there being 
several with role reversal or different RULE-SET applications. The start conditions for 
each exercise are tabulated in Appendix C. All exercises are open water, two vessel 
encounters. The exercises are described below along with the requirements of the mles. 
The exercises are also described in diagrams showing vessel position and speeds; own 
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domain; relative track of target; and relevant manoeuvre points. All ranges are m 
nautical miles (M). 
6.4.1 Exercise 1 
Own ship is a tanker at I 0 knots. The target, 
initially on a bearing of Green 7°, has a similar 
speed and reciprocal course. The initial 
closing speed is about 20 knots. The target can 
be observed visually a few minutes into the 
exercise. 
If 1w action is taken: the vessels will pass 
green to green with a cpa of0.9M. 
Rule set requirements: tisk of collision exists; 
at range <6.4 but >4.5 stand-on or convention 
manoeuvres only; 
by range 4.5 convention manoeuvre ts 
mandatory; 
convention manoeuvre ts an alteration to 
starboard of 60° to 90°. 
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10 knots 
10 knots 
Figure 6.1 
Exercise 1 
18t 
(6.4M) 
12t 
(4.5M) 
Source: Author 
6.4.2 Exercise 2 
Own ship is a tanker at 10 knots. The 
target, initially on a bearing of Green 11°, 
has a similar speed and reciprocal course. 
Tite initial closing speed is about 20 knots. 
The target can be observed visually a few 
minutes into the exercise. 
If no action is taken: the vessels will pass 
green to green with a cpa of 1.4M. 
Rule set requirements: risk of close 
quarters exists; 
at range <6.6 stand-on or convention 
manoeuvres only; 
convention manoeuvre is an alteration to 
starboard of 60° to 90°. 
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10 knots 
10 knots 
Figure 6.2 
Exercise 2 
Source: Author 
6.4.3 Exercise 2X 
Own ship is a container vessel at 21 
lmots. The target, initially on a 
bearing of Green 6°, has a speed of 
15 lmots and reciprocal course. The 
initial closing speed is about 36 
knots. The target can be observed 
visually a few minutes into the 
exerctse. 
If no action is taken: the vessels will 
pass green to green with a cpa of 
1.4M. 
Rule set requirements: risk of close 
quarters exists; 
at range < 11.4 stand-on or 
convention manoeuvres only; 
convention manoeuvre ts an 
alteration to starboard of 60° to 90°. 
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15 knots 
21 knots 
Figure 6.3 
Exercise 2X 
Source: Author 
6.4.4 Exercise 3 
Own ship is a tanker at 15 knots. The 
target, initially on a bearing of Green 4°, 
has a speed of 21 knots and a reciprocal 
course. The initial closing speed is 36 
knots. The target can be observed 
visually a few minutes into the exercise. 
If no action is taken: the vessels will 
pass green to green with a cpa of0.9M 
Rule set requirements: risk of collision 
exists; 
at range <11.3 but >7.8 stand-on or 
convention manoeuvres only; 
by range 7.8 convention manoeuvre IS 
mandatory; 
convention manoeuvre is an alteration to 
starboard of 60° to 90°. 
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21 knots 
15 knots 
121 
(7.8M) 
Figure 6.4 
Exercise 3 
Source: Author 
6.4.5 Exercise 3R 
Exercise 3R is exercise 3 with roles reversed. 
Own ship is a container vessel at 21 knots. 
The target, initially on a bearing of Green 4°, 
has a speed of 15 knots and reciprocal comse. 
The initial closing speed is about 36 knots. 
The target can be observed visually a few 
minutes into the exercise. 
If 110 action is taken: the vessels will pass 
green to green with a cpa of 0.9M 
Rule set requirements: risk of collision exists; 
at range <11.3 but >7.8 stand-on or 
convention manoeuvres only; 
by range 7.8 convention manoeuvre ts 
mandatory; 
convention manoeuvre 1s an alteration to 
starboard of 60° to 90°. 
13 1 
15 knots 
21 knots 
12t 
(7.8M) 
Figure 6.5 
Exercise 3R 
Source: Author 
6.4.6 Exercise 4 (A&B) 
Own ship is a tanker at 
10 knots. The target 
initially on a bearing of 
Red 127°, has a speed of 
30 knots, and a course 
42° to the starboard of 
own course. The initial 
closing speed is about 
23 knots. The target 
cannot be observed 
visually. 
10 knots 
Figure 6.6 
Exercise 4 A & B 
Source: Author 
If 110 action is taken: the target will pass astern of own, with a cpa of 0.9M occuning 
on own ship's starboard quarter. 
Rule set requirements: risk of collision exists: 
at range <7.5 but >5.3 stand-on only; 
6.4.6.1 Exercise 4 Rule set (A) 
at range <5.3 but >3.0 stand-on or convention manoeuvres only 
by range 3.0 convention manoeuvre is mandatory; 
convention manoeuvre is an alteration to starboard tmtil the target is astern. 
6.4.6.2 Exercise 4 Rule set (B) 
at range <5 .3 stand-on or convention; 
convention manoeuvres are turns to poit or starboard at the mariner's discretion. 
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6.4. 7 Exercise 4R 
Exercise 4R is exercise 4 with roles reversed. 
The mariner is told that own ship is a 
container vessel at 30 knots (in fact the 
simulator ship model is a jet foil). The target, 
initially on a bearing of Green 11 o has a speed 
of lO knots and a course of 42° to the port of 
own course. The initial closing speed is about 
23 knots. The target may be observed visuaUy 
when the range has decreased to about 3 M. 
If no action is taken: own ship will pass 
astern of the target, with a cpa of 0.9M 
occuning on the target's starboard quat1er. 
Rule set requirements: risk of collision 
exists; 
at range <7.5 but >5.3 stand-on or convention 
manoeuvres only; 
by range 5.3 convention manoeuvre is mandatory; 
10 knots 
30 knots 
18t 
(7.5M) 
l2t 
(5.3M) 
Figure 6.7 
Exercise 4R 
Source: Author 
convention manoeuvre is an alteration starboard of 60° to 90°. 
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6.4.8 Exercise 5 (A&B) 
Own ship is a tanker at 10 knots. The target, 
initially on a bearing of Red 177°, has a speed of 
30 knots and a course 7° to the port of own 
course. The initial closing speed is about 20 knots. 
The target cannot be observed visually. 
If no action is taken: the target will pass on own 
ship's port side, with a cpa of 0.9M occurring on 
own ship's port beam. 
Rule set requirements: risk of collision exists; 
at range <6.7 but >4.7 stand-on only; 
6.4.8.1 Rule set (A) 
at range <4.7 but >2.8 stand-on or convention 
manoeuvres only 
by range 2.8 convention manoeuvre is mandatory; 
10 knots 
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(4.7M) 
61 
(6.7M) 
30 knots 
Figure 6.8 
Exercise 5 A & B 
Source: Author 
convention manoeuvre is an alteration to port between 20° and 40°. 
6.4.8.2 Rule set (B) 
at range <4.7 stand-on or convention; 
convention manoeuvres are to pmt or starboard at the mariner's discretion. 
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6.4.9 Exercise 5R 
Exercise 5R is exercise 5 with roles reversed. 
The mariner is told that own ship is a container 
vessel at 30 knots (in fact the simulator ship model 
is a jet foil). The target, initially on a bearing of 
Green 4°, has a speed of 10 knots and a course of 
7° to the starboard of own course. The initial 
closing speed is about 20 knots. The target may be 
observed visually when the range has decreased to 
about 3M. 
If no action is taken: own ship will pass on the 
target's port side, with a cpa of 0.9M occuning on 
the target's port beam. 
Rule set requirements: tisk of collision exists; 
at range <6.7 but >4.7 stand-on or convention 
manoeuvres only; 
by range 4. 7 convention manoeuvre is mandatmy; 
10 knots 
30 knots 
181 
(6.7M) 
121 
(4.7M) 
Figure 6.9 
Exercise 5R 
Source: Author 
convention manoeuvre is an alteration starboard of 60° to 90°. 
6.4.1 0 Exercise 6 
Own ship is a tanker at 10 knots. The target initially on a bearing of Red 58° has a 
speed of 20 knots and a course of 9 1 u to the starboard of own course. The initial closing 
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speed is about 22Y2 knots. The target cannot be obsetved visually unless an alteration to 
port is made by own ship. 
20 knots 
Figure 6.10 
Exercise 6 
Source: Author 
10 knots 
If no action is taken: the target will pass ahead of own at a distance of just less than 
1M, with a cpa of0.8M occurring on own ship 's starboard bow. 
Rule set requirements: risk of collision exists; 
at range <7 .3 but >5 .1 stand-on or convention manoeuvres only; 
by range 5.1 convention manoeuvre is mandatory; 
convention manoeuvre is an alteration to starboard until the target is on the port beam. 
The convention manoeuvre does not eliminate risk of collision in this case. The 
subsequent RULE-SET requirements initially make own a stand-on vessel. At 12 
minutes to domain penetration. own may stand-on or use convention manoeuvres. 
Rule set (A) makes convention manoeuvre mandatory at 6 minutes to domain 
infringement. The convention manoeuvre is to tum to starboard w1til the vessel is astern. 
Rule set (B) does not make convention manoeuvres mandatory over standing on. Tite 
convention manoeuvres are turns to port or starboard at the mariner's discretion. 
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6.4.11 Exercise 7 
Own ship is a container vessel 
at 20 knots. The target, 
initially on a bearing of Red 
40°, has a speed of 18 knots, 
and a comse 84° to the 
starboard of own comse. The 
i.nitial closing speed is about 
25 knots. The target can be 
observed visually soon after 
the exercise begins. After an 
alteration to starboard visual 
contact may be lost. 
If no action is ta/(en: the 
target will pass al1ead of own 
Figure 6.11 
Exercise 7 
Source: Author 
20 knots 
at a distance of about l.2M, with a cpa of 0.8M occuni.ng on own ship's starboard bow. 
Rule set requirements: 1isk of collision exists; 
at range <8.2 but >5.5 stand-on or manoeuvre convention only; 
by range 5.5 manoeuvre convention mandat01y; 
convention manoeuvre is an alteration to starboard until target is on the port beam. 
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6.4.12 Exercise 7R 
Exercise 7R is exercise 7 with roles reversed. 
Own ship is a feny at 18 knots. The target, initially on a bearing of Green 56°, has a 
speed of 20 knots, and a course 84° to the port of own course. The initial closing speed 
is about 25 knots. Initially the target cannot be observed visually. Visual observation is 
available after an alteration to starboard. 
20 knots,_ ______ __, 
18 knots 
Figure 6.12 
Exercise 7 R 
Source: Author 
12, 
(5.5M) 
If no action is taken: own ship will pass ahead of the target at a distance of about 1.2M, 
with a cpa of 0.8M occurring on the target's starboard bow. 
Rule set requirements: tisk of collision exists; 
at range <8.2 but >5.5 stand-on or manoeuvre convention only; 
by range 5.5 manoeuvre convention mandatory; 
convention manoeuvre is an alteration to starboard until target is at least 30° on the pmt 
bow. 
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6.5 QUESTIONNAIRE PROCEDURE 
Immediately after each exercise the subjects were given a verbal questionnaire. The 
questionnaire attempted to determine the mariners' usual action at sea in the exercise 
circumstances, and whether they were comfortable following the action prescribed by in 
the RULE-SET. If the mariner was not comfortable following the RULE-SET, he was 
asked what aspect he did not like, and what action he would find agreeable. 
6.5.1 Data collection 
The simulator exercises and questionnaire procedure yield three sets of manoeuvre 
data for each mariner-exercise. The sets are named "usual", "simulator", and "new" . 
"Usual" is intended to reflect the mariner's usual action at sea in the circumstances 
presented to him. "Simulator", is the action actually taken during the simulated 
encounter. "New", is the action that the mariner would be agreeable to in the 
hypothetical case of acting under the new rules, considering his experience in the 
simulator. 
The "usual" and "new" data were obtained by the post-exercise questionnaire. The 
answers given can be related to the actual action taken in the simulator. For 
example, if a ma1iner considers the range at which he manoeuvred in the simulator 
as commensurate with his usual action at sea, then this range is available without 
the mariner having to quantify it. If his usual range for manoeuvre was greater or 
less than that which he made in the simulator, then his answer can be made in 
relative and comparative terms. rather than absolute terms. The extent to which data 
is collected by comparison will depend on the mariner's action in the simulator and 
style of answering. 
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By usmg a post-exercise questionnaire, the circumstances are presented to the 
mariner practically, and an answer reference is created. By minimising the pmely 
cerebral processes that are associated with a "cold calling" questionnaire, and 
maximising the nmms of collision avoidance practice dming the question and 
answer process, a greater level of validity should be achieved. This is particularly 
impmtant for the "new" action data set. 
6.5.2 A learning experience 
The simulator exercise gives the mariner practical experience of applying the new 
rules. It was intended that the period in the simulator be a learning opportunity 
regarding the rules and their application. Each mariner was given a copy of the rules a 
few days before the experiments. He also had explanatory notes and self test questions. 
Before the first exercise began the mariner was questioned as to his understanding of the 
mles and any misperceptions were corrected. 
The mariner's attitude to the rules' application was addressed. Attention was drawn to 
rules 1 and 2. It was made clear that the mariner was responsible for keeping his ship 
safe and that following the mles as if an automaton was not required. It was stated that 
"If the rules do not appear to offer a solution for avoiding risk of collision, you are at 
liberty to take action outside the rules". It was also implied that action outside the rules 
would need to be justified after the exercise. The mariner's attitude to the rules has 
bearing on the action taken in the simulator and the answers given. 
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6.5.3 Questions 1 to 7 
The answers are tabulated in appendix D. A key to the tables is shown below (Figure 
6.13) with an example data cell. Questions one to seven and their use are detailed 
below. 
Individual Question 1: Mariner 
Was your action during the Letter Code 
!exercise commensurate with If the mariner stood on as usual 
vour usual action at sea? !action, he was asked at what cpa he 
!Answer: Yes (Y) No (N) Exercise [would take action. This is given in 
Number !Nautical miles. 
!Answer 2: Question 2: 
Were you comfortable with the IY: Yes 
'(rssessment of" risk of IN: No Range at which !action is taken in 
'c.ol/ision" as prescribed by these !nautical miles. or 
rules (that is, in this encounter l A M : Maintain course 
lthe ntles implied action to avoid Usual action N 
lro/lision to be necessary)? Risk <J/4 N Sense of manoeuvre P: Port Question 3: ~ Range M 6.22 M S: Starboard Were you comfortable Sense M s M 
' 
M: Maintain course 
nanoeuvring at the 
Scale M 75 M prescribed range? Scale of manoeuvre 
Engine N in degrees 
Question 4: M: Maintain course 
Were you comfortable 
with the sense of the !New actionl 
!prescribed manoeuvre? 
IAction in the simulator 
Question 5: 
Were you comfortable 
f-J 
lusual action I 
with the scale of the 
'Jrescribed manoeuvre! 
Question 6: Answer 6: 
lf engine control had been readily N: no effect 
'-- . d 
'(rvailable how would your action +: mcrease spee 
~ave been influenced? -: reduce speed 
Figure 6.13 
Key to exercise result sheets 
Source: Author 
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Question 1 
"Was your action during the exercise commensurate with your usual action at sea?" 
If the answer to this question was Yes, the values for range, sense and scale of the 
manoeuvre which were recorded for the exercise, were taken to represent usual 
behaviour at sea. 
If the answer was No, fwther questions were put to ascettain what was "usual" action. 
Question 2 
"Were you comfortable with the assessment of" risk of collision" as prescribed by these 
mles (that is, in this encounter the nt!es implied action to avoid collision to be 
necessGly)? " 
If the answer to this question was No, the mariner was asked what was the maximum 
cpa at which he would usually make a manoeuvre. 
Question 3 
"Were you comfortable manoeuvring at the prescribed range?" 
If the mariner had manoeuvred within the prescribed range and the answer to this 
question was Yes, the range at which the mariner had manoeuvred in the exercise was 
recorded as new action. 
If the answer was No, the mariner was asked to give an agreeable range of manoeuvre, 
which was recorded as new action. 
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Question 4 
"Were you comfortable with the sense of the prescribed manoeuvre?" 
If the mariner had manoeuvred with the prescribed sense and answered Yes, then that 
sense was entered as new action. 
If the answer was No, the matiner was asked to give an agreeable sense of manoeuvre, 
which was then recorded as new action. 
Question 5 
"Were you comfortable with the scale of the prescribed manoeuvre?" 
If the matiner was comfortable with the prescribed sense of manoeuvre (Q.4), 
manoeuvred to the prescribed scale and answered Yes, his action in the simulator was 
recorded as new action. 
If the matiner had not been comfortable with the prescribed sense of manoeuvre (Q.4), 
he was asked to give a scale to complement the agreeable manoeuvre sense. 
Question 6. 
''If engine control had been readily available how would your action have been 
influenced?" 
Answers could be none, slow down, or slow down combined with a particular action. 
6.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The use and limitations of simulation of navigational watchkeeping have been 
considered. The navigation sinmlator used in this research has been described. 
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The group of mruiners pruticipating in the experiments has been detailed by experience 
and qualification. The expetiment exercises have been described. The requirements for 
vessels acting under the rules are noted. The post exercise questionnaire procedure is 
explained. Three sets of manoeuvre data are ascertained for each exercise: usual action 
at sea; action in the simulator; agreeable action in light of simulator/rule experience. 
6.7 REFERENCES 
1. CURTIS, R.G. and BARRA TT, M.J. On the validation of radar simulator results, 
Journal ofthe Institute ofNavigation, 1981, V.34, p.187-201. 
2. McCALLUM, I.R. Needs ftrst - kit after, the influence of operational considerations 
on ship simulator design, International Conference on Simulators, 1983, p.41. 
3. TAPP, N.J. A non dimensional mathematical model for use in matine simulators, 
MPhil. thesis, (CNAA), University of Plymouth, 1988. 
144 
CHAPTER 7 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Tlus chapter presents and describes the results obtained from the experimental 
work, and will show the subsequent analysis and discussion. First consideration will 
be given to the validity of the results, before conducting an analysis. 
Mariners ' "usual" action will be compared with similar work in qualitative and 
quantitative terms, to give some indication of validity. The influences on the validity 
of mariners ' "new" action will be discussed. 
The analysis will consider the effect of the rules as a whole, and then continue with 
a detailed inspection of the results by individual encounter. The analysis will break 
mariner responses into four parts as may be identified in the rules: Risk; Range 
(point of manoeuvre); Sense (of manoeuvre), and Scale (of manoeuvre). 
7.2 RESULTS 
The results are tabulated in Appendix D, and in more digestible diagram format in 
Appendix E. An example of the result diagram format is given below (Figure 7.1). 
This shows mariners ' sense and scale of action, and the point of manoeuvre in 
relation to time to risk domain infringement. In appendix E, "usual" action and 
"new" action results are shown on the same page for comparison. 
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EXERCISE 1 
USUAL ACTJQNATSEA 
Figure 7.1 
Stand on 
···.,·. 
.... · .. (· ·· .. 
·· . 
Round turn to 
starboard 
Example result diagram (exercise 1 usual action) 
Source: Author 
7.3 VALIDITY OF "USUAL" ACTION AT SEA 
The data for usual action at sea can be validated by comparison with data from 
similar experiments. The comparison data is derived from work by Kemp1, Wang2, 
Corbee and Redfem4 . The detail and results of this work are described in Appendix 
F. 
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Reciprocal course encounters 
7.3.1 Exercise 1 and 2 
The sense of manoeuvre results for exercise 1 and 2 are displayed in Table 7.1. The 
encounters had green to green separations of 0.9 and 1.4M. For simplicity of 
comparison this has been row1ded to 1.0 and 1.5M respectively. Actual data 
collected is indicated by capital letters. It will be noted that as well as at l.O and 
1.5M separation, actual data exists for 0. 75M. Mariners who stood-on at I. OM 
would be asked at what separation would they make a manoeuvre and what 
manoeuvre would that be. No mariner stood-on with a separation of less than 0. 7M. 
Lower case letters indicate interpolated data. The interpolation is dependent on two 
assumptions. First, all mariners will alter to starboard when the separation is zero. 
Second, having maintained course for a patticular separation, mariners will maintain 
course for a greater separation. Data that defies interpolation despite the two 
assumptions is entered with both possibilities. Data from Kemp, Wang and Cm·bet 
is shown for comparison. 
7. 3 .1.1 Significant differences between comparison data and actual data 
The comparison data is obtained from encounters with exactly the same geometty as 
encounters 1 and 2. The vessels' speeds are the same or similar. However, there are 
several significant differences that must be considered when making a comparison. 
All three comparison data sets were derived from encounters in restricted visibility. 
Exercises 1 and 2 were conducted in conditions with night time visual detection. It 
may be expected that in conditions with visual detection, a smaller passing distance 
will be acceptable to mariners. 
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Green to green Off set (Miles) 
0.0 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.5 2.0 
A s s s M M m 
B s s s s M m 
M c s s s M M m 
a D s s s M M m 
r E s sp sp p M m 
I F s s s s M m 
n G s s s s M m 
e H s sp sp p M m 
r R s s s s sm sm 
s s s s s s sm sm 
T s s s M M m 
u s sp sp p pm pm 
Total l2s 9s:3sp - 5S:4M:3P 2sm:9M: lpm 2sm:9m: !pm 
Kemp 6S 5S: lP - 4S :2P 2M:4P 5M: IP 
Wang 9S 7S:2P - 5S:4P 2S:2M:5P 2S :6M: IP 
Corbel(%) 98S 78S :3M: l 2P - 34S: 16M:25P - IS:66M: 15P 
Table 7.1 
Exercise 1 and 2, usua l manoeuvre sense results compared with data from 
Kemp, Wang and Corbet 
Key: S alteration to starboard 
M course maintained 
P alteration to p01t 
Upper case: actual data 
Lower case: interpolated data 
The Kemp and Corbet data sets were derived from conditions with manual radar 
plotting. Exercises 1 and 2 used ARP A. It may be expected that the superior 
accuracy associated with automatic plotting would tend to encourage smaller 
passing distances. It is not known what plotting method was available in the Wang 
experiments. 
The Corbet data was obtained by a questionnaire. There may be a tendency for 
responses to a questionnaire to lean towards the strict compliance with rules, rather 
than reflect actual behaviour at sea. 
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The vessel size used by Kemp and Corbet was 10 000 and 15 000 tons respectively. 
Experiments 1 and 2 used a 98 000 ton tanker. The effect of using a much larger 
vessel is not clear. Goodwin's work suggested that while an increase in vessel size 
was accompanied by a general trend of increased domain size, the largest of vessels 
tend to accept smaller passing distances. It is not known what vessel size was used 
in the Wang experiments. 
Vessel speed in the Corbet experiments was 12 knots. The slightly faster speed may 
encourage an alteration to starboard across the head of the target, instead of stand-
on and port alterations. 
The sample of mariners is different regarding time, race and expetience. The Kemp 
experiments were carried out in the early 1970's, Corbet' s questimmaire during the 
period 1980-81, and Wang, by 1987. Corbet has compared data collected for his 
questiormaire with a similar study over 1968-69 (See Appendix F). The results 
differ significantly. The earlier data for green to green reciprocal encounters, show a 
greater tendency to alter to port and greater reluctance to alter to starboard. The 1 
mile passing distance was accepted more than twice as readily in the 68/69 study. 
The change in behaviour may be due to the introduction of the 1972 conference 
mles in 1977, and conunensurate change in training. Whatever the reason, the 
change must be considered when making the comparison. 
The nationality of the subjects participating in the experiments in this thesis was 
British and one Canadian. It is assumed that the subjects in the Kemp and Corbet 
exercises were at least in the main British. The subjects for Wang's experiments 
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carried out at Dalian Maritime University, were probably Chinese. There may be 
differences in culture and training regime that will influence the data. It is not 
known whether there is any effect or what this would be. 
The marmers who participated in the experiments for this thesis were of high 
experience. All had Class 1 certificates, Y4 had command experience, and the mean 
sea time accrued was almost 22 years. The subjects used by Kemp and Corbet 
appear, as groups, to be a little less experienced in terms of cer1ification and sea 
time. The effect of this difference if any is not known. The experience of the Wang 
subjects is not known. 
7.3.1.2 The comparison 
Despite the differences mentioned above it may be expected that a similar 
qualitative pattern of the distribution of manoeuvre sense will be in evidence if the 
results are valid. The quantitative element of the distribution will be affected by the 
difference factors . 
The distributions of starboard, stand-on and port alteration for all four sets of data 
have been presented graphically (Figures 7.2/3/4). For ease of comparison the data 
has been converted to percentages . It should be remembered that the actual number 
of mariners represented are 6 (Kemp), 9 (Wang), 108 (Corbet) and 12 (Perkins). 
There was no data at 1.5M for Corbet. The Perkins data only has points at l.OM and 
1.5M. The other points are made up by using the interpolation method indicated for 
Table 7 .1. Where the data point could not be interpolated, · for the sake of the 
graphical presentation. each possibility was awarded Y2 a mariner each. 
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7. 3 .1. 3 Distribution of starboard alteration 
lt may be expected that with a cpa of zero, all mariners will alter to starboard. As 
the separation increases, the number altering to starboard will decrease until all 
accept the passing distance or alter to pmt. The Perkins data follows this pattem as 
does the comparison data. In quantitative terms the Perkins data fits within the 
bounds of the comparison data. This analysis gives no reason to suspect the validity 
of the data. 
100 
90 
80 -
. 70 
% of manners 60 
altering to 50 
starboard 40 
30 
20 
10 
...._ 
' -._. , 
' . 
' ' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
" 
0~------+-------+-------+-----~ 
O.OM 
Source: Author 
0.5M 1.0M 1.5M 
Green to green offset 
Figure 7.2 
Exercise 1 and 2 
Distribution of Starboard alteration 
7.3.1.4 Distribution of stand-on manoeuvre 
2.0M 
--Kemp 
······· Wang 
-- --Corber1 
--o--Perkins 
It may be expected that with a cpa of zero, no mariners will stand-on. As the cpa 
increases so will the number of mariners, w1til all accept the passing distance and 
stand-on. The Perkins data follows this pattem as does the comparison data. In 
quantitative tetms it can be seen that the Perkins mariners will more readily stand-
on at lesser cpas than the comparison data mariners. The acceptance of smaller 
passing distances may be explained by the differences described above: visual 
detection and use of ARP A. The validity of the data is supported by this analysis . 
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90 
80 
70 
60 
%of mariners 
standing on 50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
O.OM 
Source: Author 
0.5M 1.0M 1.5M 
Green to green offset 
Figure 7.3 
Exercise 1 and 2 
Distribution of Stand-on manoeuvre 
7.3 .1.5 Distribution of port alteration 
2.0M 
--Kemp 
······· Wang 
-- --Corber1 
-D-Perkins 
It may be expected that with a cpa of zero, the number of mariners altering to port 
will tend to zero. As the cpa increases, in a green to green reciprocal encounter, the 
number of mariners altering to port will initially increase, and then decrease to zero. 
The Perkins data follows this pattem as does the comparison data. In quantitative 
terms the Perkins data partially coincides with the Corbet data, however, there is a 
considerable disparity with that of Kemp and Wang. The comparison over time 
carried out by Cor bet (as considered above) suggests that the Kemp data collected in 
the early 1970's will indicate a higher proportion of alterations to port than data 
collected at a later date. This argument cannot be applied to the Wang data that is 
reported much later. That the Perkins data shows a partial correlation with the 
Cm·bet data arouses suspicions about the effect of questimmaires. It may be that 
answers given in the questionnaires, both Perkins and Corbet, lean towards strict 
compliance with the COLREGS rather than nmmal behaviour at sea. Mariners may 
not be prepared to admit that they alter to port in such circumstances. This analysis 
indicates that the data is broadly in tune with expectations, however it must be 
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considered that the data may not nuly reflect the extent of port alterations. There 
may be a corrunensurate over repotting of the altemative actions: alteration to 
starboard and stand-on. 
70 
60 
% of mariners 50 
altering to port 40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
O.OM 
Source: Author 
7.3.2 Exercise 3 
0.5M 1.0M 1.5M 
Green to green offset 
Figure 7.4 
Exercise 1 and 2 
Distribution of Port alteration 
--Kemp 
---·-·· Wang 
-- - - Corbert 
--o--Perkins 
2.0M 
The sense of manoeuvre results for exercise 3 are displayed in Table 7.2. Actual 
data collected is for green to green separations of 0.9M and occasionally 0.75M and 
0.5M. Other data points are filled by interpolation using the method previously 
desctibed for Table 7.l. Data from Redfem is shown for comparison. The only 
difference between the Redfem exercise EDTP24 and exercise 3 is that the fanner 
had a cpa of 0.4M and the later 0.9M. Other aspects of encounter geometry were the 
same. Other factors , ship speeds and type; the simulator and bridge equipment, and 
the general level of experience of the human sample, were similar. 
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Green to green Offset (Miles) 
0 0.4 0.5 0.75 0.9 
A s s s M 
B s s s 
M c s s s M 
a D s s s 
r E s s/p p 
1 F s s s 
n G s s s 
e H s s s p 
r R s s s 
s s s s s 
T s s s M 
u s s s 
Total 12s lls : ls/p 7S:3M:2P 
Red fern 8S:OM:IP 
Table 7.2 
Exercise 3, usual manoeuvre sense results, compared with data from Redfern 
12 
10 ~ Number of 8 --Starboard 
- · · · · · · Maintain manners 6 
----Port 
4 
2 -
---:-.-:..-::-- _.:. -- -
0 - --
OM 0.4M 0.75M 0.9M 
Green to green offset 
Figure 7.5 
Exercise 3, manoeuvre sense results 
Source: Author 
Figure 7.5 illustrates the distribution of the manoeuvre sense as plotted from the 
tabulated data at points 0; 0.4; 0. 75, and 0.9M. The data and interpolation are in 
keeping with the expected pattern. A quantitative examination shows that at 0.4M, 
11 of 12 mariners will definitely alter to starboard, leaving one whose sense of 
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alteration carmot be detennined. No mariner will stand-on. Redfem's results show a 
good conelation. Eight of nine alter to starboard, and one to port. No mariner stood-
on. There is nothing in this analysis to cast doubt on the validity of the results. 
7.3.3 Exercise 2X and 3R 
Table 7.3 indicates the results of exercise 2X and 3R. Actual data was collected for 
points 0.9M and 1.4M and occasionally 0.75M. Other data is derived from the 
interpolation method desctibed earlier. Data from Redfem is shown for compatison. 
Green to green Offset (Miles) 
0 0.4 0.75 0.9 1.4 
F s s s s 
M N s s s M 
a 0 s s s M 
r p s s s M 
I Q s s s s 
n R s s s s 
e s s s s M 
r T s s s M M 
s u s s/p p M 
Total 9s Ss: ls/p 7S:IM:IP 3S:6M:OP 
Red fern 7S:OM:2P 
Table 7.3 
Exercise 2X and 3R, usual manoeuvre sense results compared with data from 
Redfern 
The only difference between the Redfem exercise EDTP24 and exercise 2X and 3R 
is that the initial cpas are 0.4M, 0.9M and 1.4M respectively. All other aspects of 
the simulated encounter are the same. Figme 7.6 illustrates the distribution of the 
manoeuvre sense as plotted from the tabulated data at points 0; 0.4; 0.9, and 1.4M. 
The data and interpolation are in keeping with the expected pattern. A quantitative 
examination shows that at 0.4M, 8 of the 9 mariners will defmitely alter to 
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starboard, leaving one who ' s sense of alteration cannot be determined. No mariner 
will stand-on. Redfem' s results show reasonable correlation. Seven will alter to 
starboard and two to port. Again, none stood-on. There is nothing in this analysis to 
cast doubt on the validity of the results. 
10~----------------------------~ 
8 
Num?erof 6 
manners 
4 
2 
0+----~-~-----~~-~~-·~_.7_~--~--~-~~---_-__ -_-_-~-~ 
OM 0.4M 0.9M 1.4M 
Green to green offset 
Figure 7.6 
--Starboard 
..... .. Maintain 
----Port 
Exercise 2X and 3R, manoeuvre sense results 
Source: Author 
Right angled crossing 
7.3.4 Exercise 7 
The sense of manoeuvre results for exercise 7 are displayed in Table 7.4. Results 
from Red fern ' s EDTPO 1 are shown for comparison. Differences between exercise 7 
and EDTPOI were that the initial cpas were 0.8M and 0.3M respectively, and that 
other vessels were present in the Redfem exercise. The greater passing distance will 
increase any tendency for standing on. The other vessels in EDTPO 1 were largely 
incidental. However, the presence of a target being overtaken on own vessel 's pot1 
side may have had a dissuading influence on alterations to port. 
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Perkins Redfem 
Action No. % No. % 
Ale starboard 5 38 6 40 
Round turn starboard 6 46 7 46 
Ale pmt 1 8 1 7 
No action 1 8 1 7 
Total 13 lOO 15 100 
Table 7.4 
Exercise 7, usual manoeuvre sense results compared with data from Redfern 
The distribution of sense of manoeuvre can be seen to be almost identical between 
the Perkins and Redfem data. This includes the distinction between round tums to 
starboard and other starboard alterations. It is noted that the port alteration in the 
Redfem data set was unintentional. 
The range at which manoeuvres were made are plotted in Figure 7.7. Apa1t from 
one exceptionally early manoeuvre the Perkins data broadly matches that of 
Redfem. Three miles is the clear mode in the Perkins data. It is suggested that while 
BD-------------------------------~ 
6 -
5 
Range 4 (Miles) 
3 -
2 . 
1 . 
0~--~-+~~+-~-+----~~~-+~~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
No. of mariners 
Figure 7.7 
--tr-Redfern 
-Q-Perkins 
Exercise 7, point of manoeuvre results compared with data from Redfern 
Source: Author 
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three miles appears as a mode for the questionnaire a more true reflection of action 
at sea is that indicated by the Redfem data, with action being taken over a less 
defmed array of ranges. The Redfem data also suggests that some individuals will 
take action at less than two miles. This is not indicated by the Perkins data. 
NB. The Perkins' port alteration was made at 8.5M but is not plotted for range in 
Figure 7. 7. The Redfern port alteration could not be distinguished from the 
starboard alterations and has been plotted. 
7.3.5 Exercise 7R 
Exercise 7R can be compared with Redfern' s EDTP02. Differences between 
exerctse 7R and EDTP02 were that the initial cpas were 0.8M and 0.3M 
respectively, and that other vessels were present in the Redfern exercise. The greater 
passing distance will increase any tendency for standing on. The other vessels in 
EDTP02 were largely incidental. However, "the situation was complicated by the 
presence of a second vessel, T3, crossing from starboard which posed no immediate 
threat, having an earlier and negative cpa of two miles, but could influence the time 
at which action was taken." In fact only two Redfern mariners waited to pass ahead 
of the second target before taking action to avoid the main threat. 
The manoeuvre sense results of exercise 7R are shown in Table 7.5 with EDTP02 
results for comparison. No mariner stood-on in either of the experiments. All the 
Perkins mariners altered to starboard, with 13 of 15 Redfern mariners doing 
likewise. It must be suspected that a proportion of mariners will alter to pm1 in these 
circumstances as suggested by the Redfern data. The mariners making up the 
Perkins sample are N to U who are, as a group, of especially high experience. 
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Perkins Redfem 
A/c staroaJd 8 13 
A/c Port 0 2 
No action 0 0 
Total 8 15 
Table 7.5 
Exercise 7R, usual manoeuvre sense results compared with data from Redfern 
The scale of starboard manoeuvre ranged from 60° to 95°, with an average of 77 'h0 , 
for the Perkins data set. The Redfem mariners made "substantial alterations of 
comse to starboard, the average value being 76°". Both data sets indicate a clear 
similarity in tllis case. 
7.3.6 Summary of usual action validity 
7.3.6.1 Limitations 
Before summarising the findings of the validity comparisons, it is first proper to 
consider the limitations of the method. Perhaps most important is the limited 
amount of experimental and comparison data. Only the Corbet data ( 108 mariners) 
could begin to stand any serious scmtiny from a statistician. Given that the data sets 
are of a small size, what can be inferred will only show where the results are 
invalid, or suspected, rather than a positive validation of the data. 
Another limitation is that of the similarity of comparison encounters. None of the 
encounters had exactly matching circumstances, which results in a need to consider 
the likely effect of the difference. Clearly different mariners on different days may 
be included as differing circumstances, but here, only a large sample will counteract 
the diversity. Not all the experiment exercises had "usual" action data available for 
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comparison. Reciprocal and crossing encounters were covered, but overtaking and 
overtaken were not. 
7.3.6.2 Results validity 
Overall the results appeared to show a high level of correlation with the comparison 
data. Four issues can be identified which indicate the likelihood of invalidity. 
The results for exerc1se 1 and 2 indicate a suspected under reporting of port 
alteration. If this is so, there will be a commensurate over reporting of starboard or 
stand-on action. 
Exercise 7 produced a too common range of manoeuvre answer for give-way action, 
The usual action is more likely to be over a more even spread around the value of 
the reported range. 
The range at which give-way action was taken for exercise 7, may be artificially 
early for some mariners, who would usually act atless than 2M in practice. 
In exercise 7R no mariner altered to port. The size of the sample may not be large 
enough to indicate this action and or under reporting may be extant. The comparison 
data indicates that a proportion ofthe mariners will make a port alteration. 
7.4 VALIDITY OF ACTION UNDER THE NEW RULE-SETS 
The results for new rules can give some indication ofthe ease with which such rules 
might be implemented at sea in reality. The results do not directly represent what 
160 
will happen at sea if the new rules are implemented. The various reasons for the 
difference between the simulation results and actual operation are discussed below. 
7Al Attitude to mles 
The force of law that suppot1s the current COLREGS has an affect on the mariner's 
attitude towards rules and their application. That deviants can face punishments will 
influence attitude. There was no ·real force of law acting on mariners during the 
simulator exercises and post exercise questionnaire. While a mariner may have been 
uncomfortable with action prescribed by the new rules, they may have obeyed if the 
force of law had been extant. Conversely, the mariner may act within the scope of 
the rules while under training or observation, but go on to develop non-compliant 
behaviour when at sea. Time and experience will influence the application of rules. 
The human constantly updates his problem solving method. 
7.4.2 Experience of and with rules 
The mariners' experience of the new rules is minimal. The period· spent learning the 
new rules was a matter of a few hours; experience of applying the rules was limited 
to the exercises in the simulator. This must be contrasted against the lifetime of 
experience and training that the mariner has received for the existing rules. The 
introduction of any major revision of the COLREGS, would today be accompanied 
by a package of education and training, preferably using simulators. Novice 
manners would be 'indoctrinated' with the new rules at the beginning of their 
career. 
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7.5 ANALYSIS 
Questions that the experiments may be used to answer include 
What is the effect of the rules? 
What is the chance of implementing the rule-base? 
What is the chance of implementing individual rules? 
To evaluate the effect of the rules it is necessary to consider two features of the 
results. First, how many mariners would be compliant with the rule-base by their 
usual action at sea, and second, how many mariners may be persuaded to change 
their behaviour to comply with the rule-base. This analysis will be done, 
considering the results as a cumulative whole, 
7.5.1 The effect of the rules 
Table 7.6 indicates the number and proportion of mariners who are not compliant 
with the rules as their usual action, and their new action. It also shows the change in 
behaviour effected by the rules. The analysis breaks down mariner action into Risk; 
Range; Sense and Scale of manoeuvre. 
NB. Mariners have been judged as being compliant with the point of manoeuvre 
rule if they manoeuvre within one minute of the proper time period. 
7.5.1.1 Risk 
On 19 out of 117 occasions ( 16% ), mariners did not "usually" consider risk to exist. 
On only 6 out of 117 occasions (5%) did mariners feel uncomfortable complying 
with the new rules. The effect of the new rules was to change mariner behaviour on 
13 out of 19 occasions (68%). 
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1 2 2X 3 3R 4A 4B 4R SA SB SR 6 7 7R TOT % 
Risk Usual 4112 0/9 0/9 3/12 1/9 5/8 1/8 2/8 0/8 2113 1113 0/8 19/1 17 16% 
New 2112 0/9 0/9 1/12 119 2/8 0/8 0/8 0/8 0/ 13 0/13 0/8 6/117 5% 
Change 2/4 0/0 0/0 2/3 0/1 3/5 1/1 2/2 0/0 2/2 l/1 0/0 13/19 68% 
Range Usual 1/8 3/9 1/8 1/3 117 3/7 2/6 0/6 2/8 8/ 11 10/12 0/8 32/93 34% 
New 1110 2/ll 0/8 2/6 117 3/8 6/8 0/6 2/8 5/ 13 6/13 1/8 291106 27% 
Change 0/1 1/3 l/1 0/1 0/1 0/3 0/2 0/0 0/2 4/8 5/10 0/0 11/32 34% 
Sense Usual 3/8 0/3 2/9 118 1/3 117 5/6 3/8 1/ 11 111 2 0/8 18/83 22% 
New 2110 0/4 2/ 11 1/8 4/6 1/8 7/8 3/8 l/ 13 0/13 0/8 2 1/97 22% 
Change l/3 0/0 0/2 0/1 0/1 l/1 0/5 0/3 0/1 111 0/0 3/18 17% 
Scale Usual 0/5 1/3 217 417 1/2 6/6 1/l 4/5 9/10 9/11 4/8 41/66 63% 
New 0/8 1/4 019 217 1/2 717 111 4/5 6/ 12 1/13 2/8 25/76 33% 
Change 0/0 0/1 2/2 2/4 0/1 0/6 0/1 0/4 3/9 8/9 2/4 17/41 41 % 
Table 7.6 
Proportion of new rule non-compliance for usual and new action, and the effect of new rules on mariner behaviour 
Note: Consider entry for Exercise 1, Risk. 
"Usual 4/ 12" indicates that four out of 12 mariners would not usually(under present rules) take action(w.r.t Risk) that complied with 
the new rules. 
"New 2/12" indicates that two out of 12 mariners were not agreeable to the prescribed action under the new rules. 
"Change 2/4" indicates that the effect of the new rules was to change mariners' usual behaviour to rule compliant behaviour on two 
out of four occasions. 
Mariners who did not accept risk criteria are not considered for compliance w,r, t Range or Sense or Scale of manoeuvre. 
Mariners who did not accept Sense of manoeuvre are not considered for compliance w.r.t Scale of manoeuvre. 
The risk criterion used in the rule-base appears to be generally acceptable to the 
mariners in the circumstances presented to them. It is suggested that the one mile 
radius risk domain would maintain its acceptability regardless of the geometry of 
encounters presented. The slowest vessel in the experiments was at 10 knots. Slower 
vessels will have increasing difficulty with this rule. Encounters with a cpa > 1\tiM 
were not presented and therefore the validity of the size of the "close-quarters' 
domain" cannot be stated. This issue is considered below, in fmther detail when 
discussing the individual exercises. At first sight it appears that the risk rule would 
have a good chance of being successfully implemented for open water, two vessel 
encounters. Fmther consideration would have to be given to "slow" vessels. 
7.5.1.2 Range 
On 32 out of 93 occasions (34%), mariners would "usually" alter course at a range 
that was outside the rule-base. On 29 out of 106 occasions (27%), mariners felt 
uncomfmtable altering at the range specified in the new rules. The effect of the new 
rules was to change mariner behaviour on ll out of 32 occasions (34%). 
The requirement to alter at particular points required a significant change in mariner 
behaviour. On only a 1/1 of occasions, were mariners prepared to make the change. 
At first sight there is some doubt whether this rule could be implemented 
successfully as it stands. A more detailed examination below. will reveal that 
mariners' difficulty with this rule is mainly concentrated around encounters with a 
vessel crossing from the port side, and that the sense of manoeuvre prescribed for 
one encounter (Ex.5A) affected the mariners' answer regarding the acceptable point 
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of manoeuvre. If these individual cases can be addressed, the acceptance of the 
point of manoeuvre rule will be greater. 
Specific manoeuvring points in rules are a novel idea for the mariners who partook 
in the experiments. One mariner (who represents five occasions of being 
uncomfortable with this aspect of the rules), admitted finding the use of vector 
lengths to determine the point of manoeuvre, an "alien experience," and to not really 
understanding the reasoning behind the rules. The use of education to emphasise the 
coordination benefits of such a mle, is likely to have a significantly beneficial 
effect 
7.5.1.3 Sense 
On 18 out of 83 occasions (22%), mariners would "usually" alter course in a sense, 
conh·ary to the requirements of the new mles. On 21 out of 97 occasions (22%), 
mariners felt uncomfottable altering in the sense specified in the new mles. The 
effect of the new mles was to change mariner behaviour on 3 out of 18 occasions 
(17%). 
In two exercises, 4A and 5A, the new rules required the mariners to take action that 
clearly put their vessel at risk. If these exercises are discounted, then the mariners 
operating outside the rule-base reduce to 16% for usual action and 12% for new 
action. 
While the number of disaffected mariners may be small, the impact that the rule has 
on them is also small. A more detailed examination of individual exercises below 
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will indicate that most non-compliance with the sense of manoeuvre part of the 
rules, is perpetrated by mariners who may be judged to be non-compliant with the 
current regulations. This may suggest that the natural action of mariners is dominant 
over rule following. Extraordinary efforts may be needed to make the disaffected 
mariners comply in these cases. 
7.5.1.4 Scale 
On 41 out of the 66 occasions (63%) when mariners would "usually" alter course in 
the sense required by the new rules, they would not alter to the scale required. On 
25 out of 76 (33%) occasions, mariners who alter in the coiTect sense by the new 
rules, felt uncomfortable altering to the scale specified in the new rules. The effect 
of the new mles was to change mariner behaviour on 17 out of 41 occasions ( 41 %). 
The effect of individual exercises is masked by considering the scale of manoeuvre 
results as a whole. Clearly specific circumstances affect the results. In exercise 4R 
the rules failed to make any impact on mariners' action on seven occasions. In 
exercise 7, eight out of nine mariners were prepared to change the scale of their 
manoeuvre. 
The source for the manoeuvre scale, the RIN manoeuvring diagram, was originally 
intended for use when the target was not in sight. In more general use in this rule-
base, sometimes with visual contact and ARPA infonnation available, it is not 
unexpected that the extent of the manoeuvres is deemed to be excessive in some 
circumstances. It is unlikely that this part of the rule-base could be implemented 
successfully. 
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7.6 ANALYSIS IN DETAIL BY ENCOUNTER TYPES 
To examine the remaining non-compliant behaviour it is appropriate to look at the 
exercises individually. In doing so, further insight on the influence of and human 
interaction with rules may be gained. In particular the following questions may be 
answered: 
How can the mle-base or individual rules be modified to enfranchise the non-
compliant mariners? 
How may the non-compliant mariners be encouraged to comply? 
Is it likely that the non-compliant mariners can be persuaded to comply? 
To what extent does the non-compliant action undermine the coordination efforts 
to the mle-base? 
7.6.1 The reciprocal course encounter 
Exercises I, 2, 2X, 3, and 3R were all green to green reciprocal course encounters. A 
rule-base that adopts anti-clockwise sight-line rotation as a convention, risks non-
complementary action in the green to green reciprocal encounter. 
If the mariner considers the initial passing distance in a reciprocal encounter to be too 
small, he must, according to the rules, alter to starboard to effect a red to red passing of 
appropriate distance. However, when the initial sight-line rotation is clockwise, the 
starboard alteration is unattractive because of the need to pass across the target vessel's 
head, and the distance to be covered before original course can be regained. TI1e 
positive action must overcome the existing negative rotation before any red to red 
passing distance is produced. It is tempting for the mariner to alter to port. A port 
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alteration is more in keeping with the natural principles suggested by Kemp (2.3.3.1). It 
is only when the issue of coordination is considered, that a port alteration is faulted. 
lihe strategy implied by the cunent regulations requires an alteration to starboard to 
effect a red to red passing. It should be noted that an alteration to starboard, in this case, 
must be made early enough to cross ahead of the target with a suitable margin. Case law 
supports this common sense observation. 5 Standing on is accepted and presumes 
acceptance of the passing distance. An alteration to port is anti-strategy, although if 
taken at an early stage, when tisk of collision could be deemed not to exist, it may not 
be considered as illegal. However, alteration to pmt is generally censured in texts 
interpreting the regulations.6 An alteration to port to increase the passing distance infers 
that risk of collision exists and therefore the sense of alteration should be to starboard. 
In any case a port alteration contradicts what coordination attempts are made by the 
current rules and as such may be described as anti-regulation. 
The graphs of data from other researchers (Figures 7.2/3/4), illustrate mariner action in 
green to green reciprocal encounters. TI1ere appears to be an opportunity for non-
coordinated action in encounters with passing distances from 0.5 to 2.0M. TI1e potential 
for non-coordination appears to maximise between 1.0 and 1.5M. TI1e exercises I, 2, 
2X, 3, and 3R specifically test in tllis area. 
All 16 mariners took patt in at least two of the green to green reciprocal encounters. Of 
those 16, three (E,H;U) altered to port when the cpa was 0.9M as tl1eir usual action at 
sea. With a cpa of 1.4 E, H, and U would stand-on in the circumstances presented to 
them. 
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llte new rules attempt to avoid non-complementary action by making alteration to 
starboard compulsory when the cpa is sl.OM. Port alterations are banned when the cpa 
is s1.5M. It is hoped that when the initial cpa is> 1.5M the passing distance is accepted. 
7.6.1.1 Exercise 1, 3, & 3R 
Where appropriate, the results from exercises I, 3, and 3R are discussed as a group. 
Usual action: 6P 8M 19S 
New action: 5P 4M 24S 
Table 7.7 
Exercise I, 3, & 3R, usual and new manoeuvre sense results 
7.6.1.1.1 Risk 
Of the 33 exercise nms ( 16 persons), 8 ( 4 persons) usually stand-on at sea. In the light 
of new rules, on4 occasions (3 persons) the risk criterion was accepted, an alteration to 
starboard being made. On the other 4 Iuns (2 persons) the need to stand-on was 
maintained. In this case the rule has had the effect of changing mariner behaviour 
conceming Iisk, on 4 out of 8 occasions. 
7.6.1.1.2 Range 
Of 25 exercise nms ( 16 persons), five ( 4 persons) usually manoeuvre after the twelve 
minute limit. New action saw late manoeuvres reduced to three (2 persons). Of these 
one mariner made two port alterations with only 7 minutes to domain infringement. 
Starboard alterations must be made earlier to effect a reasonable passing distance. 
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7.6, 1.1.3 Sense of manoeuvre 
The usual alteration was to port on a disturbing six (3 persons) out of 25 occasions ( 13 
persons). Of the 6 exercise mns where usual action was an alteration to port, the new 
rules had the effect of changing action in one instance. 
TI1e 20 to 25% of usual port alterations suggested by these results, indicates that the 
cunent regulations in practice, are not providing a coordination solution. TI1at the 
explicit instructions of the new rule-base did little to influence mariner behaviour 
suggests that the problem is deep rooted. A proportion of mariners clearly fmd the 
natural principle of increasing existing cpa more compelling than either set of rules. 
7.6.1.1.4 Scale of manoeuvre 
Exercise l 
Five out of five mruiners who altered to starboard as usual action, would alter by 60-90° 
Eight out of eight mruiners who made a starboard alteration as new action, would alter 
by 60-90° 
Exercise 3 
Five out of seven mminers who altered to starboard as usual action would alter by 60-
900. 
Nine out of nine mariners who made a starboard alteration as new action, would alter by 
60-90°. 
Exercise 3R 
Three out of seven mariners who altered to starboard as usual action. would alter by 60-
900. 
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Five out of seven mariners who made a starboard alteration as new action, would alter 
Own vessel in exercises I, 3, and 3R is a tanker at 10 knots, a tanker at 15 knots, and a 
container vessel at 21 knots respectively. It appears that as the vessels increase in 
collision avoidance ability (greater speed and manoeuvrability) the usual and new 
alteration is decreasing in scale. 
7.6.1.2 Exercise 2 and 2X 
Exercise 2 Exercise 2X 
Usual action OP:9M:OS OP:6M:3S 
New action OP:9M:OS OP:5M:4S 
Table 7.8 
Exercise 2 and 1X, usual and new manoeuvre sense results 
Under the new rules the mariners were allowed to alter to starboard or stand-on. The 
usual and new action was in keeping with the rules. In tllis case the rules did not need to 
alter mariner behaviour. 
As before (I ,3 ,3 R Scale) the results suggest that vessel collision avoidance ability 
affects matiners' choice of manoeuvre. Both exercises had an initial cpa of JAM. In 
exercise 2, where own ship was a tanker at I 0 knots, 9/9 mariners stood on as usual and 
new behaviour. In exercise 2X, where own ship was a container vessel at 2·1 knots, 3/9 
would usually alter to starboard, and 4/9 altered to starboard as new action. 
Witl1 some mariners altering when the cpa was 1.4M, the data collected does not 
indicate what action can be expected with a greater cpa. A greater initial cpa will 
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generally result in more standing on. The results show this. They do not show whether 
those mariners who manoeuvre at cpa 1.4M will stand-on at a cpa of 1.6M (just outside 
the rule domain). Also, they do not show whether the mariners altering to starboard with 
a cpa of 1.4M, will be tempted to alter to port with a cpa outside the rule domain. 
7.6.2 The crossing encounter 
Tluee exercises tested the tight angled crossing case, Exercise 6 and 7 had a target 
crossing from port that would pass ahead creating a cpa of0.8M. In exercise 6 own ship 
was a tanker at lO knots with the target at twice the speed. In exercise 7 own ship was a 
container vessel at 20 knots with the target at 18 knots. Exercise 7R was a reversal of 
exercise 7; own ship was a ferry at 18 knots. 
7.6.2.1 Exercise 7R 
Under the current regulations own ship is required to "give-way" to the target (Rule 15). 
If possible action should "avoid crossing ahead". For avoidance by course alteration this 
implies a turn to starboard. 
7.6.2.1.1 Risk 
Eight out of eight mminers made manoeuvres as usual and new action. 
7.6LI.2 Range 
Eight out of eight would usually act before the 12 minute limit. 
Seven out of eight were agreeable to new action within the 12' minute limit. 
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One out of eight held that a manoeuvre in the I Oth minute was agreeable given that a 
manoeuvre of 80-100° was required. His usual action was an alteration of 60°, 3 minutes 
earlier at 13 minutes. 
7.6.2.1.3 Sense 
Eight out of eight mariners turned to starboard as their usual and new action. It is noted 
that when validating the usual action results (7.3.5), a proportion of mariners would be 
expected to alter to pott in these circumstances. The group of mariners participating in 
this exercise were of paiticularly high expe1ience. 
7.6.2.1.4 Scale 
Four out of eight made a usual alteration of a scale that was in keeping with the rules 
Six out of eight were agreeable to a new action alteration of 80-100°. 
llte remaining two maintained their usual action ( 60° and 70°). 
lllis rule for the circumstances presented was largely uncontroversial. Four of the 
ma1iners would not usually alter so far to starboard. Two of the four were not agreeable 
to alte1ing to the extent required. The responsibilities placed: on own ship by tllis rule, in 
these circumstances, appear to be compatible with tltose accepted by the mariners under 
the existing COLREGS. 
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7.6.2.2 Exercise 6 and 7 
7.6.2.2.1 CwTent regulations 
Under the cwrent regulations, if the vessels are in sight of one another, own ship is 
required to stand-on (Rule 15). The stand-on vessel may take action once it is apparent 
that the give-way vessel is not obeying the mles. This action must avoid if possible, an 
alteration to port (Rule 17(a)(i)). Rule 17(b) requires that the stand-on vessel takes 
avoiding action if she " ... finds herself so close that collision cannot be avoided by her 
action alone ... " l11e give-way vessel may be expected to take " ... early and substantial 
action to keep well clear."(Rule 16). 
7.6.2.2.2 New rules 
The new rules require at or before 12 minutes, an alteration to starboard until the target 
is on the port beam. In exercise 6, this action decreases the cpa and the target will 
continue to cross ahead of own. The tepa is increased and own-ship must stand-on until 
the new 12 minute point. After the new 12 minute point own-ship may continue the twn 
to starboard until the target is astem. 
In exercise 7 altering to starboard until the target is on the port beam creates a cpa of 2 
to 3 M, with own crossing ahead. 
Ex. 6 and 7 
Usual 2P:3M:21S 
New 1P:OM:25S 
Table 7.9 
Exercise 6 & 7, usual and new manoeuvre sense results 
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7.6.2.2.3 Risk 
Of the 26 exercise runs ( 13 persons), on 3 occasions (3 persons) the usual action was to 
stand-on. In the light of the new rules tluee out of tluee accepted the risk criteria and 
altered to starboard. 
7.6.2.2.4 Range 
The point at which action is taken shows a similar pattem across both exercises. 
Pmt alterations 
Both usual pmt alterations were made at 19-17 minutes, 9-7M. 
Starboard alterations 
The point at which usual starboard alterations were made range from 17 to 4 minutes, 8 
to 2M. The mean usual point for alteration is 7.3 minutes, about 3Y2M. Excluding two 
particularly early actions by one mariner (G), the mean reduces to 6.3 minutes, about 
3M. Three miles was also the mode. 
On two out of 21 occasions ( 1 person) altered before tl1e 12 minute point as usual 
action. 
On 11 out of 25 occasions ( 10 persons) altered before the 12 minute point as new 
action. 
Tltis rule required considerable change in mariner behaviour. The rules had the effect of 
changing behaviom on 50% of occasions (see Table 7.6). The principle of standing on 
for a target on the p01t bow appears to have a strong effect, even in the face of contrary 
new rules. 
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7.6.2.2.5 Sense of manoeuvre 
Of the two occasions (2 persons) when action would usually be an alteration to port, the 
mles had the effect of alteting mariner behaviour once. 
7.6.2.2.6 Scale of manoeuvre 
The scale of an alteration to starboard is 
divided into four: 
i) turns to put the target abeam 
ii) tums up to a parallel course 
iii) turns to put the target astern 
iv) round tum (180° tlu·ough to 360} 
The four types of tum are illustrated and 
quantified in Figure 7.8 
Exercise 6 
01iginal 
heading 
(iv) Round turn 
(i) 
Target on 
beam 
(ii) 
Turns up 
to 90° 
(iii) 
Target 
astern 
Figure 7.8 
Exercises 6 and 7, divisions of the scale of 
manoeuvre 
Source: Author 
The scale of starboard alteration in the circumstances of exercise 6 may be made in two 
stages, ( 1) and (2). 
Starboard alterations 
Target Turns up Target Round 
on beam to 90° astern turn 
Usual ( l) 1 4 0 5 
Usual (2) 0 3 1 6 
New (l) 6 3 0 3 
New (2l 0 3 3 6 
Table 7.10 
Exercise 6, usual and new scale of starboard turn results 
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The usual scale of starboard alteration in these circumstances was to parallel the target's 
comse (tw.ns up to 90°) or take a round tw.n. Only one mariner would put the target on 
the port beam as usual action. About half the mariners were agreeable to the new action 
and would put the target on the pmt beam. Most of the convetts were from those who 
would usually make a round tum. Of the fom who usually altered to parallel the target's 
course only one was cornfmtable with the new mles. 
In exercise 6 the target maintained her course making a secondary action necessary for 
the six mariners who had put the target on the port beam. Subsequent application of the 
manoeuvre diagram required a tum to starboard until the target was astern. Tlu·ee would 
do this as new action, the remaining tlu·ee making a round turn. 
Those mariners paralleling the target's comse make a solution to the encounter, with the 
target vessel standing on, with one manoeuvre. Three of the six mariners who would be 
happy to put the target on the pmt beam, saw this manoeuvre as an intermediate step to 
their usual round turn 
Exercise 7 
Starboard alterations 
Target Tums up Target Round 
on beam to 90° astern turn 
Usual 3 1 1 6 
New 12 0 0 l 
Table 7.11 
Exercise 7, usual and new scale of starboard turn results 
Three of the 11 mariners who usually altered to starboard would put the target on the 
pmt beam as usual action. A round tw.n to starboard would usually be taken by six of 
the twelve mariners. Ten out of ll mariners who usually altered to starboard were 
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agreeable to put the target on the port beam as new action. Twelve of 13 mariners who 
were agreeable to a starboard alteration as new action were also agreeable to put the 
target on the port beam. 
7.6.2.2. 7 Compruing exercises 6 and 7 
Clearly mruiners were more comfortable with the new mles in the circumstances of 
exercise 7 rather than exercise 6 as fru· as manoeuvre scale is concerned. In exercise 7 
the new mles offered a proactive means to deal with the target on the p01t beam. Whlle 
the mles were the srune for exercise 6, the matiners were less comf01table with their use 
when in the more passive role. 
7.6.3 Overtaking 
Exercise 4R and 5R present own ship in an overtaking situation. In both cases own ship 
is a container vessel at 30 knots, and has a target on the starboard bow, at a speed of 10 
knots. The cpa is 0.9M in both. In exercise 4R the initial sight-line rotation is anti-
clockwise; in 5R the rotation is clockwise. The cwTent mles require own-ship to keep 
clear of the target and, even under Rule 19( d), an alteration of cow·se to port may be 
acceptable, especially in Ex.5R, but not n01mally in Ex.4R. The new rules require an 
alteration to starboard of 60-90° by the 12 minute point. The only significant difference 
in mruiner behaviour between exercises 4R and 5R was that concerned with sense of 
manoeuvre (see below). 
4R 5R 
Usual action IP IM 6S 3P OM 5S 
New action IP OM 7S 3P OM 5S 
Table 7.12 
Exercise 4R & SR, usual and new manoeuvre sense results 
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7.6.3.1 Risk 
On 15 of 16 occaswns marmers manoeuvred as usual action. All 16 marmers 
manoeuvred as new action. In both exercises the requirements of the new rules 
concerning risk; were commensurate with nearly all the mariners' usual behaviour. 
7.6.3.2 Range 
The usual and new action ranged from 20-6 minutes, 8-3M. The mean new point of 
manoeuvre was 13.75 minutes, almost 6M. Ten out of 15 mariners would usually take 
action before the 12 minute point. The rules had no significant effect on the behaviour 
of the non-compliant mariners. 
7.6.3.3 Sense 
In exercise 4R on the one occasion that a mariner altered to port as usual action, the 
rules had the effect of making new action a starboard alteration. Strangely one mariner 
who would usually alter to starboard, altered to port as new action. In exercise 5R five 
out of eight mariners altered to starboard as usual and new action. TI1e rules had little 
significant effect on the sense of manoeuvre in either exercise. Although there are too 
few results .fi:om which to draw real conclusions, it appears that the initial negative 
sight-line rotation in exercise 5R has a strong influence on the choice of manoeuvre 
sense. 
7.6.3.4 Scale 
Only one of the ll usual starboard alterations fell within the 60-90° scale. No mariner 
was persuaded by the new rules to make a starboard alteration of such an extent. In 
exercise 4R new action ranged from 10-40°. In exercise 5R new starboard alterations 
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ranged from 20-65°. Nearly all mariners found the scale of starboard manoeuvre to be 
excesstve. 
7.6.4 Overtaken 
In exercises 4A, 48, SA and 58, own vessel is being overtaken. The initial scenarios 
are the reverse of exercises 4R and 5R respectively. The exercises 4 and 5 are each 
mn with two RULE-SET versions A and B. 
7.6.4.1Exercise 4A 
7.6.4.1.1 Risk 
Three out of eight manners manoeuvred as usual action. Six out of the eight 
manoeuvred as new action. 
7.6.4.1.2 Range 
Of the three mariners who usually took action, two would wait until after the 12 
minute limit. Five out of six mariners would wait until after the 12 minute limit as 
new action. 
7.6.4.1.3 Sense 
Two out of three mariners altered to starboard as usual action. Two of six mariners 
altered to starboard as new action. The mles made no impact of mariner behaviour 
here. An alteration to starboard in these circumstances could put own vessel into 
greater danger. In exercise 48 the mariner was left to decide an appropriate sense of 
manoeuvre. It is telling that all altered to port. 
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7.6.4.1.4 Scale 
Of the two mariners who altered to starboard only one was within the scale 
presctibed by the rules, for both usual and new action. 
7.6.4.2 Exercise 48 
7.6.4.2.1 Risk 
Seven out of eight mariners manoeuvred as usual and new action. 
7.6.4.2.2 Range 
Six out of seven mariners altered after the 12 minute point as usual and new action. 
7.6.4.2.3 Sense and Scale 
There was no rule instruction as to the sense or scale of the manoeuvre. All seven 
mariners altered to port between 20° and 50°, as usual and new action. 
7.6.4.3 Exercise SA 
7.6.4.3.1 Risk 
Six out of eight mariners would usually take action. All eight manoeuvred as new 
action. 
7.6.4.3.2 Range 
Four out of six mariners would manoeuvre after the 12 minute point as usual action. 
Only two out of eight would wait until after the 12 minute point as new action. 
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7.6.4.3.3 Sense 
Only one out of six mariners would usually alter to port. The same one out of eight 
would make a port alteration as new action. This action would be taken at the 161h 
minute (about six miles). A port alteration after the 12 minute point would put own 
vessel into danger. 
7.6.4.3.4 Scale 
The scale of port alteration required was between 20° to 40°. The single mariner 
altering to port as usual and new action would alter by 60° in each case. 
7.6.4.4 Exercise 58 
7.6.4.4.1 Risk 
Six out of eight mariners would usually make a manoeuvre. Seven of the eight 
manoeuvred as new action. 
7.6.4.4.2 Range 
Seven out of seven ma1iners would wait until after the 12 minute point for both 
usual and new action. 
7.6.4.4.3 Scale and Sense 
There was no mle instmction as to the sense or scale of the manoeuvre. Six out of 
six altered to starboard between 10° and 40° as usual action. Seven out of seven 
altered to starboard between 10° and 60° as new action. 
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7.6.4.5 Comparing exercise 5A and 5B 
A significant difference between the results of 5A and 5B was that in 5B all 
mariners were prepared to wait until after the 12 minute point for their manoeuvres. 
In 5A only two out of eight would wait. It is suspected that the requirement of the 
RULE-SET A to make a specific manoeuvre has influenced the point at which the 
mariners would make their manoeuvre. 
It is noted that different groups of mariners partook in the A and B exercises. The 
group that executed exercise 5B were mariners N to U, who were noted earlier as 
having a higher mean level of experience than the other group, A to H. However it 
is thought that this is unlikely to be significant in this case. 
7.6.4.6 Comparing RULE-SETS A and B 
Rule set B is clearly more acceptable to manners m the given circumstances. 
Inspection indicates that rules specifYing a particular sense of manoeuvre and a 
fixed risk criterion, carmot be safely applied to .the general case for vessels of 
"slow" speed. This phenomenon may be especially noticeable when one is being 
ove1taken. The mariners left to make up their mind what sense of manoeuvre to 
make, waited until after the 12 minute point, hence attempting to maintain the 
coordination effmts of the rules. This suggests that the approach of RULE-SET B, 
with regard to escape action, is the conect one. 
7.6.4.7 Objective rules adversely affecting mariner behaviour 
Rule set A (apart from the caveat of Rule 2) applied to the overtaking exercises ( 4 
and 5) would put own vessel further into danger. The issue of objective rules 
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inappropriately influencing mariner behaviour may be examined here. That only 
once out of 16 occasions (E in exercise 4A) were the rules followed as wrote, 
indicates that the mariners were able to recognise circumstances in which the rules 
could not be safely applied. However the prescriptive sense of manoeuvre required 
in 5A inappropriately affected the range at which action was taken. 
7.7 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
7. 7.1 Validity 
The "usual" action data collected in the experiments appears to show a reasonable 
amount of validity when compared to the work of other researchers. However, the 
sample is small. 
The validity of "new" action data caru10t be ascertained without full scale real life 
implementation of the new rules. Factors that will create a difference between the 
results and actual mariner behaviour if there is full scale real life implementation 
include: 
the mariners making up the human sample were not fully indoctrinated into the 
new rule system; 
the simulation of encounters is a pseudo representation of real life events 
which will to a certain extent make the mariners act differently; 
human behaviour is influenced over time by experience: action today may not 
be representative of action in I 0 years time; 
the force of law and commensurate threat of retribution Is not acting on 
mariners during the simulation exercises or questionnaire. 
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Despite the difference factors it is held that the data does suggest what may be 
acceptable practice, and what rule elements have a chance of implementation. 
7. 7.2 What is the effect of the r:ules? 
The new rules affected mariner behaviour. The effect varied depending on the 
particular exercises. Given the particular experiments carried out, the risk rule had a 
large effect and the sense rule a small one. The mariners maintained a critical view 
of the rules. It is comforting that mminers are prepared to break the rules in order to 
avoid dangerous situations. It is equally disturbing when, despite objective rules, 
some mariners persist with behaviour which is ripe for a non-complementary 
response from a target. 
7. 7.3 What is the chance of implementing the rule-base? 
The chance of implementing the RULE-SET A as a whole as it stands would be 
almost none. Rule set 8 with its less prescriptive approach to escape action would 
have a better chance but would suffer many rule infringements. 
7. 7.4 What is the chance of implementing individual rules? 
Given the particular exercises that were run, the least contentious part of the rules 
was that concerning risk The one mile circular domain as a criterion for risk 
appears to have a good chance of being implemented. Further work concentrating on 
acceptance by slower vessels is necessary. The acceptance and effectiveness of the 
I Y:zM close quarters' domain has not been properly ascertained. 
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The successful implementation of the point of manoeuvre rule is not certain. Other 
parts of the rule-base influenced the acceptance of this rule. For this rule to be 
successfully implemented a programme of education emphasising the importance 
and reasons for the rule would be needed. 
Rule set A required sense of manoeuvre action that put own vessel fmther into 
danger. If the exercises specifically concemed with RULE-SET A are ignored, there 
are only lO out of 83 occasions ( 12%) when mariners were not comfortable with the 
rules. While this is not a great proportion the anti-rule behaviour is likely to be 
deeply rooted and would be difficult to change. The new rules had almost no effect 
on this aspect of mariner behaviour. 
The scale of manoeuvre required by the rules was the part least accepted by the 
mariners. The manoeuvre diagram was originally intended as advice when vessels 
were not in sight of each other. The rule-base had basic data requirements of target 
range and bearing. In practice however mariners had ARP A data and visual input. 
The mariners appear not to accept the general approach of a manoeuvre diagram 
which assumes no knowledge of target heading. It is also clear that knowledge of 
own speed influences acceptable scale of manoeuvre: a faster speed encourages a 
lesser manoeuvre. The rules had a significant effect on mariners behaviour but 
ended with one third remaining non-compliant. It is unlikely that this mle would be 
rigorously adhered to. In most cases the exact scale of manoeuvre is not critical 
which may explain why the mles had a significant effect. 
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7. 7.5 How can the rule-base or individual rules be modified to enfranchise the 
non-compliant mariners? 
As already mentioned the RULE-SET B would have a much better chance of 
implementation than set A. The less prescriptive approach for escape action is more 
acceptable to mariners and appears to better maintain coordination by encouraging 
mariners to stand-on until action is absolutely necessruy. 
The prescription of scale of manoeuvres appears to be not only inefficient but 
unacceptable to mariners in the general case. Removing the general requirement to 
manoeuvre to a particular extent would not harm the coordination efforts of the 
rules. An alternative quantitative requirement could be to make manoeuvres that 
create a prospective cpa of a prescribed distance. Mariners successfully make 
judgements to this effect at present. 
A special case of prescribed manoeuvre scale is for targets bearing red 30° to 67"12''. 
The requirement to "turn to starboard until the target is abeam to port" makes the 
maximum contribution possible to anti-clockwise sight-line rotation. There is some 
value in retaining this scale of manoeuvre. However the whole idea of altering for a 
vessel crossing from p01t had a mixed reception in the experiments. When it was 
possible to cross ahead of the target, the action was almost unanimously accepted. 
When unilateral action did not allow own-ship to pass ahead. and a secondary 
manoeuvre was needed, acceptance was mixed. 
lt would be less controversial if with a target crossing from port own-ship was 
allowed to stand-on as rs the case 111 the COLREGS 72. Knowledge of target 
187 
heading would be required in order to apply the rule. It was a criterion derived from 
the technological scenario that target heading data was not available. Alternatively, 
standing on could be an option if target heading was known and indicated a crossing 
vessel. In any case it is thought that the mariners discomfort with this rule is largely 
due to unfamiliarity. The simulator experiences were worst case scenarios and were 
not designed to indicate the general benefits of being able to proactively contribute 
to a coordinated solution. 
7.7.6 How may, and 1s it likely that, the non-compliant mariners can be 
persuaded to comply? 
The use of education would greatly enhance the success of any rule implementation. 
The education and experience associated with the current regulations are what have 
made the current regulations almost sacrosanct for many mariners. The role of 
education and especially experience tluough simulators would be to introduce and 
indicate the benefits ofa new rule system. Such education would need to overcome 
the prejudice embedded through past practice and experience. While it may be 
difficult to reverse wholly the pattern of behaviour in experienced mariners, new 
recruits will be more susceptible to indoctrination of fresh practices. 
Education may have limits. The exercises of this thesis and the work of others 
indicates that a proportion of mariners persist in action that ove11ly disregards rules 
whether they be the COLREGS 72 or proposed new rules. Anti-regulation action is 
typically altering to port in reciprocal course or crossing encounters. The 
COLREGS 72 and various commentaries make it clear that altering to port is ridden 
with danger and not generally acceptable. The new rules are explicit in their 
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requirements and yet the anti-rule behaviour of the COLREGS 72 is maintained. 
Such behaviour has withstood all influences of education. 
New technology may offer a solution in the policing ability of automatic data 
recording and transmission as considered in chapter 3 (3 .6.2). [n using a quantified 
mle-base it is simple to define anti-mle behaviour, at least for two vessel open water 
encow1ters. Rule infringements can now be prosecuted which may in turn have a 
regulating effect on mariner behaviour. 
7.7.7 To what extent does the non-compliant action undermine the coordination 
efforts of the rule..;base? 
The most significant non-coordination comes from mariners who alter course with 
the incorrect sense. [n general with a target forward of the fore aft line an alteration 
to starboard is required. [f the target has own vessel in its forward sector then only 
starboard alterations will do. Mariners who alter to port in these circumstances are 
likely to undetmine the coordination effmt of the rule-base. 
Vessels being overtaken need to stand-on until the 12 minute point. Although the 
mles command the ovettaking vessel to alter to starboard, it appears that this 
requirement is not generally acceptable. In practice the overtaken vessel must expect 
to have the target alter to pass her on either side. Conversely the overtaking vessel 
should act before the 12 minute point to avoid pre-empting the stand-on vessel's 
manoeuvre. The experiments showed that in general the overtaken vessels, when 
allowed to make their own appropriate manoeuvre, would stand-on until at least 12 
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minutes. However a proportion of the overtaking vessels left manoeuvres too late, 
which could result in non-complementmy action. 
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"Doctoratifis. The assumption that a man ·s worth is to be measured by mere diligence. A man 
spends three years Jilinutely documenting documents if you understand my meaning, anyway 
investigating issues that have escaped more discerning scholars, and emerges from the ordeal with 
a doctorate which is supposed to be proof of his intelligence. Than which I can think of nothing 
more stupid. But there you are, that's the modern fashion. It comes, I suppose, from a literal 
acceptance of the ridiculous dictum that genius is an infinite capacity for taking pains. These 
fellows seem to think that if you can demonstrate-an appetite for indigestible and trivial details for 
three years you must be a genius. In my opinion genius is the capacity to jump the whole process 
of taking infinite pains, but then as I say, nobody listens to me. I mean there must be millions o( 
people taking whatever these infinite pains are without a spark of intelligence let alone genius 
between them. And then you have a silly fellow like Einstein who can "t even count ... It depresses 
me. if really does, but if's the .fashion. " 1l1e Dean of Porterhouse College 
in TOM SHARPE Porterhouse Blue. Seeker and Warburg, 1974, p.l48. 
CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSION 
8.1 DESCRIBING THE PROBLEM 
ln chapter 2 various fundamental elements of the collision avoidance problem have been 
derived and described. Tite term "risk of collision" is used to define the state when 
action to avoid collision is necessary (2.3.3), It is noted that risk of collision cannot be 
eliminated in practice. An acceptable level of risk must exist for any marine venture 
(2.2.4). Statistically, risk increases with proximity to land and commensurate increase in 
traffic density. ln practice, acceptable risk rises, and passing distances decrease. Tite 
human mruiner's perception of acceptable risk is known to vary with circumstances. 
8.1.1 Complementary action 
Tite establishing and maintenance of sight-line rotation of approaching vessels has 
previously been cited as an essential collision avoidance principle (2.3 .1 ). It is deduced 
therefore that the action of two vessels should aim to be complementary, and not cancel 
each other's contribution to sight-line rotation. lltree complementary action strategies 
that achieve tllis have been defined (2.3.3). To avoid cancelling action, vessels must 
each adopt the same strategy in a particular case. 
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Natural principles as defmed by Kemp, do not provide a means for vessels to ensure that 
each applies the same strategy (2.3.3.1 ). A vessel can wait until the other manoeuvres, 
thus indicating her perception of what is the required strategy. However it is not always 
possible to observe the action of the other vessel, and in any case, it is not satisfactory 
for each vessel to be indefinitely waiting for the other to manoeuvre. For the 
complementary strategies to be mutually adopted, a form of coordination must be 
imposed. 
8.1.2 Rogue vessels 
An examination of the three strategies, indicates that when the target appears to be a 
rogue, anti-strategy action may be necessruy (2.4.3). 
8.1.3 Coordination requirements 
An examination of possible reasons for a target appearing as a rogue (2.4.4), indicates 
that to minimise rogue behaviour, vessels must have a mutual perception of 1isk, and 
when to manoeuvre, as well as the strategy to be applied (2.4.5). TI1e tJu-ee items of 
mutual perception are coordination requirements. It has been noted that rules can form a 
tacit agreement between pruties and hence aid coordination (2.4.6.3). 
8.1.4 Rules 
It has been said that mles should require action which is as close to mariners' natural 
behaviour in order that they are most likely to be followed. Conversely the role of a rule 
is to b1ing a spectrum of natural behaviour to a narrow set of normal behaviour. There 
is a compromise to be had between achieving nmmal behaviour and creating a rule 
which will be followed (2S2.1 ). 
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8.1.5 Rule limitations 
Rules which try to cater for all variables will become infinitely complex. Rules for 
operational use by humans must be relatively simple. This means that whether following 
a set of rules produces a useful result depends on the circumstances of the case (2.6.3). 
8.1.6 Current Regulations 
The current regulations use a variety of concepts and procedmes (2. 7). The data inputs 
implied by the cu!Tent collision regulations have been noted (Table 2.1 ). The cu!Tent 
mles do not meet the coordination requirements of providing mutual perception of risk 
and when to manoeuvre (2. 7. 4 ). Mutual perception of strategy is not always provided by 
the current rules. l11e current mles imply that the mariner is responsible for avoiding 
collision regardless of circmnstances (2.7.5). l11e mariner must know when, and when 
not, to apply the rules. 
8.2 TECHNOLOGY 
Chapter 3 examines the cmrent and developing teclmology which may be applied to the 
collision avoidance problem. A collision avoidance system may be considered as havirlg 
sensor and processor elements. A sensor acts as a transducer, obtaining data from the 
environment which is passed to the processor. Human sensors include the eye and ear. 
8.2.1 Machine sensors 
Machine sensors are mruine radar and other radio communications (3.4). Use ofprimruy 
radar is wide spread on merchant vessels. Vhf radio-telephone is common on all classes 
of vessel. l11e use of mobile satellite communications continues to grow. Digital 
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selective calling for terrestrial and space segment communication allows large amounts 
of data to be transferred efficiently. 
8.2.2 Automatic cooperative communications 
l11e concept of automatic cooperative communications (ACC) covers teclmology that 
allows vessels to share infmmation automatically with other parties (3.4.4). The base 
teclmology for a sophisticated exchange of information between vessels is already being 
demonstrated, l11e specifics of any system depend as much on political-economic as 
teclmological issues. l11e most sophisticated ACC system could revolutionise collision 
avoidance practice. 
8.2.3 Machine processors 
Processors take data from the sensors and use it to produce useful information for 
solving the collision avoidance problem (3.5). ARPA and advisory expert systems are 
sub-processors that pass on information to primary processors such as the human brain 
or automatic expert systems. ARPA is common on large merchant vessels. 
Teclmological advance will make ARPA available to all vessels that currently cany 
radar. l11e infotmation de1ived tlu-ough ARP A gives a quantitative description of the 
geometrical and dynamic relationship between own and target vessels. Expert systems 
are finite in their field of application. Machines that are tmly intelligent do not yet exist. 
8.2.4 General technology 
A high accuracy Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) for vessel positioning 
is likely to evolve from the technology of GPS and GLONASS. Moves are being 
made to administer such a system on an international civilian basis. The 
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transmission of own GNSS position through an ACC system will be influential on 
collision avoidance practice (3.6.1). 
The combination of ACC and "black box" technology would allow the automatic 
recording and reporting of collisions and near misses. This potential development 
brings the opportunity to detect automatically action that is proscribed by 
quantitative regulations. This may affect mariner behaviour and the acceptance of 
mles (3.62 and 7.7.6). 
8.2.5 Automatic collision avoidance system 
By definition an automatic collision avoidance system has no human input. A range 
of technological scenarios for an ACAS have been considered (3. 7). The most 
advanced, with truly artificially intelligent processing and commensurate sensors, 
may be able to mimic all human functions. Simpler systems with expert system type 
processing can be imagined with a range of supporting technology. 
8.3 TECHNOLOGY AND RULES 
Chapter 4 describes the relationship between the collision avoidance system and the 
collision regulations. The data and information that are implied by the mles must be 
compatible with that which the CAS can produce. 
The current manual collision avoidance system cannot meet data input requirements 
that are implied by the COLREGS 1972. 
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An ACAS that is truly artificially intelligent and has machine vision, will probably 
also have use of sophisticated' ACC. Such a system could comply with the data 
requirements of the COLREGS 72. The use of true artificial intelligence opens 
questions of responsibility in all fields not just that of collision avoidance. 
The use of an expert system type processor is not compatible with the COLREGS 
72. The use of such a machine requires the judicial recognition of the discrete rule-
base that makes up the machine's program. 
The availability of cettain sensors determines the ability to comply with several 
COLREGS 72 rules. Without machine vision an ACAS does not have the data 
inputs necessary to distinguish between the need· to apply the rules of section 11 or 
Ill. The sophistication of ACC determines whether Rules 16 and 17, and Rule 18 
can be complied with. 
8.4 RULES FOR AN ACAS 
The development of mles for an ACAS is described in chapter 5. This thesis tests 
the human application of a mle-base that is suitable for a certain ACAS 
technological scenario. The scenario is one with an expert system processor, and 
sensors limited to radar. This leads to a mle-base that has target range and bearing 
as the only inputs, and quantification as a reflection of the ACAS program. In using 
quantification it has been possible to meet the three coordination requirements of 
providing means to achieve a mutual perception of risk, point of manoeuvre and the 
strategy to be applied. Mutual perception of risk requires the use of a circular 
domain centred on own vessel. Mutual perception of when to manoeuvre uses 
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RDRR theory with defined points at which responsibility changes. An element of 
dual responsibility has been adopted by use of a manoeuvring diagram which 
implies anti-clockwise sight-line rotation. Single responsibility "protects" vessels 
being overtaken. The rule-base as presented to mariners was contained on four sides 
of A4 paper including explanat01y diagrams (Appendix A). 
8.5 SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS 
Chapter six describes the simulation experiments. Mariners were asked to apply the 
new rules to encounters presented in a navigation simulator. Immediately after the 
exercise a verbal questionnaire was used to ascertain the mariner's usual action at 
sea and what action he was agreeable to take in the light of the new rules. 
8.6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The experimental results are described m chapter 7. The number of runs of 
particular exercises was too small to offer value in a statistical analysis. The data for 
mariner's usual action at sea appears to make a reasonable match with that of 
previous researchers. Specific areas where it must be suspected that there is a 
difference between actual behaviour and behaviour reported by the results have 
been highlighted. The differences are marginal and do not invalidate the whole of 
the data (7.3.6.2). 
The data for mariner's action in the light of new rules (new action) ca1111ot be taken 
as a direct representation of actual mariner behaviour in the event of the new rules 
being implemented (7.4). The new action data does have value by indicating the 
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important issues linked with applying a quantitative rule-base. The issues that are 
raised would warrant further investigation before action is taken. 
The majority of action required by the new rules was in keeping with mariners' 
usual practice. The new rules had a significant effect on the occasions that they 
demanded a change in behaviour. However a critical view of the rules was 
maintained by the mariners. They would not follow mles that put their vessel into 
danger and the influence of prior experience was evident. 
There would be no real success in implementing either version ofthe mle-base as a 
whole. The less prescriptive approach to escape action, in set B, had better results, 
and is the more appropriate way. The requirement to alter at an early stage with a 
target crossing from port was unfamiliar. It would be less controversial to allow 
standing on as an option, although this implies knowledge of target heading in order 
to distinguish between crossing and overtaking situations. 
8.6.1 Implementing individualmles 
The expe1imental results indicate little that condemn the concept or size of the 
circular risk domain. This aspect of the mles shows the most promise for ease of 
application. Fmther work will need to consider vessels of slow speed and their 
difficulty in unilaterally overcoming existing sight-line rotation (7.5.1.1 ). 
The experimental results indicate little that condemn the concept or size of the 
circular risk of close quarters domain. However the results were too few and 
isolated to be of any significant value. 
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Quantitatively regulating the point of manoeuvre may be the most important aspect 
of rules. The experimental results were mixed. Other aspects of the rules had an 
influence on the acceptance of this rule. Future work needs to test this rule type in 
isolation (7.5.1.2). 
The sense of manoeuvre required by the new rules was often commensurate with 
usual behaviour. On the relatively few occasions that sense of manoeuvre needed to 
be changed the rules had little effect. The limited number of results suggests that 
rules will often have difficulty in changing the sense of manoeuvre that a mariner 
would otherwise make (7.5.1.3). 
The scale of manoeuvre required by the new rules was often excessive. Knowledge 
of target heading caused mariners to minimise the size of their alterations, A more 
appropriate quantification of the scale of manoeuvre may be to require a new cpa of 
prescribed distance (7.7.5). 
8.6.2 Own speed 
Own speed appears to affect agreeable manoeuvres in two ways. First with greater 
speed comes a greater willingness to manoeuvre to increase a passing distance 
(7.6.1.2). Second with greater speed there is a tendency towards decreasing the 
initial scale of the collision avoidance manoeuvre (7.6.1.1.4). 
8.6.3 Education 
The use of education will be essential to accompany any major change in collision 
regulations. Acceptance of the rules is increased with individuals' understanding of 
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the accompanying reasons and benefits. Education may have limits. Some usual 
action that is clearly anti-COLREGS 72 persisted and became new action, despite 
the unequivocal instructions of the new rules (7.7.6). 
8. 7 RECOMMENDATIONS- FURTHER WORK 
The case for judicial recognition of a discrete rule-base for the sake of an ACAS has 
been made in this thesis. Such a rule-base would have legally sanctioned 
quantification tlu·oughout. This leads to the prospect of quantified collision 
regulations for application by human mariners. However ACAS are not the only 
grounds from which quantified collision regulations may evolve. 
The coordination requirements of mutual perceptions have been discussed (2.4.5). 
ARPA technology is growing in availability and can provide quantified data to a 
reasonable accuracy. This data coupled with quantified rules means that mutual 
perception can now be achieved. ACC offer the prospect of quantified data to an 
accuracy and availability greater than ever before (3.4.4). 
Interactive PC based software is being used for collision avoidance training and it is 
being proposed for testing for qualifications. Such interactive systems have 
quantification built in. The training and qualifying exercises imply acceptable 
quantification (3.6.3). 
Any move towards large scale MTC would undoubtedly make use of computer run 
algorithms in order to help control traffic. Again this implies quantification of 
collision avoidance parameters. An expert system onboard ship, even in the guise of 
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an advisory system, must have embedded quantification when applied to collision 
avoidance. On-line decision support from a piloting expert system suggests 
embedded quantification which may be linked to collision avoidance (3.5.2.1). 
The argument for having quantification in collision regulations clearly can 
encompass more than ACAS. The testing of the human application of such rules has 
merit. The preliminmy experimental study carried out as part of this thesis has 
indicated a number of issues which may be worthy of further investigation. 
I. The experimental testing, m isolation, of the risk element of the mle-base. 
Particular effort should be given to the problems of slow speed vessels and the 
effectiveness of the close quat1ers domain concept. 
2. The experimental testing, in isolation, of the point of manoeuvre element of the 
rule-base. By using this idea to quantify the responsibilities of the give-way and 
stand-on vessel under the cunent rules a better test can be made. The full value of 
such a rule will be seen while extraneous effects from other new rules will be 
avoided. Particular attention may be given to general rules applied to extremes of 
vessel speed and relative speed. 
3. The experimental testing and theoretical analysis of a limited dual responsibility 
mle for a target crossing from the port side. The action of putting the target on the 
pot1 beam is theoretically, and at least sometimes practically, attractive. 
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4. The experimental testing and theoretical analysis of objective rules in multi-ship 
encounters and encounters in confined waters. Simple rules, especially quantitative 
rules can be made to crack in complex situations (2.6). Matters of importance are: 
How may be rules and quantitative limits be best squeezed in order to 
maintain the coordination integrity of the rule-base? 
What risk is there of the mariner being inappropriately influenced by the 
rules, when in a complex situation which he would have otherwise dealt with 
satisfactorily? 
8.8 KEY POINTS 
I. Domain dependent processors requtre their limitations to have judicial 
recognition. This implies the statutory prescription and consequential judicial 
recognition of a discrete and quantified rule~base. 
2. Domain dependent processors are not compatible with the COLREGS 72. 
3. The COLREGS 72 imply various data inputs. Whether a collision avoidance 
system can meet the requirements will depend on the specific technology being 
employed. 
4. The COLREGS 72 do not adequately provide the means truly to coordinate 
action between vessels. 
5. Patticular objective criteria are required if rules are to be used to help ensure 
coordination of vessels' actions. 
6. The human application of a discrete and objective rule-base raises many issues, 
some of which are highlighted in this thesis. 
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Appendix A 
RULE-SETA 
1. Responsibility 
The mariner is responsible Jar making suitable decisions and taking appropriate actions to avoid collision 
under these rules. 
2. Departure from these rules 
Departure from these rules will only be tolerated if action under the rules does not allow risk of collision to 
·be avoided. When making a departure from~these rules, the rule obligations on target vessels must be taken 
into consideration. 
3. Definitions 
i)"own risk domain" is an area bounded by a circle of radius I mile centred on own vessel. 
ii)"own close quarters domain" is an area bounded by own risk domain circumference, and a circle of 
radius 1.5 miles centred on ow11 vessel. 
iii)"fore/aft boundary line" runs through own vessel from 112.5° to 292.5". lllis delineates between targets 
"forward" or "aft" for the purpose of these-rules. 
iv)"Risk of collision" exists if "own risk domain" is infringed by the relative velocity vector of the target 
vessel. i c. CPA in range 0.0 to 1.0 inclusive. 
v)"Risk of close quarters" exists if O\\TI "close quarters domain" is infringed by the relative velocity vector 
of the target vessel. i.e. CPA in range 1.1 to 1.5 inclusive 
4. Manoeuvre requirements 
a) Freedom - vessels operating under manoeuvre class "freedom" arc free to manoeuvre( or stand-on) in 
any sense which does not result in a subsequent "risk of collision" or "risk of close quarters" situation. 
b) Convention - vessels operating under manoeuvre class "convention" must use those manoeuvres 
prescribed on the manoeuvring diagram. 
c) Stand-on.- vessels operating under manoeuvre class "stand-on" must hold their course and speed. 
5. Manoeuvre class application 
a) Risk of collision 
i) For targets forward of the fore/aft line: 
When own risk domain is infringed by relative velocity vector of: 
> 18 minutes. manoeuvre freedom applies: 
18 to 12 minutes. manoeuvre convention or stand-on applies; 
< 12 minutes. manoeuvre convention applies. 
ii) for targets aft of the fore/aft line: 
When own risk domain is infringed by relative velocity vector of: 
> 18 minutes. manoeuvre freedom applies: 
18 to 12 minutes, stand-on applies: 
12 to 6 minutes. manoeuvre convention or stand-on applies: 
<6 minutes, manoeuvre convention applies. 
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b) Risk of close quarters 
For all targets: 
When own close quarters domain is infringed by relative velocity vector of < 18 minutes, 
manoeuvre convention or stand-on applies. 
6. Manoeuvre convention diagram 
Convention manoeuvres depend on target relative bearing and are prescribed by the manoeuvre diagram. 
If the convention manoeuvre given is not considered sufficient, a subsequent application of the manoeuvre 
diagram may be made by using the target's new relative bearing. 
Shiptead 
I 
Turn to starboard I between 60" and 90" 
Tom to starboard until 
target is abeam to port 
Turn to starboard 
until target :is astern 
7. Return to course 
210" 
I Turn to nntt between 20E~40" 
Thmtoport 
until target 
is astmn 
Tum to starboard 
until target is at least 
3<r on the port bow 
n2'r 2-...._ 
Thm to port until 
targetJBastem 
Having manoeuvred to avoid collision. a return to original course may only be made when that course will 
give a CPA of at least 1.5 miles. 
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RULE-SET A continued 
Definition diagrams 
Own risk domain 
Own close quarters domain 
Ford/aft boundary line 
Risk of collision 
Risk of close quarters 
.............._ 
29it• l 
Own ship's head 
Own shitJ's head 
Own risk domain 
(circle, radius 1 mile) 
Own close quarters domain 
( extemal radius 1.5 miles) 
llit• z 
-............_ 
Fore/aft boundary line 
Appendix A 
Target A gives risk of collision 
Target B gives risk of close quarters 
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RULE=SET A continued 
Manoeuvre Class Application Diagram 
lllis diagram shows the applicable manoeuvre class with respect to: 
infringement of own risk domain, 
by relative velocity vector of varying length, 
for targets forward and abaft the beam. 
18 _· 
Own ship's 
head 
Convention 
Appendix A 
nt~:~o 
Fore/aft Line~ 
Convention or Stand-on 
Stand-on 
Feedom 
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RULE=SETB 
1. Responsibility 
The mariner is responsible for making suitable decisions and taking appropriate actions to avoid collision 
under these rules . 
2. Depa1ture from these rules 
Departure from these rules will only be tolerated if action under the rules does not allow risk of collision to 
be avoided. When making a departure from these rules. the rule obligations on target vessels must be taken 
into consideration. 
3. Definitions 
i)"own risk domain" is an area bounded by a circle of radius I mile centred on own vessel. 
ii)"own close quarters domain" is an area bounded by own risk domain circumference, and a circle of 
radius l.5 miles centred on own vessel. 
iii)"fore/aft boundary line" runs through own vessel from 112.5° to 292.SO. lllis delineates between targets 
"forward" or "aft" for the purpose of these rules. 
iv)"Risk of collision" exists if "own risk domain" is infringed by the relative velocity vector of the target 
vessel. i.e. CPA in range 0.0 to 1.0 inclusive. 
v)"Risk of close quarters" exists if O\\rn "close quarters domain" is infringed by the relative velocity vector 
of the target vessel. i.e. CPA in range 1.1 to 1.5 inclusive 
4. Manoeuvre requirements 
a) Freedom - vessels operating under manoeuvre class "freedom" are free to manoeuvre(or stand-on) in 
any sense which does not result in a subsequent "risk of collision" or "risk of close quarters" situation. 
b) Convention - vessels operating under manoeuvre class "convention" must use those manoeuvres 
prescribed on the manoeuvring diagran1. 
c) Stand-on- vessels operating under manoeuvre class "stand-on" must hold their course and speed. 
5. Manoeuvre class application 
a) Risk of collision 
i) For targets forward of the fore/aft line: 
When 0\\TI risk domain is infringed by relative velocity vector of: 
> 18 minutes. manoeuvre freedom applies; 
18 to 12 minutes. manoeuvre convention or stand-on applies: 
< 12 minutes. manoeuvre convention applies. 
ii) For targets aft of the fore/aft line: 
When O\\n risk domam is infringed by relative velocity vector of: 
> 18 minutes. manoeuvre freedom applies: 
18 to 12 minutes. stand-on applies: 
< 12 manoeuvre convention or stand-on applies. 
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RULE-SET B continued 
b) Risk of close quarters 
For all targets: 
When own close quarters domain is infringed by relative velocity vector of < 18 minutes, 
manoeuvre convention or stand-on applies. 
6. Manoeuvre convention diagram 
Convention manoeuvres depend on target relative bearing and are prescribed by the manoeuvre diagram. 
If the convention manoeuvre given is not considered sufficien~ a subsequent application of the manoeuvre 
diagram may be made by using the target's new relative bearing. 
~ 
Shlp's head 
I 
Turn to starboard until 
target is abeam to p 
7. Return to course 
Toms to port or starboard. 
The following must be taken into account: 
the existing cpa; 
target's rule obligations; 
own vessel's capabilities 
Turn to starboard 
until target is at least 
30° on the port bow 
Having manoeuvred to avoid collision. a return to original course may only be made when that course will 
give a CPA of at least 1.5 miles. 
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RULE-SET B continued 
Definition diagrams 
Own risk domain 
Own close quarters domain 
Fore/aft boundary line 
Risk of collision 
Risk of close quarters 
Own ship's head 
Own ship's head 
Own risk domain 
(circle, radius l mile) 
Owt1 close quarters domain 
(external radius 1.5 mHes) 
' 112'/" 2 
-............ 
Fore/aft boundary line 
Appendix A 
Target A gives risk of coiUston 
Target B gives risk of close quarters 
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RULE-SET B continued 
Manoeuvre Class Application Diagram 
lllls diagram shows the applicable manoeuvre class with respect to: 
infringement of own risk domain, 
by relative velocity vector of varying length, 
for targets forward and abaft the beam. 
18 _· 
Convention 0 
I 
Own ship's 
head 
I 
I 
I 
0 Convention or Sbmd-on 
Stand-on 
Feedom 
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Appendix B 
SHIP TYPE 3 Container 
Specification 
Displacement: 50100 Tonnes 
Length BP: 212 
Block Coefficient: 0 .6 
Type of Engines: SSD 
Number of Shafts: 
Shaft Separation: M 
Direction of Rotation: Clockwise 
Maximum Shaft Speed: 120 RPM 
Type of Propellers : 1 Fixed 
Propellers Depth: 11 M 
Area of Each Rudder: 44 SqM 
Maximum Rudder Angle: 35 Deg 
Rudder Time Mid/Max: 13 s 
Maximum Speed Full Away: 23 Kts 
Maximum Speed Full Ahead: 17.2 Kts 
Half ahead to Full Ahead Time: 860 s 
Draught Forward: 12.2 M 
Draught Aft: 12.2 M 
Moulded Depth: 26 M 
Bridge Height From Deck: 20 M 
Bridge Distance From COG: -71 M 
Antenna Height From Sea: 37 M 
Antenna Offset From COG: -7 1 M 
Radar Blind Arc: 178-183 DEG.REL 
Characteristics (35 De2 Port Rudder} 
Time to Steadv State 
Speed and Rate of Turn: 631 s 
Maximum Rate of Turn: 60.6 DEG/MIN 
Percentage Loss of Speed: 50.9 
Steady State Speed: 8.4 Kts 
Steady State Rate of Turn: 40.3 DEG/MIN 
Steady State Drift Angle: 23 .4 Deg 
Time to Turn 360 Degrees: 491 s 
Tele2raph Settin2s 
Ahead: RPM Speed Pitc!t-% 
Full 90 17.2 Kts lOO 
Half 70 13 .4 Kts lOO 
Slow 50 9.6 Kts lOO 
Dead Slow 35 6.7 Kts 100 
Stop 0 0 Kts lOO 
Astern: 
Dead Slow 35 5 .4 Kts lOO 
Slow 45 6 .9 Kts 100 
Half 60 9.2 Kts lOO 
Full 80 12.2 Kts 100 
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SHIP TYPE 8 Tanker 
Specification 
Displacement: 98000 Tmmes 
Length BP: 238 
Block Coefficient: 0.81 
Type of Engines: SSD 
Number of Shafts: 
Shaft Separation: M 
Direction of Rotation: Clockwise 
Maximum Shaft Speed: 90 RPM 
Type of Propellers: I Fixed 
Propellers Depth: 11 M 
Area of Each Rudder: 65 SqM 
Maximum Rudder Angle: 35 Deg 
Rudder Time Mid/Max: 13 s 
Maximum Speed Full Away: 16.5 Kts 
Maximum Speed Full Ahead: 12.4 Kts 
Half ahead to Full Ahead Time: 1663 s 
Draught Forward: 12.6 M 
Draught Aft: 12.6 M 
Moulded Depth: 16 M 
Bridge Height From Deck: 16 M 
Bridge Distance From COG: -79 M 
Antenna Height From Sea: 23 M 
Antenna Offset From COG: -79 M 
Radar Blind Arc: 178-183 DEG.REL 
Characteristics (35 De~:; Port Rudder} 
Time to Steadv State 
Speed and Rate of Turn: 810 s 
Maximum Rate of Turn: 51.3 DEG/MIN 
Percentage Loss of Speed: 72 .4 
Steady State Speed: 3.4 Kts 
Steady State Rate of Turn: 22.1 DEG/MIN 
Steady State Drift Angle: 34 .1 Deg 
Time to Turn 360 Degrees: 807 s 
Tele~:;raph Settings 
Ahead: RPM Speed Pitch-% 
Full 80 12.4 Kts 100 
Half 55 8.5 Kts 100 
Slow 35 5.4 Kts 100 
Dead Slow 20 3.1 Kts lOO 
Stop 0 0 Kts 100 
Astern: 
Dead Slow 20 2.5 Kts 100 
Slow 30 3.7 Kts 100 
Half 45 5.6 Kts 100 
Full 60 7.4 Kts 100 
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SHIP TYPE 4 Ferry 
Specification 
Displacement: 5000 Tonnes 
Length BP: 105 
Block Coefficient: 0.64 
Type of Engines: MSD 
Number of Shafts: 2 
Shaft Separation: 10 M 
Direction of Rotation: Outwards 
Maximum Shaft Speed: 120 RPM 
Type of Propellers: 2 CP 
Propellers Depth: 3 M 
Area of Each Rudder: 8.5 Sq M 
Maximum Rudder Angle: 35 Deg 
Rudder Time Mid/Max: 12 s 
Ma.'<.imum Speed Full Away: 20 Kts 
Maximum Speed Full Ahead: 15 Kts 
Half ahead to Full Ahead Time: 320 s 
Draught Forward: 4.2 M 
Draught Aft: 4.2 M 
Moulded Depth: 17 M 
Bridge Height From Deck: 7 M 
Bridge Distance From COG: 35 M 
Antenna Height From Sea: 22 M 
Antenna Offset From COG: 35 M 
Radar Blind Arc: 178-183 DEG.REL 
Characteristics (35 De2 Port Rudder} 
Time to Steadv State 
Speed and Rate of Turn: 364 s 
Maximum Rate ofTurn: 101.3 DEG/MIN 
Percentage Loss of Speed: 53 .8 
Steady State Speed: 6.9 Kts 
Steady State Rate of Turn: 55 .3 DEG/MIN 
Steady State Drift Angle: 34 Deg 
Time to Turn 360 Degrees: 364 s 
Telegraph Settine;s 
Ahead: RPM Speed Pitch-% 
Full lOO 15 Kts 100 
Half 85 12.75 Kts lOO 
Slow 85 7.65 Kts 60 
Dead Slow 85 3.2 Kts 25 
Stop 85 0 Kts () 
Astern: 
Dead Slow 85 2.0 Kts 25 
Slow 85 4.8 Kts 60 
Half 85 8.0 Kts 100 
Full lOO 9.4 Kts 100 
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SHIP TYPE 11 Jetfoil 
Specification 
Displacement: 115 Tonnes 
Length BP: 50 
Block Coefficient: 0 
Type of Engines: GT 
Number of Shafts: I 
Shaft Separation: M 
Direction of Rotation: Clockwise 
Maximum Shaft Speed: 2150 RPM 
Type of Propellers: I Fixed 
Propellers Depth: 0 M 
Area of Each Rudder: 0 SqM 
Maximum Rudder Angle: 0 Dcg 
Rudder Time Mid/Max: 0 s 
Maximum Speed Full Away: 45 Kts 
Maximum Speed Full Ahead: 45 Kts 
Half ahead to Full Ahead Time: 282 s 
Draught Forward: 0 M 
Draught Aft: 0 M 
Moulded Depth: 0 M 
Bridge Height From Deck: 0 M 
Bridge Distance From COG: 0 M 
Antenna Height From Sea: 11 M 
Antenna Offset From COG: 0 M 
Radar Blind Arc: 0 DEG.REL 
Characteristics (35 De~:, Port Rudder} 
Time to Steady State 
Speed and Rate of Turn: 10 s 
Maximum Rate ofTum: 187 DEG/MlN 
Percentage Loss of Speed: 0 
Steady State Speed: 45 Kts 
Steady State Rate ofTum: 140.5 DEG/MlN 
Steady State Drift Angle: 0 Deg 
Time to Turn 360 Degrees: 154 s 
Tele~:,raph Settin~:,s 
Ahead: RPM Speed Pitch-% 
Full 2150 45 Kts 100 
Half 2000 41.9 Kts 100 
Slow 1900 39.8 Kts 100 
Dead Slow 1300 27.2 Kts lOO 
Stop 1055 22.1 Kts 100 
Astern: 
Dead Slow 1300 21.8 Kts 100 
Slow 1900 31.8 Kts 100 
Half 2000 33 .5 Kts lOO 
Fu ll 2150 36.0 Kts 100 
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Exercise start conditions 
Ship Target 
type Heading Speed CPA TCPA Range I Bearing 
Ex 1 
Own Tanker 000 lOk 
Targ' Container 180 lOk 0.9M 22min 7.42M I G7° 
Ex 2 
Own Tanker 000 10k 
Target Container 180 10k 1.4M 22min 7.47M I Gll 0 
Ex J 
Own Tanker 000 15k 
Target Container 180 18k 0.9M 2Jmin 13.98M j G4° 
Ex 4 
Own Tanker 000 10k 
Target Jet-foil 042 30k 0.9M 22min 8.58M I Rl 27° 
Ex 5 
Own Tanker 000 lOk 
Target Jet-foil 353 30k 0.9M 22min 7.65M [ Rl 77° 
Ex6 
Own Tanker 000 IOk 
Target Container 091 20k 0.8M 25min I 9.39M I R58° 
Ex7 
Own Container 000 20k 
Target Ferry 084 l8k 0.8M I 2lmin I 9.04M I R40° 
Exlx 
Own Container 180 21 
Target Tanker 000 15 1.4M I 23min ll4.0 1M I G6° 
Ex3R 
o,v'Il Container 180 21 
Target Tanker 000 15 0.9M I 2J min J IJ.98M J G4° 
E:<4R 
Own Jet-foil 042 30 
Target Tanker 000 10 0.9M I 22min 1 8.58M J Gll 0 
Ex5R 
Own Jet-Foil 353 30 
Target Tanker 000 10 0.9M I 22min I 7.65M I G4° 
E.•<7R 
Own FerrY 084 18 
Target Container 000 20 0.8M I 2lmin j 9.04M I G56° 
229 
N 
w 
0 
Question 1: ~f the mariner stood on as usual action, he was 
Was your action during the exercise Individual 
h Mariner asked at what cpa he would take action. This is commensurate with your usual action at sea? 
Letter Code !given in Nautical miles. Answer: Yes (Y) No (N) 
Question 2: Exercise Answer 2: 
Were you comfortable with the assessment Number Y: Yes 
of" risk of collision" as prescribed by these !Range at which action is ~:No 
ntles (that is, in this encounter the ndes N 
~aken in nautical miles, or 
implied acLion lO avoid collision lO be M : Maintain course 
!necessary)? 1 A 
Usual action N Sense of manoeuvre 
Risk <3/4 N Question 3: P:Port 
Were you comfortable manoeuvring at the ~ Range M 6.22 M S: Starboard 
rprescribed range? A Sense M s M "-. M: Maintain course Scale M 75 M 
--Question 4: Engine N Scale of manoeuvre in degrees 
Were you comfortable with the sense of the IM: Maintain course 
rprescribed manoeuvre? 
INew action I 
LJ Question 5: tAction in the simulatorl Were you comfortable l·vith the scale of the 
!,prescribed manoeuvre? IV sual action I 
Answer 6: 
puestion 6: N : no effect 
if engine control had been readily available how ft-: increase speed 
would your action have been influenced? - : reduce speed 
Key to exer cise result sheets 
N 
w 
-
I 
Usual action 
Risk 
Range 
Sense 
Scale 
Engine 
1 
Usual action 
Risk 
Range 
Sense 
Scale 
Engine 
N 
<j/4 
M 
M 
M 
N 
N 
10.0 
s 
70 
N 
A 
y 
N 
6.22 M 5.92 
s M s 
75 M 80 
N 
G 
N 
y 
6.1 10.0 3.0 
s s p 
90 90 40 
N 
Exercise 1 (12 mariners) 
B c 
N N 
y <3/4 y <1.0 
5.92 5.92 M 5.35 5.35 M 
s s M s s M 
80 80 M 80 80 M 
N N 
H R 
y N 
y y 
5.79 3.0 6.32 6.32 6.32 8.0 
s p s s s s 
70 40 60 60 60 60 
N N 
D E F 
N y 
y y y 
5.2 5.2 5.66 5.66 5.66 5.99 5.99 5.99 
s s p s p s s s 
90 90 20 90 20 90 90 90 
N N 
s T u 
N N 
y 0.7 N y 
5.62 8.0 M 4.61 M 7.0 5.29 5.29 
s s M s M p s s 
60 60 M 90 M 20 60 60 
N N 
N 
w 
N 
2 
Usual action 
Risk 
Range 
Sense 
Scale 
Engine 
2 
U sua I action 
Risk 
Range 
Sense 
Scale 
Engine 
A 
y 
y 
M M M 
M M M 
M M M 
N 
E 
y 
y 
M M M 
M M M 
M M M 
N 
Exercise 2 (8 mariners) 
B c D 
y y y 
y y y 
M M M M M M M M M 
M M M M M M M M M 
M M M M M M M M M 
N N N 
F G H 
y y y 
y y y 
M M M M M M M M M 
M M M M M M M M M 
M M M M M M M M M 
N N N 
Exercise 2x (9 mariners) 
2X N 0 p Q 
Usual action N y y y 
Risk y y y y 
Range M 7.19 7.19 M M M M M M 11.37 11.37 11.37 
Sense M s s M M M M M M s s s 
Scale M 60 60 M M M M M M 60 60 60 
Engine N N N N 
2X R s T u F 
Usual action y y y y N 
Risk y y y y y 
Range 10.0 10.0 10.0 M M M M M M M M M 9.88 9.88 9.88 
Sense s s s M M M M M M M M M s s s 
Scale 60 60 60 M M M M M M M M M 40 60 40 
Engine N N N N N 
Exercise 3 (12 mariners) 
3 A B c D E F 
Usual action N y N y N N 
Risk <J/4 N y <J/4 y y y y 
Range M 11.92 11 .92 7.22 7.22 7.22 M 7.91 7.91 9.94 9.94 9.94 10.59 10.59 10.59 6.0 8.07 8.07 
Sense M s s s s s M s s s s s p p p s s s 
Scale M 75 75 60 60 60 M 80 80 60 60 60 15 60 15 60 60 60 
Engine N N N N N N 
3 G H R s T u 
U sua! action N N y N y y 
Risk y <l/2 N y y 0.7 N y 
Range 10.0 8.05 8.05 5.0 5.08 5.0 7.57 7.57 7.57 10.59 10.59 10.59 M M M 7.07 7.07 7.07 
Sense s s s p s p s s s s s s M M M s s s 
Scale 35 60 60 40 75 40 60 60 60 30 60 60 M M M 60 60 60 
Engine N N N N N N 
Exercise 3R {9 mariners) 
3R N 0 p Q R 
Usual action y N y y y 
Risk y y y y y 
Range 7.44 7.44 7.44 10.0 6.9 10.0 9.85 9.85 9.85 8.7 8.7 8.7 10.15 10.15 10. 15 
Sense s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s 
Scale 60 60 60 40 70 60 50 50 60 64 64 64 60 60 60 
Engine N N N N N 
3R s T u F 
Usual action N N N N 
Risk y 0.7 N y y 
Range 6.0 7.96 7.96 M M M 9.0 7.33 7.33 9.89 9.89 9.89 
Sense s s s M M M p s p s s s 
Scale 20 60 20 M M M 25 60 25 40 60 40 
Engine N N N N 
N 
w 
0\ 
4A 
Usual action 
Risk 
Range 
Sense 
Scale 
Engine 
4A 
Usual action 
Risk 
Range 
Sense 
Scale 
Engine 
N 
<3/4 
M 
M 
M 
N 
N 
3.0 
s 
50 
N 
A 
N 
5.56 M 
p M 
30 M 
E 
y 
4.78 4.78 
s s 
50 50 
Exercise 4A ( 8 mariners ) 
B c D 
N N y 
y y y 
M 4.71 M M 5.10 5.10 3.15 3. 15 3.15 
M p M M p p p p p 
M 50 M M 40 48 45 45 45 
N N + 
F G H 
N y N 
y y <j/4 N 
M 3.25 3.25 6.73 6.73 6.73 M 4.97 2.5 
M p p s s s M s p 
M 48 48 66 66 66 M 40 20 
N N N 
Exercise 4B (8 mariners) 
4B N 0 p Q 
Usual action y y y y 
Risk y y y y 
Range 2.95 2.95 2.95 4.68 4.68 4.68 5.94 5.94 5.94 3.0 6.93 3.0 
Sense p p p p p p p p p p p p 
Scale 20 20 20 20 20 20 48 48 48 20 20 20 
Engine N N N N 
4B R s T u 
Usual action y y y y 
Risk y y y y 
Range 4 .9 4.9 4.9 4.23 4 .23 4.23 4.88 4.88 4.88 M M M 
Sense p p p p p p p p p M M M 
Scale 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 M M M 
Engine N N N N 
N 
w 
00 
4R 
Usual action 
Risk 
Range 
Sense 
Scale 
Engine 
4R 
Usual action 
Risk 
Range 
Sense 
Scale 
Engine 
Exercise 4R (8 mariners) 
N 0 
(N ) N 
y y 
4.21 4.21 4.21 7.86 7.86 7.86 
s * s s p p 
40 * 40 20 22 22 
Reduced Speed N 
R s 
y N 
y y 
7.17 7.17 7.17 3.0 4.97 3.0 
s s s s s s 
33 33 33 20 60 20 
N N 
p Q 
N N 
N y 
M 8.00 8.00 8.26 8.26 8.26 
M s s p s s 
M 10 10 20 50 10 
Slow Down N 
T u 
y y 
y y 
5.56 5.56 5.56 4 .16 4.16 4.16 
s s s s s s 
28 28 28 18 18 18 
N N 
N 
w 
\0 
5 
Usual action 
Risk 
Range 
Sense 
Scale 
Engine 
5 
Usual action 
Risk 
Range 
Sense 
Scale 
Engine 
A 
N 
~/4 N 
M 4.58 
M p 
M 25 
N 
E 
N 
y 
3.0 4.43 
s p 
20 40 
N 
Exercise SA (8 mariners) 
8 
N 
<j/4 y 
6.5 6.2 4.15 6.2 
s p p p 
50 60 40 60 
+ 
F 
y 
y 
6.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 
s s s s 
20 25 25 25 
N 
c D 
y N 
y y 
3.0 7.13 7.13 2.5 6.6 6.6 
s s s s s s 
60 80 80 40 40 40 
N N 
G H 
N N 
y <3/4 N <3/4 
5.0 3.25 5.0 M 3.03 3.03 
s s s M p s 
30 50 50 M 40 35 
N N 
N 
+:-
0 
5B 
Usual action 
Risk 
Range 
Sense 
Scale 
Engine 
5B 
U sua] action 
Risk 
Range 
Sense 
Scale 
Engine 
N 
y 
y 
2.6 2.6 
s s 
30 30 
N 
R 
y 
y 
3.01 3.01 
s s 
30 30 
N 
Exercise SB (8 mariners) 
0 
y N 
y 
2.6 2.48 2.48 2.48 1.5 
s s s s s 
30 20 20 20 40 
N N 
s 
y N 
y 
3.01 3.43 3.43 3.43 M 
s s s s M 
30 20 20 20 M 
N N 
p Q 
y 
y y 
4.69 4.69 4.36 4.36 4.36 
s s s s s 
21 21 10 10 lO 
N 
T u 
y 
y y 
3.22 3.22 M M M 
s s M M M 
60 60 M M M 
N 
N 
~ 
-
5R 
Usual action 
Risk 
Range 
Sense 
Scale 
Engine 
5R 
Usual action 
Risk 
Range 
Sense 
Scale 
Engine 
y 
6.38 
p 
8 
N 
y 
5.18 
s 
63 
N 
Exercise SR (8 mariners) 
N 0 
N 
y y 
6.38 6.38 6.4 6.4 6.4 
p p s s s 
8 8 30 60 30 
N 
R s 
N 
y y 
5.18 5.18 6.3 6.3 6.3 
s s s s s 
63 63 30 60 30 
N 
p Q 
N y 
y y 
6.1 6.1 6.1 6.01 6.01 6.01 
s p s s s s 
20 15 20 47 47 47 
N N 
T u 
N y 
y y 
3.0 4.32 4.32 3.68 3.68 3.68 
p s p p p p 
10 60 10 13 13 13 
N N 
N 
.... 
N 
6 
Usual action 
Risk 
Range 
Sense 
Scale 
Engine 
6 
Usual action 
Risk 
Range 
Sense 
Scale 
Engine 
A 
N 
y 
3 5.3 
s s 
91 j(J 125 
N 
G 
N 
y 
6.0 7.87 6.0 
s s s 
70 3) 70 70 
Slow 
Exercise 6 (13 mariners) 
B c D E F 
N N N N N 
y y y y y 
5.3 M 5.64 5.64 3.0 5.24 3.0 5.0 7.38 5.0 3.0 4.29 4.29 3.0 7.81 5.3 
s M s s s s s s s s s s s s s s 
91 M JO 130 JO 130 180 360 j(J 360 1!!0 1l!O 360 180 360 I !SO 360 J8 J8 J8 180 j) j ) 360 154 154 154 360 125 360 125 360 
N N Slow N N 
H N 0 p Q T 
N N N N N N 
y y y y y y 
3.0 4.45 4.45 3.5 4.64 4.64 3.0 6.45 6.45 7.21 7.21 7.21 M 7.41 2.0 3.0 6.38 6.38 
s s s s s s s s s p s p M s s s s s 
90 90 90 190 40 40 360 33 33 360 60 30310 60 M) / 36o 360 3 60 )O 360 )O 360 360 90 360 
Slow and stand-on Target on beam and slow Target on beam and slow Slow N 
Exercise 7 (13 mariners) 
7 A B c D E F G 
Usual action N N N y N N N 
Risk y y y y y y y 
Range 3.0 7.61 7.61 2.5 5.27 5.27 3.0 7.39 7.39 5.0 6.52 6.52 3.0 5.0 5.0 2.95 2.95 2.95 8.0 5.76 5.76 
Sense s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s s 
Scale 84 50 50 130 55 55 l!SU360 45 45 50 50 50 1HU360 60 60 60 60 60 35 50 50 360 
Engine N N N O~tion N N N 
7 H N 0 p Q T 
Usual action N y N N y N 
Risk y y y y y y 
Range M 3.74 3.74 8.5 7.60 7.60 3.5 4.68 4.68 2.0 6.5 3.0 3.26 3.26 3.26 3.0 5.44 5.44 
Sense M s s p p s s s s s s s s s s s s s 
Scale M 60 60 45 45 50 360 56 56 360 50 :>U 360 360 360 360 360 52 52 
Engine Option N N N Slow Down N 
Exercise 7R (8 mariners) 
7R N 0 p Q 
Usual action y y N y 
Risk y y y y 
Range 6.0 4.67 4.67 5.5 5.5 5.5 8.08 8.08 8.08 8.71 8.71 8.71 
Sense s s s s s s s s s s s s 
Scale 60 89 89 89 89 89 59 72 72 95 95 95 
Engine N N N N 
7R R s T u 
Usual action y N y N 
Risk y y y y 
Range 6.84 6.84 6.84 6.35 6.35 6.35 6.19 6.19 6.19 5.84 5.84 5.84 
Sense s s s s s s s s s s s s 
Scale 89 89 89 60 84 60 89 89 89 77 84 84 
Engine N N N N 
Time to risk 
domain 
infringement 
(minutes) 
Time to risk 
domain 
infringement 
(minutes) 
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I EXERCISE 1 I 
USUAL ACTION AT SEA 
.· 
·.; 
Stand on 
............... l ........ . 
Round tum to 
starboard 
I NEWACTION I 
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Stand on 
·.. . .. · .... 
. ····-~--. . . . -... 
. ..... : .. .. 
i 
......... j ••.•••..•••• 
Round turn to 
starboard 
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I EXERCISE 2 X I 
USUAL ACTION ATSEA 
Stand on 
·--/ . 
_ .. · ... 
.":-. .---·· 
. ·. 
·-.. 
.. . .· .. 
..
.. ··---.... _- - . . 
':.···· · . 
·· ··:·-: ·.. : .· ·. _____ _ ... - ··----.. :~-- :-. ___ _ 
·-..: .·"-. . 
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·:--···· 
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···-· ;···-····!······-r····-·· 
·-. : 
·-. -----~----------\~-- .· 
. -- ~ ..... . 
.--··. __ 
_ .. -··-.. 
··-....... : ........ --
Round turn to 
starboard 
...... 
· ... : _ .. -
I NEWACTION I 
Stand on 
... 
. ·· ·. _ 
__ .-.\.:_- --
·_-::.. ______ ..... -·· ·. ___ .·· . .. 
·_;.: __ _ 
_·.:.:. ____  :-< 
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, I . -:· ! < ) + " " -- . 90' 
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·. --...... : ... . . 
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Round turn to 
starboard 
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Time to risk 
domain 
infringement 
(minutes) 
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domain 17 ... L ) .... ~ ..... : .... 
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EXERCISE3 
USUAL ACTWNATSEA 
Stand on 
. · .. ..  
. ··- --.:-< . 
· .. 
·· ... ······-······ ..... ·:. 
..... .. ; ....... --·· 
··-- . . ··!·· ... 
... . -·· , . 
Round turn to 
starboard 
I NEW ACTION I 
Stand on 
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Round turn to 
starboard 
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Time to risk 
domain 
infiingement 
(minutes) 
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domain 
infringement 
(minutes) 
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I EXERCISE 3R I Appendix E 
I USUALACTIQNATSEA I 
Stand on 
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Round turn to 
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I NEWACTION I 
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I EXERCISE 4A I 
USUALACTIONATSEA 
Stand on 
··. ,· 
.... 
.. -·· ·· .. 
_:-._ 
..--·· ······ 
·_:/-.. 
Round tum to 
starboard 
I NEWACTION I 
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Stand on 
r -
..... -~. .... . 
· ... -· .. 
Round turn to 
starboard 
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Time to risk 
domain 
infringement 
(minutes) 
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infringement 
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I EXERCISE 4B I Appendix E 
USUAL ACTION AT SEA 
Stand on 
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Round turn to 
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I NEW ACTION I 
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Stand on 
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COMPARISON DATA 
Kemp experiments 
Kemp conducted various encounter experiments in the early 1970's on a simulator 
at the City of London Polytechnic (Guildhall University). The details and results of 
experiments of patticular interest for comparison in this thesis are set out below. 
End-on or nearly end-on encounters 
The experitnents of interest are those which Kemp conducted with "experienced" 
subjects. The subjects were Merchant Navy officers all with at least Class 2 
cettificates of competency. All were male and within the age range 24-40. The 
encounters were conducted on a marine radar simulator. Visual detection was not 
simulated. 
Five standard encounters were used with a single target ship on a parallel and 
opposite course to the subjects ship in every case. One encounter was end-on with a 
cpa of zero. The four other encounters had a green to green passing distance 
incremented in Y2 M up to a cpa of 2.0M. In every trial the target ship was made to 
maintain course and had a constant speed' of 10 knots. The subjects were each given 
in tum the five encounters though not necessarily in the same order. 
The subjects ships were simulated to be of 10 000 tons gross with a full speed of 15 
knots. The initial speed was I 0 knots. The subjects had the facility to increase or 
decrease speed as well as to alter course either way. Action in the encounters is 
recorded in Table F.! 
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Subject End-on 0.5M offset l.OM offset 1.5M offset 2.0M offset 
1 s s s M M 
2 s s s p M 
3 s p p M M 
4 s s p p p 
5 s s s p M 
6 s s s p M 
TOTAL 6S:OM:OP 5S:OM:lP 4S:OM:2P OS:2M:4P OS:5M:lP 
Figure F.l 
Results of experiments by Kemp for reciprocal course encounters 
Source: Author based on Kemp 
Wang experiments 
Key: S alteration to starboard 
M course maintained 
P alteration to ort 
Experiments by Wang are repmted in Zhao. The experiments appear to be identical 
to the those carried out earlier by Kemp. The encounters are reciprocal course, end 
on and green to green with separations of Y2 mile intervals up to 2 miles. The 
encounters were in "restricted visibility" and it is assumed that the subjects were 
presented with the situation in a ship simulator with radar. The results are set out in 
Table F.2 below. 
Subject End-on 0.5M offset t.OM offset l.5M offset 
I s s s s 
2 s s s p 
3 s p p M 
4 s p p M 
5 s s s s 
6 s s p p 
7 s s p p 
8 s s s p 
9 s s s p 
Total 9S 7S:2P 5S:4P 2S:2M:5P 
Figure F.2 
Wang's reciprocal course experiments 
Source: Author based on Zhao 
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Corbet questionnaire 
Corbet reports on a questionnaire survey of mariners' actions in reciprocal course 
encounters. The questionnaire was given to trainees at the end of radar simulator 
courses. The "trainees" were all experienced watchkeeping officers with either 
Class 1 or 2 ce1tificates of competency. The encounters were presented as radar 
plots which included end on and green to green offsets of ~ mile, 1 mile and 2 
miles. 
Detailed circumstances of the case were given which included: 
open sea; 
restricted visibility and no target lights visible; 
engines at Half Ahead and on Standby; 
own ship: 15 000 tons displacement cargo vessel, 500 feet overall; 
speeds: Full Ahead 16 knots 
Half Ahead 12 knots (initial speed). 
target vessel speed is 12 knots (inferred from plot) 
"Each trainee was asked in each case to state the initial action which, in his opinion, 
should have a reasonable chance of success in avoiding a close quarters situation yet 
at the same time would put his own vessel in a position which would enable him to 
cope satisfactorily with any development which could be foreseen under the existing 
circumstances of each case." The results of the questionnaire have been tabulated 
below (Table F.3) for the purposes of this thesis. 
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End-on Green to Green 
CPA Zero 0.5 M lM 2M 
90° or more 57 76 35 1 
Starboard 50° to 89° 35 6 2 0 
<50° 14 2 0 0 
Total Starboard allcration 1116 I 98.2% 84 77.8% 37 34.3% 1 0.9% 
90° 0r more 0 7 10 4 
Port 50° to H9° 0 5 13 4 
<50° 0 I 4 8 
Total Port alteration 0 11 % 13 ]2.(1% 27 25.11% 16 14.8% 
Stand-On 11 11 % 3 2.7% 17 15.7% 71 65.7% 
Reduction of speed onlv. Total 0 0% 5 4.6% 23 21.3% 17 15.7% 
Stop take all way off 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% l 0.9% 
Undecided 2 1.9% 3 2.7% 4 2 1.9% 
Grand Totals 108 108 108 108 
I Manoeuvre I Sense as rounded % 9HS 78S:3M: 12P I 34S: 16M:25P I IS:66M: ISP 
Figure F.3 
Selected results from Corbet Questionnaire 
Source: Author based on Corbet 
The questioJUlaire was canied out during the petiod 1980-81 and involved 108 
subjects. Corbet provides data from a "similar" survey conducted in 1968-9 with 4 1 
subjects. Table F.4 below presents the data comparison. 
0.5M l.OM 
1968-69 1980-8 1 1968-69 1980-81 
Altered to starboard 36.6% 77.8% 2.4% 34.3% 
Altered to pot1 53 .7% 12.0% 4 1. 5% 25 .0% 
Reduced speed only 7.3% 4.6% 19.5% 21.3% 
Stood-On 2.4% 2.8% 36.6% 15.7% 
Figure F.4 
Corbet questionnaire: comparing surveys from 1968-9 and 1980-1 
Source: Corbet 
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Redfern experiments 
Redfern conducted encounter exercises on the navigation simulator at the University 
of Plymouth for a watchkeeper behaviour study for the Dept. of Transport, UK, in 
1993. The details and results of experiments of pmticular interest for comparison in 
tlus thesis are set out below. 
Action by Head on Vessel- Open Sea 
"Two scenarios EDTP23 and EDTP24 sought to check watchkeeper action when 
meeting another vessel ve1y fine to starboard in the open sea. In both cases the 
closing speed was the same, but own vessel type and speed differed". 
EDTP23 
Initially, own ship, a container vessel at 21 knots, had another vessel OS2, ahead at 
a range of l2.4M. Observation would confirm the closing speed to be 36 knots and 
that there was a negative cpa of four cables, passing starboard to starboard. 
"Action was taken at an average 7.3M within the limits of 8.9 to 5.0 miles. One 
subject experienced steering difficulties, but in post exercise report stated that had 
hehad been able to do so he would have altered course 10° to pmt at a range of five 
nules so as to increase the starboard to starboard pass off distance. A second subject 
altered course 20" to port at a range of 7.2 miles when the relative bearing of OS2 
was green 3". Contact by vhf was attempted in order to advise the other vessel of his 
intentions. Both actions, intended and executed, were in contravention of Rule 14. 
The remaining seven subjects properly altered course to starboard in good time, 
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achieving positive cpas in the range six cables to 2.4 miles, with an average of 1.5 
miles". 
EDTP 24 
Initially, own ship, a tanker at 15 knots, had another vessel, OS2 ahead at a range of 
12.4 rniles. This situation is identical to EDTP23 except that the ship types and 
speeds are reversed. 
"Action was taken at an average 6.4 miles, and within the limits of 5.2 to 8.9 miles. 
Such action was on average one and a half minutes later than in EDTP23. This is 
not seen as significant. On this occasion eight subjects altered course to stafboard~ 
achieving new cpas in the range of five cables to l. 7 miles, with· an average value of 
one mile. One subject altered course 15° to pmt, when OS2 was on a relative 
bearing of green 4° and at a range of 5.5 miles. Again the stated reason was to 
increase the starboard to starboard passing distance. That between the two scenarios 
17% of the set of well trained and qualified subjects elected to ignore the 
requirements of Rule 14 must be a cause for concern. lfhere were no special 
circumstances, and in all three cases the alterations were not substantial. 
Action by Stand-on Vessel- Open Sea 
EDTPOI 
"Subjects were advised that engines were not at immediate readiness in the open sea 
situation". Initially, own ship, a container vessel at 20 knots, had a target at 8.8 
miles, approximately four points on the port bow. "Systematic observation would 
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show the bearing at first to be steady, that it was closing at some 24 knots, and that 
without action their would be a negative cpa of three cables, the target passing 
crossing own ship head at a range offour cables". 
"All 15 subjects monitored the developing situation. Action was taken under Rule 
17 by 14 watchkeepers at ranges between 4.4 and 0.4 miles. The mean range was 
2.2 miles with a time to cross ahead of 3.75 minutes. One watchkeeper took no 
action, stating he accepted the four cables pass ahead range, but had the engines 
been available he would have slowed down" .. 
"The action taken by seven of the subjects was a round turn to starboard, often after 
firststeadying on a course parallel to the tlueat. One subject altered course to port at 
a range of I. 7 miles and a second made a small, and late alteration to starboard 
which resulted in a collision". The port alteration was unintentional, and caused by 
unfamiliarity with the equipment. 
EDTPOl 
Action No. % 
Ne starboard 6 40 
Ne pott 1 7 
Round tum starboard 7 46 
No action I 7 
Total 15 lOO 
Table F.S 
Action taken by mariners in exercise EDTPOI 
Source: Redfern 
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Action by Give Way Vessel Crossing- Open Sea 
EDTP02 
Appendix F 
"Subjects were advised that engines were not at immediate readiness in the open sea 
situation". Initially, own ship, a feny at 18 knots, had a target, OS2, at 8.8M range 
approximately four points on the starboard bow, and on a steady bearing. 
"Observation would show that the closing speed was 24 knots and that if no action 
was taken a negative cpa of three cables would result, with own ship passing four 
cables ahead of the target". 
"The situation was complicated by the presence of a second vessel, T3, crossmg 
from starboard which posed a no immediate threat, having an earlier and negative 
cpa of two miles, but could influence the time at which action was taken". 
"Action was taken at an average 4.8M range from OS2, with limits of 1.8 to 6.3M. 
Only two subjects waited to pass ahead of T3 before taking action to avoid OS2. 
Two altered course to port, including one of those making a late manoeuvre, in 
contravention of Rule 15. Thirteen subjects made substantial alterations of course to 
starboard, the average value being 76°, making their intentions quite clear to all 
other patticipants". 
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COLLISION A VOIDANCE, COLLISION REGULATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY 
Perkirts, C.J. and Redfem, A. 
In: NA V 93, Practical Navigation - The Application of Advanced Systems, Conference 
of the Royal Institute ofNavigation, London, 1993. 
Abstract 
This paper considers the legislative change that would be necessary if an 
mtificially intelligent automatic collision avoidance system were to be implemented. 
The requirement for pre-implementation legislative change is illustrated using 
marine radar as an example. Possible future technologies are discussed. Elements in and 
the nature of the cwTent collision regulations are considered with respect to automatic 
sensor and processor limitations. 
1. Introduction 
The application of artificial intelligence to ship operation is increasingly 
attractive, and work in tllis area is already being carried out. The problem is usually 
tackled as a means of replacing man by machine within the existing legislative 
framework. This paper discusses the legislative changes that would be necessary in 
order to apply aitificial intelligence to automatic collision avoidance. 
Technology and legislation have been introduced in order to reduce the 
likelihood of collision. For the introduction of technology to be of proper benefit it must 
be compatible with the legislative framework. When marine radar was first used it was 
not fully integrated with the collision regulations. This had unfortunate consequences. If 
today or tomonow's advanced systems are to be benefited from, appropriate legislation 
must exist. 
2. A precedent for change 
The application of technology has often taken place \vith inadequate prior 
consideration of operational factors. Though the application may have brought about an 
overall increase in safety and efficiency, the full potential of the new technology is not 
initially realised. In some cases the new technology can be shown to have caused 
accidents wllich would otherwise not have occuned. In the wake of such accidents 
retrospective legislation and training are introduced. The application of radar to marine 
collision avoidance is clearly a case of this kind. 
Marine radar development accelerated during the 1939-45 war. By 1944 most 
combatant vessels including convoy escorts were equipped with surface search radm·. 
Tite primary purpose of the radar was the detection of enemy submarines. Convoy 
escorts were also able to make use of the radar for keeping themselves on station and 
keeping the blacked out convoy in formation[ 1]. 
The convoy escort was required to be within 500 yards of her assigned station in 
the anti-submarine screen. It was often necessary to zigzag, altering course every few 
nlinutes in order to maintain position. Each new course required the solution of a 
relative motion problem, that of intercepting a radar target. It was also necessary to 
intercept column lead ships and stragglers when the-convoy began to lose its formation. 
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The wartime Naval watch officer became skiUed at colJision avoidance/rendezvous 
navigation using radar information. He received radar training and was supported by a 
bridge team of several trained men. 
After the war radar became commerciaUy available and merchant ships began to 
be equipped. The training given to 
merchant marine watchkeepers was initially scanty. If radar plotting was carried out, 
tllis was a task additional to their other duties for which they received no extra suppmt. 
The introduction of radar was a great advance in elinlinating risk of collision. It 
nlight have been considered a panacea, but this was not to be. Collisions still occurred 
involving radar equipped vessels, giving birth to the term "radar assisted collision". 
In the classical case of the radar assisted collision the two vessels were initially 
passing clear. Only after acting on radar information did one or both vessels bring about 
a collision situation. The following statements were both made by Lord Justice Willmer 
during judicial proceedings conceming separate collision cases. " .. ,tllis is an unhappy 
case of a collision between two well-found ships, both equipped \vith every modern aid 
to navigation, including radar. It is a melancholy reflection that the collision would 
probably not have happened if the ships had not been equipped with radar. "[2]. "It was a 
collision which should never have happened at all; and one can quite confidently say 
that it would not have happened if the ships had not been equipped with radar ... "[3]. 
The problem in general was an inadequate appreciation of the relative motion 
problem. Titis was often evident by a scarcity of plotting or no plotting at all. In 
response to the occurrence of this type of collision, various changes in training and 
legislation were made. 
In I 956 B1itain required evidence of competence in radar use before the issue of 
a second mate's certificate [4]. British law requires that "while a ship which is required 
to be fitted with a radar installation is at sea and a radar watch is being kept, the radar 
installation shall be under the control of a qualified radar observer. ... "[5]. A "qualified 
radar observer" has undergone a course which includes plotting; understanding the need 
to plot, and the linlitations of tlte radar installation. 
l11e 1948 revision of the collision regulations did not mention tlte use of radar. 
Subsequent revisions in 1960 and 1972 recognised the influence of radar and included 
recommendations on tlte use of radar information frrst in an armex, and then in the body 
of the rules. 
Radar as a case in point shows that the introduction of new technology changes 
operating procedures for wllich conunensurate Lmining and legislation is required, in 
orderto maintain or increase a level of safety. 
3. Future technology 
Technology that could influence collision avoidance in the future includes 
advanced communications and artificial intelligence. These technologies have the 
potential to revolutionise cunent operations and greatly reduce collision incidents. 
3. I Automatic cooperative communication svstems 
Cooperative communications exist when two parties act to aid a communication. 
It has been considered that the essentials for avoiding collision included 
"communications, either to agree or indicate action"[6]. 
Cooperative communication is promoted in the current regulations. For instance 
Rule 8, Action to avoid collision, prut (b) " Any alteration of course and/or speed to 
avoid collision shall if the circumstances of the case admit, be large enough to be readily 
apparent to another vessel observing visually or by radar ... ". Lights, shapes and sound 
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signals are all used to cooperatively communicate. VHF radio telephone is commonly 
used to aid collision avoidance, 
In the future it is likely that the principle of cooperative communication will be 
strengthened by the adoption of systems which are automatic and have a dedicated 
channel of communication. Vessel Traffic Services (YTS) of the future require 
improved cooperative communications in order to provide a quality traffic image and 
individual ship identification [7,8]. Following the Exon Valdez stranding an Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance system is now mandatory for tankers in Prince William Sound. 
The system can provide the YTS centre with information which includes time, position 
by differential GPS; speed and course over the ground and ship identification [9]. l11e 
sharing of this type of information is of benefit not only to YTS but also independent 
collision avoidance. 
Many parties have repmted on automatic cooperative communication 
systems[ 10,11, 12, 13, 14]. l11ese systems have the potential to exchange almost any 
infmmation between suitably equipped ships. l11e information exchange could provide 
knowledge of target's classification, reinforce data from prinmry radar and ARP A, and 
even target manoeuvring intentions. The application of advanced automatic cooperative 
communications has a great potential influence on the application of artificial 
intelligence in collision avoidance. 
3.2 Artificial intelligence applications 
One definition of artificial intelligence is "the study of the computations that 
make it possible to perceive, reason and act"[ 15]. The abilities to perceive, reason and 
act are all requirements for successfully avoiding collision. It may follow that collision 
avoidance is a suitable application for artificial intelligence. But why should man be 
aided or replaced by machine? 
Collisions between vessels occur resulting in loss of life, environmental damage 
by pollution and a wasting of resources. It is regularly noted that human error is the 
largest factor in mruine accidents[ 16]. If the collision regulations were applied as 
intended then collision would be a rare occurrence. 
Human frailties in terms of collision avoidance include lack of understanding of 
agreed conventions and inadequate judgement particularly during times of stress (due to 
work overload or boredom). The application of an intelligent machine could overcome 
these human frailties. A machine's understanding of conventions can be tested and its 
judgement is not susceptible, as is human judgement, when under stress. Many projects 
have been or are developing some form of attificial intelligence to deal with the 
collision avoidance scenario. 
Most recently projects have been of an expert system knowledge based approach 
[17,18,19]. Expert systems are written to solve problems which can be defmed by a 
particular domain of knowledge. "An expert system uses a compilation of the 
knowledge of one or more expe11 persons and through a computer program, performs 
the decision making as if the expert people were actually performing the task"[20]. 
l11e application of expett systems to collision avoidance can be seen in two 
guises. l11e machine processor can offer advice to the mariner or it can control the 
vessel, automatically implementing collision avoidance manoeuvres. 
3.2.1 Advismy systems 
Most of the expert system applications for collision avoidance have been 
promoted in the fmm of advismy systems. l11e machine will process the input data and 
'vill output some form of useful information. ARPA processes raw radar data and 
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outputs various predicted mathematical relationships between the vessels. The expert 
system may define risk of collision; qualifY encounters according to the collision 
regulations, and then recommend action to avoid collision. 
An advisory system might be considered attractive because it may possibly be 
installed on a vessel without reference to legal constraints. By considering the expert 
system merely an aid to navigation, the responsibility remains with the human navigator. 
Also, by leaving the responsibility with the human navigator, the limitations of 
automatic sensors may be defen·ed. 
The application of an advisory system may be limited due to difficulties 
reconciling human assessment with machine advice when they differ. l11e reconciliation 
is an additional task, and 
possibly a difficult, or even an impossible task for the watchkeeper. Tite expert system 
needs to present the reasoning behind its conclusion in human reasoning tenns. Many 
expert systems that are being developed concem themselves with producing expe11 
human behaviour rather than human reasoning [2I]. 
l11e altemative application of expert systems avoids problems of having two 
"Captains" on the bridge. An automatic collision avoidance system removes the human 
element from the operation. 
3.2.2 Automatic collision avoidance system(ACAS) 
In an ACAS the entire collision avoidance operation is carried out by the 
machine system. The input data is acquired automatically, then processed before 
appropriate control functions are automatically initiated. By definition human input is 
not required in an automatic system. 
An automatic system would provide a major component in an unrnanned b1idge. 
It may be seen as a step towards an unrnanned vessel though it is only a minor 
component in that scenario. A likely initial application of an ACAS is to provide a 
temporarily unrnanned bridge during relatively low key parts of a voyage. 
An ACAS equipped vessel would operate in the same theatre as manually 
operated vessels. The two modes of operation would need to be compatible as would 
any mles or legislation governing that operation. 
4. Legislative change required 
If an automatic collision avoidance system is to be applied then the current 
collision regulations require alteration. The required change is due to limitations of both 
automatic sensor and processor. 
4.I Sensor limitations 
The cunent collision regulations reflect the use of human vision in collision 
avoidance. An automatic system would need to mimic human vision if it were to 
comply with the current regulations. The teclmology that is available at present and in 
the near future, does not and is unlikely to, mimic human vision to a sufficient extent 
[22,23]. l11e teclmology that is likely to be used in place of human vision is p1imruy 
radar and, or some fmm of cooperative communications system. 
4. I. I Primruy radar 
P1imruy radar(radru') is compulsory on merchant vessels greater than 1600 GRT 
[24). It has become a well used tool for the watchkeeper. For collision avoidance it is 
used alongside a visual lookout, and in cases of resuicted visibility it is often the only 
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reliable tool. Under the present regime radar compares poorly with hwnan vision in 3 
instances: 
(i) it does not detect all the targets that hwnan vision can; 
(ii) it does not distinguish between vessels by class (as required by Rule 18 
Responsibilities between vessels); 
(iii) and it does not distinguish between vessels in sight of one another or not in 
sight of one another. 
Nb. Processed radar data can provide target aspect however this is historic information. 
Visually observed target aspect is instantaneous information. The difference between 
the two methods of acquiring target aspect will influence the collision avoidance 
operation in some circumstances. 
4.1.1.1 Target non-detection 
Radar may detect a target when the radar transrrusswn response which is 
reflected from the target is greater than the background noise. Target response depends 
on among other factors target material and size. In general a stronger response is 
obtained from larger metallic vessels rather than smaller wooden or plastic vessels. 
Typical of poor radar targets are some fishing boats and some yachts. Background noise 
depends on among other factors, sea state in close proximity to the vessel and 
precipitation including rain, hail and snow anywhere within the detection range. Despite 
the use of various radar system adjustments and modem filtering techniques non-
detection remains possible. 
While there is a possibility of non-detection the concept of "single 
responsibility" used in the present regulations may be inapprop1iate. In many cases the 
current collision regulations assign responsibility to one vessel to keep out of the way of 
the other. The former is termed the "give-way vessel" and the latter the "stand-on 
vessel". The stand-on vessel is initially required to "keep her course and speed" while 
the give-way vessel has a largely free choice of manoeuvres with which to keep clear. lf 
it becomes apparent that the give-way vessel is not taking appropriate action in 
compliance with the mles then the stand-on vessel may manoeuvre. If this stage is 
reached then the regulations have "failed" in the first instance and a dangerous situation 
exists due to the unpredictability of the give-way vessel. This stage is always reached 
when the stand-on vessel is not detected by the give-way vessel. 
A system of mles which safely assigns responsibility to both vessels( dual 
responsibility) is needed when non-detection is possible. 
4.1.1.2 Responsibility by class 
There is some benefit if the vessel in the best position to manoeuvre is able to 
take the initiative [25]. Vessel manoeuvrability is clearly a factor in collision avoidance. 
In an attempt to make use of the manoeuvrability concept the collision regulations 
divide vessels into discrete hierarchical classes. Rule 18, Responsibilities between 
vessels, requires that under pruticular circumstances a power dJiven vessel should keep 
out of the way of a vessel not under command; a vessel restlicted in her ability to 
manoeuvre: a vessel engaged in fishing, and a sailing vessel. The shapes and light 
configurations which indicate vessel status are designed for conswnption by hwnan 
vision, but are of no use for radar observation. Unless vessel classification could be 
communicated in a satisfactmy way then vessels could not always be given this type of 
p1ivilege. 
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4.1.1.3 Action according to visibility state 
When vessels are in sight of one another in most instances the current rules 
prescribe responsibility for keeping out of the way to one vessel only. When vessels are 
not in sight of one another in an area of restricted visibility, both are required to 
manoeuvre. Tite concept of a vessel being in sight or not is easily dealt with when using 
human vision. Radar however carmot mimic the human faculty of sight. 
4.1.2 Cooperative communications 
The future use of cooperative communications as previously desc1ibed could 
compensate for some of the limitations of radar. Radar non-detection could be 
compensated by transponder technology emitting vessel position. Transponder 
tecluiology also allows responsibility by class. The concept of a vessel being in or not in 
sight is not provided by automatic cooperative communications. 
4.2 Processor limitations 
4.2.1 The ordinacy practice of seamen 
To comply with the collision regulations it is necessary to adopt the ordinary 
practice of seamen. "Nothing in these Rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner, 
master or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to comply with these 
Rules or of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinruy 
practice of seamen, or the special circumstances of the case"[26]. 
Tite marine collision regulations as written do not explicitly indicate how the 
navigator should behave. The exact science of collision avoidance only begins to be 
explained when a collision incident is dissected during judicial proceedings. Tite 
regulations are limited to the following: 
the regulations indicate some of the factors that should be considered for vessel 
navigation and collision avoidance; 
in some instances they assign responsibility to one vessel for keeping out of the 
way of the other, and in one instance they describe the sense of course alteration for 
both vessels; 
in some instances they proscribe some manoeuvres. 
The regulations themselves do not entail a complete rule-base. Titey lack vanous 
instructions which include: 
the sense of course alteration in many cases; 
the extent of course or speed alteration; 
the timing of course or speed alteration. 
In law and in the regulations the missing parts of the rule-base are described as 
the "ordinary practice of seamen". The ordinary practice of seamen is only described 
exactly when a pru1icular incident is under judicial scrutiny. Masses of case law exists 
which desc1ibes the ordinary practice of seamen for specific incidents. The ordinary 
practice of seamen can only be described for specific cases because it depends on the 
specific or special circumstances of tlte case. 
TI1e operational complexity of collision avoidance and infmite number of 
possible encounter situations makes a general and a total defmition of tl1e ordinary 
practice of seamen difficult to construct. l11e difficulty in defining this aspect of 
collision avoidance on-line is likely to be a problem for an artificially intelligent system. 
When it is possible to construct an artificially intelligent system which is 
faultless with respect to the regulations and judicial procedure, it will also be possible to 
use that system as the oracle in judgement of collision cases. This may or may not be 
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practical. There are no human systems which are faultless with respect to the regulations 
and judicial procedure (though fault is only noted in the case of a collision). It is likely 
that it is impossible to make a machine that is theoretically faultless under the present 
re gun e. 
4.2.2 The nature of rules 
" ... accepting a regime of rules necessitates tolerating some number of wrong 
results - results otl1er than those that would have been reached by the direct and correct 
application of the substantive justifications undergirding the rule. "[27]. 
The preceding statement indicates that rules are general and can only be applied 
in a useful way when tl1e circumstances of the case match the rule. The regulations 
themselves recognise that their application to specific cases, may not always serve to aid 
the safety of vessels. A departure from the rules is allowed, indeed required when 
necessary to avoid immediate danger. 
"In construing and complying with these Rules due regard will be had to all 
dangers of navigation and collision and to any special circumstances, including the 
limitations of the vessels involved, which may make a departure from these Rules 
necessary to avoid immediate danger"[28]. 
Any collision avoidance system (rutificially intelligent or otllerwise) must not 
only encompass circumstances which fall \vitllin the ordinary rules, but it must also 
encompass all oilier situations. The system must obey the regulations and avoid 
collision. 
5. Conclusion 
If the potential benefits of applying artificial intelligence to marine collision 
avoidance are to be realised, tllen legislative change must occur. In the past technology 
has been applied for collision avoidance witllout necessary prior consideration of 
operational factors. This resulted in patticular collision incidents and general unsafe 
practice. The problem was remedied by post-implementation legislation and training. It 
is clear that the application of an automatic collision avoidance system could not legally 
occur witllout pre-implementation legislative change. 
The legislative change relates to the automatic sensors that may be used and tile 
nature of tile automatic processor. Sensor limitations bring into question the concepts of 
single responsibility; responsibility by class, and a vessel being in or not in sight. l11e 
nature of the automatic processor challenges tile role of the collision regulations in the 
judicial system. 
At the Institute of Marine Studies, University of Plymouth, research is being 
conducted concerned with the legislative change that would be necessary to implement 
an automatic collision avoidance system. 
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Appendix G 
Reguirements for coordination and the application of an automatic collision 
avoidance system 
Chris Perkins and Tony Redfern 
Journal of the Institute of Navigation, May, 1996. 
ABSTRACT 
This paper is concerned with the legislative change which would have to take place if 
an automatic collision avoidance system were to be implemented. 
TI1e principle of complementary action, and the role of coordination in 
achieving that action is considered. Current collision avoidance practice is discussed, 
noting the coordination attributes of the International Regulations for the Prevention of 
Collision at Sea, and the responsibility placed on the mariner by the regulations. The 
processing element of an automatic collision avoidance system is considered in the 
light of current judicial practice. 
The paper concludes that the implementation of an automatic collision 
avoidance system is incompatible with the current collision regulations and the 
supporting judiciary. It is suggested that successful implementation will require the 
recognition of a discrete rule base. 
1. INTRODUCTION. In the light of statistics which indicate that human error plays a 
part in the majority of marine accidents1, it is not surprising that automation of ship 
board operations is increasingly attractive. Collisions between vessels at sea continue 
to occur despite considerable advances in navigation aids atid several waves of 
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legislation. llte consequences of collision, loss of life and resource, and resultant 
pollution, have encouraged many parties to work towards a solution to the problem. 
Most recently work has focused on the partial or full automation of the collision 
avoidance operation. 
The work of computer programmers and engineers has considered the problem 
as one of replacing man by machine within the existing legislative framework2·3•4 • 
lltis paper results from research which considers legislative changes, which would 
have to take place, if a fully automatic collision avoidance system were to be 
implemented. 
The fact that legislative change is related to both the automatic system's 
sensors and processors has already been described5 . This paper concentrates on the 
relationship between the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collision at 
Sea (COLREGS)6 and the supporting judicial system, with the nature ofthe automatic 
processor. llte first consideration is the need for complementary action between 
vessels and the role of coordination in achieving that action. The current operational 
scenario will then be discussed, indicating the merits of the COLREGS for 
coordination, and the responsibility placed on the human mariner by the COLREGS. 
lihe automatic system will be examined in the light of current operation. 
2. COMPLEMENTARY ACTION. In general manne practice it is desirable for 
action to avoid collision to be complementary. Calvert 7 noted that an essential 
collision avoidance principle is to maintain or establish sight-line rotation, For net 
sight-line rotation both vessels actions must be considered. By avoiding 
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uncomplementary action, net sight-line rotation will occur with minimum effort, 
hence disturbing traffic ilow least, and resultant gains in safety and efficiency. 
Sight-line rotation may be anti-clockwise(positive) or clockwise (negative). 
Three complementary action strategies exist which will achieve net sightline rotation. 
In a particular encounter both vessels may adopt a convention of positive rotation; 
both vessels may adopt a convention of negative rotation, or one vessel will stand-on 
while the other is responsible for making the manoeuvre, and choosing the sightline 
rotation sense. It is clear that some form of agreement is necessary in order to apply 
the strategies. 
Without a form of agreement what would be the nature of :behaviour at sea? 
From his experimental evidence Kemp8 has suggested that three main principles 
would apply: 
"(a) Manoeuvres would be made to pass astern of the vessel being avoided. 
(b) Manoeuvres would tend to increase whatever miss distance is originally 
estimated. 
(c) There would be a reluctance to reduce speed." 
None of these principles involves any coordination between the vessels. Only one 
vessel can pass astern of the other. Passing astern may be in contlict with the principle 
of increasing the existing closest point of approach (cpa). 
If both vessels took action totally independently of each other, cancelling action 
would occur for 50% of the encounters. If a vessel can observe the action of the other 
then she can make her manoeuvre complementary with the action of the vessel which 
manoeuvres tirst. However, it is not always possible for a vessel to observe the 
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actions of the other, and it is not satisfactory for a vessel to be waiting indefinitely for 
the other to showher intentions. A form of coordination is required. 
3. COORDINATED ACTION. To achieve coordination a mutual perception of three 
elements in the encounter is needed. Each vessel must mutually perceive: the risk of 
collision; the strategy to be applied, and when manoeuvres arc to be made. Unless 
these criteria are met then the target may appear as a rogue vessel and coordination 
may not ensue. 
Cannel9 has suggested that a solution to a coordination problem maybe found 
in three ways: 
"(i) Agreement, specific agreement in an individual case. 
(ii) 1'acit agreement in a series of similar situations. 
(iii) By the obvious salience of a particular solution." 
Specific agreement in a particular case may only be reached if there is a suitable 
communication channel available. Vhf radio tclephone(Rn sometimes provides a 
suitable link but does not constitute a general solution. It is noted that technology 
currently under discussion10 may provide an opportunity for a general solution in the 
future. 
A particularly salient feature in an encounter may provide a means of 
coordination. An initial cpa may suggest manoeuvres to increase the existing sightline 
rotation. Unfortunately most features are open to misperception. Truly salient features 
arc not prevalent enough to offer a general solution. 
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Tacit agreement exists in the form of rules and conventions. The COLREGS 
are the rules and conventions which entail the tacit agreement for the collision 
avoidance scenario. 
4. CURRENT PRACTICE. Lack of coordination. Tiw mariner has a tacit agreement 
with other mariners that in the event of an encounter at sea, complementary action 
will be achieved through the COLREGS. An inspection of the COLREGS indicates 
that of the three coordination requirements, only strategy is covered. While 
recognising the importance of achieving a mutual perception of risk and when to make 
manoeuvres, the regulations do not provide a means of achieving this. TI1e mariner 
must some how deal with these points if coordination is to be achieved. 
Simulator studies 11 ·12•13 , questionnaires 14 , traffic studies15 and incident reporting 
schemes16 , all indicate that mariners' perceptions of risk of collision, vary with the 
circumstances of the case and through the watchkeeping population. In the absence of 
a tacit agreement, mutual perception of risk of collision can only be achieved, if a 
communications channel for specific agreement exists. Vhf RT sometimes provides 
that means. Without a means to ensure a mutual perception of risk of collision, 
passing distances are exaggerated (when sea room allows) to compensate for the 
otherwise inevitable uncertainty. 
Simulator studies also indicate that the point at which manners will 
manoeuvre, vanes throughout the watchkeeping population and with the 
circumstances of the case. Without a means of ensuring mutual perception of the 
situation, a vessel which is yet to manoeuvre, may be considered as a rogue. The 
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watchkeeper IS required to make manoeuvres "early" in order to overcome this 
problem. 
17re mariner and the law. In law, the "missing parts" of the collision 
regulations are given quantification when cases of collision come to court. Inspection 
of case law will show what is an acceptable passing distance, for risk of collision not 
to exist, in a particular set of circumstances. The distance will vary depending on the 
circumstances, but it will not vary depending on the particular mariner being tried. 
There are absolute values for risk of collision and by these the mariner will be judged. 
The same argument applies to the point at which manoeuvres are to be made. 
In not quantifying many aspects of the collision avoidance operation the 
COLREGS avoid becoming infinitely complex. The possibility of creating rules which 
account for all possible circumstantial variables can only be considered alongside the 
concept of a supreme being. In court, the effect of circumstantial variables are 
considered retrospectively to one particular collision. The deliberation is carried out 
by several men with advisors, over a period of hours or days. At sea, to comply with 
the law, the individual mariner must make a correct judgement as to the effect of the 
circumstantial variables, on-line, over a period of minutes. 
An absolute rule system. ll1e generality of rules has caused Schauer17 to note 
that " ... accepting a regime of rules necessitates tolerating some number of wrong 
results - results other than those which would have been reached by the direct and 
correct application of the substantive justifications undergirding the rule". The current 
regulations imply this limitation of rules and yet will not accept a number of wrong 
results. 
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Rule 2(a) states that "Nothing in these rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the 
owner, master or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to comply with 
these Rules or of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary 
practice of seamen, or by the circumstances of the case" 18 . 
Rule 2(b) states that "In construing and complying with these Rules due regard 
shall be had to dangers of navigation and collision and to any special circumstances, 
including the limitations of the vessels involved, which may make a departure from 
these Rules necessary to avoid immediate danger" 19 . 
Rule 2 makes it clear that the mariner is required to know when the general 
rules are going to give Schauer's wrong result, and act upon that in order to avoid 
collision. l11e mariner is also required to find a solution to the collision avoidance 
problem in all "special circumstances". The regulations appear not to give the mariner 
any reprieve in the event of collision. 
l11is concept of guilt, regardless of circumstances, presents a high level of 
personal accountability, and is laudable in that it probably promotes a high level of 
.personal responsibility. However, this approach has been criticised for inhibiting the 
use of regulations to truly aid the mariner. l11e regulations have been described as 
being drawn up to suit the purposes of lawyers rather than mariners, distinguishing 
responsibility for collision rather than maximising operational guidance. 
l11e COLREGS are worded and constructed such that in the event of a 
collision the mariner can be found at fault. Human error or incompetence is the 
apparent reason for the collision. The mariner may be demoted or removed from the 
watchkeeping population altogether. This system of justice may need review if an 
automatic collision avoidance system is to be implemented. 
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5. APPLYING AN AUTOMATIC SYSTEM. Technical work in the field of 
automatic collision avoidance is already being carried out. The attractions of the 
concept of an automatic collision avoidance system range from a reduced manual 
work load to the absence of human error. 
A machine which will diligently follmv its pre-programmed instructions may 
be tested prior to implementation. The substance of the computer program may be 
inspected, and the machine itself might be tested for at least the number of encounters 
which a human mariner would have during a life time at sea. Given success in the 
tests, the machine will be deemed competent and issued with the appropriate 
certificate. llie machine's competence will remain constant throughout its life time. 
The human watchkeeper is also tested for competence. This usually entails a 
few hours of verbal questions on the application of the collision regulations. Given 
success in this examination the human is deemed competent and issued with a 
certificate. Human competence is likely to vary throughout a lifetime, however the 
certificate is likely to remain valid to retirement unless a collision occurs. 
Despite being tested to a level of undoubted satisfaction, the machine will not 
be able to account for all the circumstantial variables which are implied by the 
COLREGS. The machine's program may be massive but is finite. Action initiated by 
the machine, is limited in useful application, by the finite scope of the program. 
Learning. The human may also be limited by the scope of his knowledge. The 
city dweller transported to the jungle may find most of his knowledge and skills 
useless in the new environment. Humans do however have an ability to learn. It 
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appears that the human mariner is expected to deal with extraordinary and complex 
circumstances by some learning process. 
Some computing techniques exhibit a learning facility. This concept may offer 
many advantages in automatic system development. The on-line use of such a system 
could produce the best or the worst aspects of human processing. Such technology 
would add a further dimension to the issue of responsibility and liability. 
A discrete rule base. Leaving aside the concept of a learning computer, it is 
apparent that the machine of limited program is not compatible with the nature of the 
COLREGS. To use a machine with a strictly limited rule base in the face of the 
absolute rule system of the COLREGS would risk a collision which could not be 
defended in law. Knowingly operating with a machine which could not comply with 
the law in circumstances which may be encountered, would be to court criminal 
liability. For the automatic system to be properly used, the COLREGS and supporting 
judiciary would need to legitimise the machine's limitations. This would require a 
discrete rule base. 
1l1e discrete rule base will form the basis of the machine's program, and will be that 
which the machine is tested against. For testing, the rule base will have quantification 
of many aspects of the collision avoidance operation. This must include some form of 
quantification of risk of collision and when manoeuvres arc expected to be made. It 
appears that the ingredients for coordination might be provided through legislation in 
a discrete rule base. 1l1e human application of such a rule base is the subject of 
experimental research at the University of Plymouth. 
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6. CONCLUSION. The COLREGS do not in themselves provide a framework which 
will allow two vessels to coordinate action. The wording and construction of the 
COLREGS implies that the human mariner is responsible for avoiding collision in all 
circumstances. An automatic collision avoidance system could not be constructed to 
take account of all circumstances. Therefore the implementation of an automatic 
collision avoidance system is not compatible with the current collision regulations and 
the supporting judicial system. 
It is necessary to recognise that it is impossible for a collision avoidance 
system, manual or automatic, to be wholly compatible with an absolute rule system. It 
is not appropriate therefore, to simply make the vessels involved in a collision 
responsible, when judged by an absolute rule system. The implementation of an 
automatic system can only be possible when the fundamental limitations of the system 
arc recognised by the judicial process, and an appropriate form of responsibility and 
liability is adopted. 
It is suggested that appropriate responsibility will be judged against a discrete 
rule base. When circumstances arise outside the remit of the rule base then liability 
could not fairly be criminal. Civil liability might remain with those traditionally held 
responsible, but this may not necessarily be the best solution. 
In formulating a discrete rule base which is suitable for testing an automatic 
system against, it will be necessary to quantify certain collision avoidance parameters. 
In doing so there may be a opportunity to move towards regulations which allow the 
mutual perception between vessels which is necessary for coordination. Experiments 
using a navigation simulator are being carried out at the University of Plymouth to 
investigate this possibility. 
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